PUTIN VISIT TO TURKEY SEPTEMBER 2-3

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004887

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2014
TAGS: PREL ENRG TU RS
SUBJECT: PUTIN VISIT TO TURKEY SEPTEMBER 2-3

REF: 02 ANKARA 2914

(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 11.


2. (C) Summary: The highest-level Russian visitor to Turkey
since Podgorny in 1972, Putin will arrive amid steadily
increasing bilateral economic ties -- particularly in Russian
energy sales and interest in energy-sector investments and
arms sales and one million Russian tourists in 2004 -- and a
lively debate in Turkey about whether increased alignment
with Russia represents a strategic alternative for Turkey.
Embassy requests talking points about the visit to share with
the GOT by August 31. End Summary.


3. (C) Putin's visit will take place in the context of three
important trends in Turkish/Russian relations. First, Russia
is steadily increasing its presence in Turkey's energy
sector, both through exports of Russian gas to Turkey (Russia
supplies over 60 % of Turkey's gas) and through increased
transshipment of Russian crude through the Bosphorus and
Dardanelles. The GOT is increasingly concerned about growing
tanker traffic from the Black Sea traversing the Straits.
Our contacts have acknowledged strong Russian pressure in
favor of a trans-Thrace bypass pipeline backed by the Russian
pipeline company Transneft (Note: the Russian-backed project
competes with the trans-Thrace project of Trace Development
Company in which there is U.S. commercial involvement. End
note).


4. (C) Moreover, we have seen keen Russian interest here in
buying Turkish energy infrastructure. For example, Russian
Transneft heads a consortium which won the privatization
tender for the TUPRAS refinery in Izmit, Turkey's largest;
the privatization is tied up in the courts and one contact
has told us the GOT is considering re-awarding the sale to a
Saudi-U.S. consortium. There are persistent reports of
Russian interest in Turkish natural gas networks and Ali Sen,
an unsavory Turkish businessman with long-standing deep ties
to Russia, heads a company which has just bought natural gas
distribution rights in Izmir. Gazprom General Director Yuri
Kamarov visited Ankara August 24.


5. (C) Second, Russian/Turkish commercial links are
increasing broadly through Turkish exports of goods and
services (principally in construction) and Turkish imports of
Russian raw materials. The Russians are also interested in
increasing arms sales to Turkey and have been pressing a
Russian-Israeli attack helicopter.


6. (C) Third, over the last two and a half years there has
been a lively debate in Turkey about the "Eurasia" (read:
Russia) concept as an alternative for Turkey's general U.S.
and EU strategic direction (ref). This is an emotional
rather than an analytical fashion. Contacts enamored of the
"Eurasia" concept either remain unaware of the strongly
Russocentric and anti-Turkish nature of Alexander Dugin's
thesis or scramble to assert that Dugin's recent rewrite of
his book's preface, in which he makes a gesture toward
Turkey, is sufficient evidence that there is a place for
Turkey in the concept. As "Sabah" Ankara bureau chief Asli
Aydintasbas commented in the daily's Aug. 26 edition, Putin
comes in an atmosphere of unprecedented positive feeling
toward Russia, with not one discernible negative comment
about Putin in the Turkish press in the runup to his visit.


7. (S) In this context we have noticed a sea change in
strategy by the Russian Embassy in Ankara, which is now using
several fluent Turkish-speaking officers to cultivate a wider
circle of contacts outside the traditional elites and leftist
intelligentsia. Good contacts have been steadily reporting
to us that the Russian Embassy is making a concerted push to
develop close relations with Turkey's religious brotherhoods
and lodges and has been offering trips to Moscow and research
opportunities in Russian institutes to a broader circle of
political think tanks and consultants.


8. (S) The approach is not subtle. Huseyin Kocabiyik, a
prominent center-right political consultant/analyst and
long-standing contact of ours, told us Aug. 24 that, while he
and ruling AK Party MP Mahmut Kocak were recently in Baku, a
Russian deputy foreign minister openly pitched to them the
idea of Turkey's reorientation from the U.S./EU to a
"Eurasia" partnership with Russia. Similarly, Sergey
Makarov, one of the most active Russian Embassy officers in
Ankara, queried another long-standing contact of ours with
strong Islamic credentials whether it would be productive for
Putin to bring a proposal for bilateral political cooperation
far beyond the Joint Eurasia Action Plan that the two
countries signed on the margins of the 2001 UNGA.


9. (C) We expect Putin will press the Turks on energy deals
and other commercial ties and be keen to show that Russia and
Turkey share a common strategy in the Caucasus, central Asia,
and broader Middle East; the Russians have been keen to join
the OIC and, given Turkey's status as ministerial-level
chairman in office, may press for more than observer status.
The Turks would like to see a definitive Russian break with
the PKK. The two sides are likely to press each other for
further anti-terrorism commitments, with the Russians
focusing on what they perceive as Turkish tolerance for the
Chechen movement and the Turks trying to end residual Russian
support for, or tolerance of, PKK activities through Russia.


10. (C) Defense Minister Ivanov arrives Sept. 1 and the
Russians may leave the discussion of arms sales at that
level. Although the Turkish military has heretofore shown
almost no interest in acquiring Russian arms, Turkey's
civilian procurement agency has demonstrated willingness from
time to time to put politics above other considerations when
awarding arms contracts.


11. (C) Action Request: We request that the Department
provide us background and talking points for the visit that
we can share with the Turks by August 31. We would
particularly appreciate talking points to encourage the Turks
to talk from the same position the U.S. has on Georgia
(including S. Ossetia, Abkhazia),Iran (especially nukes),
Central Asia, Afghanistan, BMENA, Iraq, and energy issues
(including Bosphorus bypass routes, tanker transit through
the Straits, BTC).
EDELMAN