Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ANKARA348
2004-01-20 12:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKISH P.M. ERDOGAN GOES TO WASHINGTON: HOW STRONG A LEADER IN THE FACE OF STRONG CHALLENGES?

Tags:  PGOV PINS PREL TU 
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201247Z Jan 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000348 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2014
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH P.M. ERDOGAN GOES TO WASHINGTON: HOW
STRONG A LEADER IN THE FACE OF STRONG CHALLENGES?


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000348

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2014
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH P.M. ERDOGAN GOES TO WASHINGTON: HOW
STRONG A LEADER IN THE FACE OF STRONG CHALLENGES?


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: P.M. Erdogan expects Washington to focus on
Cyprus, economic reform, and anti-terrorism cooperation among
other issues. In turn he will press for (1) concrete U.S.
actions to block what Turks believe is the formation by
accretion of a de facto Kurdish state in n. Iraq; (2)
concrete U.S. actions against the PKK in Iraq; and (3) clear
USG support for his government. While the Turkish side sees
the visit as mainly about developing our broad common
strategy, Erdogan is also looking for a public outcome he can
characterize as concrete results. At the same time, although
Erdogan is currently unchallenged as the paramount political
figure in Turkey, he and his party face deep challenges
which, if he cannot rise to them, will affect his longevity
in government, Turkey's democratic development, and
U.S.-Turkish cooperation. End summary.


2. (C) P.M. Erdogan appears to be riding a political high and
uncommon luck as he prepares for his Jan. 28-29 visit to
Washington, where he hopes to demonstrate the Administration
recognizes him as an equal partner.


3. (C) Erdogan has been primed to hear plainspoken
expressions of U.S. interest in Turkish action (1) to reach a
Cyprus settlement by May 1; (2) to hew to credible economic
reform and macro policies; (3) to cooperate unreservedly
against terrorist groups of all stripes, including Islamist
ones (he rejects the term "Islamic terrorism"); (4) to
cooperate on Iraq; (5) to open the border with ARMENIA; and
(6) to reopen the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki seminary in
a way acceptable to the Patriarchate.


4. (C) In turn Erdogan will argue that raising U.S.-Turkish
relations to a higher level depends directly on (1) clear USG
political and diplomatic actions to dispel the conviction and
consequent resentment among Turks of all political stripes
that the U.S. is tolerating step-by-step formation of a de
facto independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq; (2)
concrete USG actions to remove the PKK threat from Iraq; (3)
high-level, sustained USG support for the GOT's new Cyprus
initiative; and (4) the clearest possible sig
nal that the
U.S. stands behind the democratically-elected government.


WHO ARE WE DEALING WITH?
--------------


5. (C) Charismatic, and possessing a common touch and
phenomenal memory for faces and functions of thousands of
party members across the country, Erdogan has a strong
pragmatic core. His pragmatism has led him away from the
radical Islamist milieu of his past, a point noted to us
unhappily by his (radical) former spiritual leader Kemal
Hoca. His pragmatism has also led him to avoid precipitously
pushing Islamic agenda items such as the wearing of Islamist
headscarves while using his outstanding preacher skills and
persona as someone persecuted by the secularist Establishment
to maintain his hold on the hearts of his more religious
supporters.


6. (C) In short, a natural politician, Erdogan has a common
touch and an ability to communicate his empathy for the
plight and aspirations of the common citizen. He projects
the image of the Tribune of Anatolia, ready to take on
corruption and privilege and to defend conservative
traditions. As a result his AK Party won a two-thirds
parliamentary majority in Nov. 2002 national elections.
Owing to AK's image as the party of change at the national
level, good record in providing services at the municipal
level, and lack of viable political alternatives, AK could
gain around 50% of the vote in March 28 nationwide local
elections. Party insiders project that such a result would
give AK control of 65% or more of the 3,200 municipalities in
Turkey, including probably Istanbul and Ankara and perhaps
even Izmir, where AK has not done well to date, plus most of
the other large cities. Every step by the Turkish
Establishment to try to diminish him -- whether by blocking
legislation or attacking his motives -- cements his
popularity in Turkey's urban sprawls and across the Anatolian
heartland. While opposition to him remains bitter in various
loci of the State apparatus, Erdogan currently faces no
credible political opponent or party.


