TURCO-ISRAELI RELATIONS REMAIN ACTIVE BUT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003988

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS TU IS
SUBJECT: TURCO-ISRAELI RELATIONS REMAIN ACTIVE BUT
UNDERGOING RECALIBRATION

(U) Classified by CDA Robert Deutsch; reasons: 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: July 13-15 visit to Turkey of Israeli Deputy
PM Olmert demonstrated that Turco-Israeli relations have
broadened beyond the mil-mil/intel ties that have hitherto
formed the core of the relationship. In the Israeli view the
visit cast in sharp relief the rivalry (which we have
previously reported) between Turkish PM Erdogan and FonMin
Gul, with the latter openly deprecating his boss to Olmert.
At the same time the visit underscored that Israel needs to
broaden its support in Turkey beyond the narrow slice of the
Turkish elite and adapt to the new Turkish political dynamic.
End summary.


2. (C) In contrast to Turkish press reports which played up
PM Erdogan's refusal to meet Olmert, the visit was a success
according to MFA, ruling AK Party (AKP),and Israeli Embassy
contacts. Our interlocutors, including MFA DDG for Middle
East Gokturk, AKP deputy chairman for foreign policy Disli,
and Israeli Ambassador Avivi, all asserted that relations
will continue to be active. Erdogan did not receive Olmert
partly because of the manner in which Olmert demanded a
meeting ("We request a meeting with PM Erdogan at x hour on x
date"),partly for domestic political reasons. Nevertheless,
Olmert had a series of highest-level meetings --
characterized as warm and constructive by all our
interlocutors -- with President Sezer, FonMin Gul (including
a very cordial dinner hosted by Gul),and various ministers.


3. (S) As we understand it, intel and military cooperation in
specific areas has never stopped, although we have heard from
one contact with long-standing connections to military intel
and the national intel organization (MIT) that Turkish intel
services are increasingly irritated by Israeli pushiness.


4. (C) MFA and Israeli interlocutors told us commercial
relations have room to grow, despite recent progress on what
they characterize as mutually beneficial business agreements.
We continue to hear from others, however, that the Turks are
irritated by what they see as Israeli foot-dragging on
agreeing to purchase water from the Manavgat river in
southern Turkey, foot-dragging they interpret as part of
Israel's policy of keeping Turkey dangling. Agriculture and
irrigation joint venture projects in the GAP region of
southeastern Turkey also have potential to grow but, judging
by Olmert's public statements, there appears to be mutual
distrust regarding faithfulness to contracts and commitments.


5. (C) Avivi said he was struck by what he noted were
uncharacteristically warm receptions from Sezer and Gul and
unexpected, deprecating remarks from Gul about Erdogan;
evidence he asserted further highlighted fissures in AKP.
Avivi told us "Israel has a great problem with Erdogan" and
the pendulum effect Erdogan's public statements are having on
the Turkish population at large. According to Avivi, Gul
told Olmert 1) 'Erdogan is not like me, he's a simple person
with no diplomatic training'; 2) Erdogan's recent statements
about Israel are not constructive; and 3) 'Erdogan is going
to damage our relationship'. Avivi further asserted that
"Israel will not be a shock absorber for everything Erdogan
wants to say". Avivi believes Turks noticed Israeli
reactions, especially a decrease in tourism, the El-Al
stoppage and took a lesson on the limits of criticism from
that.


6. (C) In contrast, Middle East Department DDG Gokturk
retreated to standard MFA talking points: 1) Erdogan's
comments should not be taken out of context, particularly
because GOT actions toward Israel have been positive; 2)
present and future relations between Turkey and Israel are in
line with historic friendly relations with Israel; and 3) the
GOT is aggressively searching for an important role in the
Middle East peace process. Despite what Gokturk
characterized as an "age-old friendship" between Turkey and
Jews, he noted as hindrances to the relationship 1) Turkish
concerns about reports that Israelis are operating in
Northern Iraq and could support an independent Kurdish state
and 2) public sympathy for the plight of Palestinians.
Gokturk also highlighted the potential for Turkey to play a
facilitating role in a Syria-Israel track as an attraction
creating additional support for the relationship. Avivi
indicated that Israel is interested in the Turk's in an
information role, but he said they had not agreed to their
efforts to act as a facilitator.


7. (C) The visit also illustrated that political relations
will continue but be more complex for several reasons:

--Israel has taken its relations for granted and has not
understood the deep changes in Turkish society. In this
regard, Israel has built its relations through (a) Jews in
Istanbul; (b) Turks from the elite; (c) the Turkish General
Staff; (d) high bureaucrats.

--Turks across the board favor the underdog and in this case
they are deeply sympathetic to the Palestinians. Turks from
all sectors and political persuasions have been repeatedly
shocked by the current GOI's actions, even while they ignore
the similar methods Ankara used against the PKK/Kurds in the
1990's.

--Whatever is happening in northern Iraq regarding Israeli
presence or influence, and however questionable Turkish intel
sources may be, neither the TGS, nor the GOT, nor the man in
the street believes GOI denials that Israel is training
peshmergas or organizing a wholesale buy-up of land.


8. (C) Comment: Turkish Israeli relations have a continuing
basis of mutual interest in business, military and
intelligence communities, but those support elements are
weakening. It remains to be seen how far they will recede
and whether a basis can be established with the emerging
power elements in AKP. Developments in the region beyond
Turkish-Israeli issues likely will have a significant impact.
DEUTSCH