Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ANKARA3130
2004-06-07 15:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

CYPRUS FOLLOW-ON: U.S. AND UK AMBASSADORS' JUNE 4

Tags:  PREL CY TU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003130 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2014
TAGS: PREL CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS FOLLOW-ON: U.S. AND UK AMBASSADORS' JUNE 4
MEETING WITH MFA U/S ZIYAL


REF: ANKARA 2898


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.4 (b,d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003130

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2014
TAGS: PREL CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS FOLLOW-ON: U.S. AND UK AMBASSADORS' JUNE 4
MEETING WITH MFA U/S ZIYAL


REF: ANKARA 2898


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.4 (b,d).



1. (C) Summary: Turks express reservations on two points in
UNSYG's Cyprus good offices report but grudgingly agree the
report is helpful. Turkey sees the Russians as unhelpful in
the UNSC and seeks a UNSC outcome that does the most to end
northern Cyprus' isolation -- probably a simple UNSC
endorsement of the report followed by strong statements by
the U.S., UK and a few others. Turkey also considers the
Annan Plan phrase "Turkish Cypriot State" to be the minimum
acceptable point of reference, but will not seek recognition
of the TRNC as an independent state. End summary.



2. (C) Calling in U.S. and UK Ambassadors June 4 to discuss
how to proceed on Cyprus, MFA U/S Ziyal and Deputy U/S Ilkin
characterized UNSYG Annan's Cyprus good offices report as
"the least that could be done" (Ziyal) and "relatively
objective" (Ilkin). The Turks proceeded to lay out two
points of concern for Ankara:


--the UNSYG's apparent interpretation that the 1960 Treaty of
Guarantee gives no right of unilateral intervention (UNSYG
report, para 61);


--the report states that the UNSC would be "well advised to
stand ready to address" lingering Greek Cypriot security
concerns, perhaps through a resolution.



3. (C) Ziyal reiterated what he said he had emphasized to SCC
Weston in Burgenstock: any change in the definition or scope
of guarantor status would be rejected by Ankara as a
deal-breaker. What the Greek Cypriots asked for they got at
Burgenstock, he added. What the Turks asked for, they got,
thanks to the U.S. and UK. What made the Annan Plan work was
the trade-off of guarantees for the Turks/Turkish Cypriots
and functionality for the Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots
did not raise these security concerns at Burgenstock. No one
should open the door to them now. Opening the door will only
encourage Papadopulos to become even more intransigent in
asserting that he is the government of Cyprus and that the
Turkish Cypriots should join him.



4. (C) Regarding UNSC action, the key would be the Council's
willingness to declare that UNSCs 541 and 550 should not be
interpreted as requiring an embargo of northern Cyprus. In
terms of what Turkey would like to see coming out of the
UNSC, Ziyal and Ilkin reiterated (reftel) that the Russians
are being unhelpful: "the Gul-Lavrov discussions in Moscow
went badly." Turkey needs to be realistic, Ilkin continued;
if it's clear a satisfactory UNSCR or presidential statement
is not in the cards, then Turkey would prefer a simple UNSC
endorsement followed by strongly worded national statements
by the U.S., UK and some others under the coordinated
statement procedure.



5. (C) In response, both Ambassadors Edelman and Westmacott
pointed out why the UNSYG report is balanced. Edelman
emphasized that the USG continues to believe the Annan Plan
offers the best basis for a settlement and there is no
disposition to re-open the text. Westmacott added that the
Russians' unrelenting pro-Greek Cypriot stance stems in part
from Putin's wish to remind everyone that Russia is still a
major player and isn't to be taken for granted.



6. (C) Turning to other next steps, Ilkin noted that Ankara
is searching for a way to clarify definitively Turkey's view
of "Cyprus"-in-the-EU as the "Greek Cypriot State". Ziyal
underscored that Ankara cannot retreat from the Annan Plan
phrase "Turkish Cypriot State". At the upcoming OIC summit
in Istanbul Turkey wants to renew the Turkish Cypriots'
status as observers under the name "Turkish Cypriot State"
but clearly labeling it as having that name under the ambit
of the Annan Plan. Turkey would not, however, try to push
beyond this change of nameplate to seek recognition. There
is pressure from the Russians not to seek the change, but
Ankara is confident it can handle the Russians since they
seek observer status. Crucial will be U.S. and UK agreement
not to lobby against the change.



7. (C) The Ambassadors reviewed U.S. and UK step-by-step
moves to end northern Cyprus' isolation. Westmacott noted
that making a breakthrough in ICAO would be helped if the EU
could achieve consensus. In this regard, Verheugen appears
strongly positive.
EDELMAN