7. (C) Moreover, Erdogan knows his government has gained
credit well beyond AK supporters, as well as in the EU, for
political reforms which, if fully implemented, will
substantially strengthen democracy in Turkey. His
government's inability to pass legislation or regulations
favored by AK supporters -- land registry reform, Supreme
Education Board (YOK) reform, Koran course reform -- has not
eroded support. Indeed, even right-of-center Turks who
remain wary of AK readily tell us the Establishment's
opposition to such reforms is counterproductive. Even if one
can attribute Turkey's lowest inflation and interest rates in
30 years to luck, Central Bank skill, and global emerging
market trends rather than to the AK government's actions,
Erdogan has reaped the political benefit.


8. (C) Taking a high-profile approach in pursuing Turkey's EU
candidacy through direct campaigning in EU capitals, Erdogan
has relished being feted by EU leaders for the past year. He
will have had positive visits by EU Commission President
Prodi and German FonMin Fischer before his Washington trip
and looks forward to the February visit by German Chancellor
Schroeder. He sees himself at this point as one of (if not
the) most important leaders of the Muslim world.
ERDOGAN'S VIEW OF RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.
--------------


9. (C) Erdogan recognizes that U.S. support can be important
for Turkey's economy and EU aspirations. He sees his task as
managing Turks's ambivalence toward us; at the same time he
wants to avoid being labeled pro-American. From the low
point in bilateral relations in March 2003 he has taken
several supportive steps, while being careful not to be too
closely associated with us since opening Turkish airspace for
the Iraq war. Erdogan agreed to a ground line of
communication for Coalition forces in Iraq. He pushed
through authorization for a Turkish deployment in support of
the Coalition. He agreed to U.S. troop rotation through
Incirlik airbase. In line with long-standing U.S. desires,
he took a bold step in Nov. 2002 to try to move Turkey away
from its no-solution stance on Cyprus and may be prepared now
to do more. He seems to be more open than any previous Prime
Minister to a re-opening of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's
Halki seminary.


10. (C) On the other hand he has made public his discomfort
with what most fellow Turks also see as American complicity
in creation of a de facto independent Kurdistan in northern
Iraq and lack of concrete U.S. action against the
PKK/KADEK/KHK. He has not controlled anti-American
suspicions among the AK parliamentary group or within the
Cabinet (DefMin Gonul told us recently on the margins of a
symposium in Istanbul that in closed meetings FonMin Gul
continues to praise the Parliament's March 1, 2003 turndown
of U.S. deployment and to advocate a more Arab/Islamic
foreign policy orientation as a counter to relations with the
U.S.). Nevertheless, Erdogan and Ministers like Gonul and
Justice Minister Cicek see U.S. support for his government as
essential to his survival, and he wants a successful visit.




THE DEEPER CHALLENGES FOR ERDOGAN
--------------


11. (C) Erdogan, AK, and his government face half a dozen
serious domestic challenges which, if he does not manage them
well, will begin to put a severe strain on his ability to
govern by late 2004 and on his and our ability to maintain
dynamic, deep U.S.-Turkish cooperation:


--Erdogan's character: Erdogan has traits which render him
seriously vulnerable to miscalculating the political dynamic,
especially in foreign affairs, and vulnerable to attacks by
those who would disrupt his equilibrium. First, overbearing
pride. Second, unbridled ambition stemming from the belief
God has anointed him to lead Turkey (Mustafa Bilginer, a
close confidant of Erdogan and his wife Emine from 1997-2003,
has analyzed this trait in a draft book on Erdogan's
character; Erdogan used Koranic allusion in his speech to the
AK Congress in Oct. 2003 to make the point about his
God-appointed mission). Third, an authoritarian loner streak
which prevents growth of a circle of strong and skillful
advisors, a broad flow of fresh information to him, or
development of effective communications among the party
headquarters, government, and parliamentary group. This
streak also makes him exceptionally thin-skinned. Fourth, an
overweening desire to stay in power which, despite his macho
image, renders him fearful and prone to temporizing even at
moments which call for swift and resolute decisions. Fifth,
a distrust of women which manifests itself not only in
occasional harsh public comments but also in his
unwillingness to give women any meaningful decision-making
authority in AK.


