Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ANKARA4733
2004-08-20 12:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

PM ERDOGAN VISITS GEORGIA

Tags:  PREL EPET TU GG RS 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004733 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2014
TAGS: PREL EPET TU GG RS
SUBJECT: PM ERDOGAN VISITS GEORGIA

REF: ANKARA 2948

(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter;
reasons E.O. 12958, 1.4 (b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004733

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2014
TAGS: PREL EPET TU GG RS
SUBJECT: PM ERDOGAN VISITS GEORGIA

REF: ANKARA 2948

(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter;
reasons E.O. 12958, 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: According to preliminary readout, Erdogan
brought Saakashvili and Zhvania a message of "Turkish support
for the GOG" in South Ossetia and Abkhazia but urged
restraint, dialogue and, in Abkhazia, easing the CIS
economic embargo. In response to Erdogan's emphasis on the
importance to Turkey of BTC, Saakashvili promised smooth
completion. Although both sides focused on improving
economic ties, the visit appeared to produce few concrete
results. End summary.


2. (C) In temporary absence of prime ministerial foreign
policy advisor Davutoglu, who accompanied Erdogan, we provide
following preliminary readout of Erdogan visit; further
readout upon Davutoglu's return.


3. (C) MFA DDG for Caucasus Tezgor, who did not accompany
Erdogan, characterized the visit as successful since both
President Saakashvili and PM Zhvania received PM Erdogan and
participated in the visit's main events. Tezgor asserted
there was "good chemistry" between Saakashvili and Erdogan.

South Ossetia
--------------


4. (C) Tezgor claimed that Erdogan gave Saakashvili a strong
double-edged message on South Ossetia (Tezgor drafted the
talking points) in their one-on-one meeting: Turkey supports
Georgia's territorial integrity and independence, but urges
restraint and dialogue, including with Russia. According to
Tezgor, Erdogan's readout to his advisors was that
Saakashvili understood the message and was receptive.


5. (C) Tezgor tried to depict the visit as a healthy signal
to Russia of Turkish support for the Georgian government. He
added that because of its proximity to Russia, the Turks view
South Ossetia as requiring a different approach than that
used by Saakashvili to end the Ajara crisis. However, two
days before the visit, Georgian Charge Tabatadze regretted to
us that that the Turks have shown no real policy or specific
proposals on South Ossetia. Admitting that Erdogan offered
the Georgians no specific proposals during the visit, Tezgor
off-handedly averred, "They have to tend their own garden."

Abkhazia
--------------


6. (C) On Abkhazia Erdogan reiterated Turkish support for the

GOG, encouraged the GOG to communicate better with Turkey's
ethnically-Abkhaz community, and urged the GOG to support
easing the CIS embargo on Abkhazia Tezgor claimed. As in
past conversations with us, Tezgor argued that easing the
embargo will improve Saakashvili's image in the region,
decrease Russian influence, promote better import control,
and foster reconciliation. Tezgor asserted further that the
embargo gives Russia a strong economic hand and has had no
effect on the Abkhazian political situation since it was
imposed. In contrast, Georgian Charge Tabatadze predicted
that easing the embargo will be perceived as a sign of GOG
weakness and will encourage more separatism.


7. (C) The Turks stand to benefit from easing the embargo,
Tezgor acknowledged. Turkish MFA claims that Turkey's
sizable ethnically-Abkhaz community (Tezgor and his deputy
put the number at 450,000) criticizes the GOT position as too
pro-Georgian and continues to pressure the MFA for change.
Turkey also wants a piece of Abkhazia's economic pie.

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
--------------


8. (C) Erdogan reportedly emphasized BTC's importance to
Turkey and the necessity of finishing work on time and
without interruption; Tezgor said he worded the PM's talking
points "in line with U.S. policy." Saakashvili promised BTC
completion will go smoothly, Tezgor added.

Turkish Investment in Georgia: Visit Fulfills Low
Expectations
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Erdogan took more than 100 businessmen with him.
According to Georgian Charge Tabatadze, the GOG used the
visit to focus on getting more Turkish investment. Erdogan
publicly told the press that Turkey aims to increase
bilateral trade from 2003's USD 426 million to USD one
billion. However, Tabatadze expected the visit to produce
few results, and he appears to have been right.


10. (C) Tezgor conceded the visit produced no concrete
economic results. Plans for Turkish renovation of the Batumi
airport are at the feasibility study stage, including on the
sticky issue of financing. The Turks have been pressing
Georgia for a double taxation agreement as an incentive for
Turkish investors and unsuccessfully tried to convince
Saakashvili during his May visit (reftel). Although Erdogan
publicly stressed the importance of a double taxation
agreement during this visit, no agreement was reached.
Tezgor said the visit was too spur-of-the-moment for this
type of deliverable; he predicted a double taxation agreement
by the end of the year.


11. (C) Erdogan and Saakashvili visited the Turkey/Georgia
border crossing at Sarp; Erdogan instructed the Turkish side
to work with greater efficiency (reciprocating a similar call
on the Georgian side by Saakashvili during his May visit to
Turkey).

12. (C) Comment: Tezgor has consistently intimated to us in
the past that the MFA sees Russia as having a more coherent
Caucasus policy than the U.S. Russian Ambassador Stegny
called on Erdogan just before the trip. Foreign policy
advisor Davutoglu continues to promote his "strategic depth"
concept (Turkey should develop close ties with Russia, Iran,
other neighbors, and the Muslim world as a counterweight to
U.S. influence). We will measure how much these factors
influenced Erdogan's approach when we call on Davutoglu.
EDELMAN