Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ANKARA3511
2004-06-22 10:55:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TGS CONCERNS ABOUT KIRKUK, PKK AND AFGHANISTAN

Tags:  PREL PTER MARR TU IZ AF 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003511 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2014
TAGS: PREL PTER MARR TU IZ AF
SUBJECT: TGS CONCERNS ABOUT KIRKUK, PKK AND AFGHANISTAN

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman: Reasons: 1.4
(b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003511

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2014
TAGS: PREL PTER MARR TU IZ AF
SUBJECT: TGS CONCERNS ABOUT KIRKUK, PKK AND AFGHANISTAN

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman: Reasons: 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (S) Ambassador met with DCHOD Ilker Basbug at latter,s
request on June 21 for a tour d'horizon of current issues in
the lead in to the President's visit to Ankara and the NATO
Istanbul Summit. Basbug clearly wanted to make several
points related to Iraq and U.S. Turkish relations.

KIRKUK
--------------


2. (S) Basbug noted that the Turks are concerned about
developments around Kirkuk as the June 30 transfer of
sovereignty approaches. They have received numerous reports
from both open source and intelligence that Kurds are
planning activities to change the ethnic composition and
balances of the city. For Turkey, he said, this is a major
issue that affects Turkish national interest. He noted that
Foreign Minister Gul had made a public statement (following a
meeting with the Iraqi Turkoman Front leader) outlining
Turkish concerns earlier in the day. Kurdish ambitions are
to take over Kirkuk. If they succeed it will be the first
step in creation of an independent Kurdish state. Turkey
cannot merely watch such a situation develop. Kurdish
groups justify their rights to Kirkuk under the TAL by
reference to the small part of the province that was under
their control as of March 19, 2003, he added. Other parts of
the TAL give Kirkuk and Baghdad special status to be
determined later, the Kurds can't have it both ways,
insisting on their rights in the TAL but ignoring other parts
of the document. No one should make a judgment that Turkey
would stand idle in the face of such steps. Basbug worried
that there could be tragic miscalculations leading to
terrible consequences.


3. (S) The Ambassador indicated we had warned the Kurds
repeatedly about the potential explosiveness of the situation
in Kirkuk and the need to proceed to resolve the grave
injustices that had been carried out there in an ordered,
fair and transparent manner. And that they would need to
consider their relations with Turkey, the impact on their
relations with the U.S. and the internal impact on their
reliance on the TAL. Furthermore, he encouraged Basbug to

take advantage of the upcoming contacts with Kurdish leaders
(Talabani arrived the same day and Barzani may be in Ankara
in the coming weeks) to make sure Turkish views are
understood.

PKK
--------------


4. (S) Basbug said he didn't want to go into the issue of
PKK in Iraq since it represented a frustrating subject in
relations with the U.S. which the military wanted to develop,
not harm. He wondered why the U.S. had not taken further
action, not a major military action, but clear signs of
political intent. However, he noted that there has been a
clear increase of PKK/Kongra Gel activity in southern Turkey.
Twenty servicemen and up to eight village guards have been
killed in the last two months. He said it would be
complicated to explain the many influences that led to this
upsurge. But he thought in addition to the domestic Turkish
developments and the divisions within the PKK leadership (he
asked whether the U.S. was in contact with Osman Ocalan),
there was a link with the developments in northern Iraq,
particularly Kurdish intentions in Kirkuk. Someone, he said,
was encouraging the PKK to leave Iraq for Turkey; there were
now double or triple the number of militants in Turkey that
there had been last year (he cited a number of 1500). It was
difficult to see the aims of the renewed violence. Turkey's
military could deal with the increased terrorism, but boys
were dying as a result. MG Kalyoncu noted that the PKK was
important for our overall relationship. When leaders wanted
to work together with allies in the future, it would be
necessary to demonstrate what their cooperation had
accomplished.


5. (S) The Ambassador pointed out the range of steps the
U.S. had taken against the PKK/Kongra Gel: our designation,
the EU's identification of the group as terrorists,
engagement with Iraqi officials on the nature of PKK/Kongra
Gel which led to Iraqi FM Zebari's statements condemning them
at the OIC meeting. Furthermore, the Ambassador noted that
we had offered SRO assets to gather intelligence, but had
heard that the MFA had concerns about the impact on relations
with Iran or Syria. (Basbug confirmed the TGS had similar
concerns as well as a negative reaction to the statement that
the data could not be used for "unilateral" operations in
Iraq.) He noted that we would have to continue to work
together, within the limits of circumstances and
developments, on the issue of the PKK/Kongra Gel terrorists.

AFGHANISTAN
--------------


6. (S) In reviewing the elements of the President's
upcoming visit and the agenda for the NATO summit, the
Ambassador thanked General Basbug for Turkey's willingness to
deploy the HRF in Istanbul for command of ISAF in February

2005. Basbug noted there was one condition, that the follow
on force (identified in the SHAPE informal rotation plan as
Italian) be fully agreed and committed before the Turks
deployed. They didn't want another deployment that stretched
months beyond its original intent as occurred when they
commanded ISAF 2.


7. (U) Baghdad and Kabul minimize considered.
EDELMAN