--Rival centers of power: Cabinet Ministers, Erdogan advisors
and a raft of M.P.s constantly tell us of the tensions
between Erdogan and Gul, with the latter appearing repeatedly
to try to undercut Erdogan. Parliamentary Speaker Bulent
Arinc, who has a strong following among more Islamist AK
M.P.s, has also caused problems for Erdogan on controversial
questions like pushing the right to wear headscarves at State
functions. Although Arinc has kept a low profile for the
past seven months, he remains a locus of troublemaking,
especially on questions involving the U.S. (e.g., troop
rotation through Incirlik).


--Lack of technocratic depth: While some AK appointees appear
to be capable of learning on the job, others are incompetent
or seem to be pursuing private or lodge (cemaat) interests.
AK is far from bringing the bureaucracy under control or
making it work efficiently. We hear constant anecdotal
evidence, not only from those on the secularist left who have
deep prejudices against AK but also from contacts on the
right, that AK appointees, at the national and provincial
levels, are incompetent or narrow-minded Islamists. AK
officials -- from Cabinet Ministers to local-level party
activists across the country -- admit to us that the party's
choice of competent and broadly acceptable candidates for the
March local elections will be exceptionally difficult and the
election of controversial or inept AK candidates would
complicate AK's ability to govern both at the local and
national level.


--Weakness of public relations and the image of hidden
agendas: Erdogan lacks advisors who are able to pre-empt or
handle the news cycle; none of his advisors has good working
relations with the Turkish military. His government has
failed continually to consult broadly and openly or to
prepare public opinion for legislative initiatives,
long-overdue reforms, or foreign policy steps (e.g., pre-war
U.S. troop deployment or troop rotation). As a result AK
creates the impression, exploited by the Establishment, that
it harbors an anti-republican, deep Islamist agenda or is
selling out the country, leading to Establishment
(dis)information campaigns which cause the government to
retreat.


--Corruption: AK rode to power on the common citizen's
revulsion against corruption. Charges that Erdogan amassed
his fortune through kickbacks as mayor of Istanbul have never
been proven but we now hear more and more from insiders that
close advisors such as private secretary Hikmet Bulduk,
Mucahit Arslan, and Cuneyd Zapsu are engaging in wholesale
influence peddling. Aksam Ankara bureau chief Nuray Basaran
told us Zapsu admitted to her Jan. 13 that Erdogan and he
benefited "directly" from the award of the Tupras (state
petroleum refinery) privatization to a consortium including a
Russian partner. Erdogan's direct acquisition of a
significant interest in a food distribution company has
become a public controversy.


--Islamist complexes and prejudices: Some appointments, such
as Prime Ministry Undersecretary Dincer (who stands by his
1995 article calling into question the relevance of the
Republic),Education Ministry Undersecretary Birinci (who in
the past called himself an "ummetci", i.e., a follower of a
greater Islamic order and an opponent of the Republic),and
head of State-run Turkish Radio and Television Demiroz (who
once paid homage to Afghan fundamentalist Hekmatyar),have
made the core of the State Establishment -- Armed Forces,
Presidency, and Judiciary -- profoundly uneasy. Erdogan's
refusal to condemn these positions, the question of the level
of influence of Islamic brotherhoods and groups (including
the followers of Fethullah Gulen) on the government, and the
presence of Turkish Hizbullah supporters in AK Party
provincial structures in the Southeast have also raised deep
concerns among many long-standing Embassy contacts who
themselves are pious. Erdogan himself recognizes the
pernicious effect of a "closed brotherhood mentality"
(cemaatcilik) in political affairs, as reflected in his Jan.
10 speech to a symposium in Istanbul, but how well he can
control the phenomenon remains a very open question.


COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) As Erdogan rides the twin desires for reform in
Turkey and for wider prosperity, he challenges those who have
traditionally reserved power and wealth for themselves at
least to yield pride of place to a different elite. While
his ultimate direction and success remain to be seen, at this
time Erdogan is the only partner capable of advancing toward
the U.S. vision of a successful, democratic Turkey integrated
into Europe.
EDELMAN