Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ANKARA3008
2004-06-01 11:40:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

PM ERDOGAN'S TRIP TO SEA ISLAND: DELIVERABLES

Tags:  CASC CY ECON IZ PHUM PREL PTER TU 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 003008 

SIPDIS


NSC FOR FRIED, BRYZA


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2014
TAGS: CASC CY ECON IZ PHUM PREL PTER TU
SUBJECT: PM ERDOGAN'S TRIP TO SEA ISLAND: DELIVERABLES
SCENESETTER

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 003008

SIPDIS


NSC FOR FRIED, BRYZA


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2014
TAGS: CASC CY ECON IZ PHUM PREL PTER TU
SUBJECT: PM ERDOGAN'S TRIP TO SEA ISLAND: DELIVERABLES
SCENESETTER

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (S) Summary: With the invitation for PM Erdogan to
attend the Sea Island G-8, we have three opportunities for
POTUS/PM interaction in the next month: Sea Island, the
POTUS Ankara visit and the NATO Summit. This intense
U.S./Turkish contact comes amid domestic pressure about the
role of Islam in Turkey and Turkey's close relationship with
Israel. Turkey's economy has improved since 2002 but is
still vulnerable. We need to look at several key elements.
There are several areas in which this series of events needs
to produce tangible results to advance productive cooperation
Turkey has agreed to co-sponsor the Democracy Assistance
Group (DAG) of the Broader Middle East and North Africa
Initiative (BMENAI),but is extraordinarily sensitive about
how its BMENAI role is perceived.



2. (S) Erdogan will be seeking U.S. steps against the PKK in
Iraq and significant Turkmen representation in the new
political structures in Iraq; we would like to renew GOT
permission for and eventually expand use of Incirlik Air Base
to support Iraq operations. On Cyprus, we are both focusing
on measures to help Turkish Cypriots overcome isolation in
the wake of Turkish Cypriot support for the Annan Plan.
Erdogan will continue to seek ways to highlight Turkey's
reform process and usefully deploy U.S. support for Turkey's
EU candidacy. On the economic side, Erdogan wants U.S.
legislation to establish a qualified industrial zone (QIZ) in
Turkey; we hope Turkey will resolve at least one of the
disputes involving U.S. companies in Turkey and we should
urge Turkish Airlines to purchase Boeing aircraft. We should
encourage Erdogan to come up with a concrete plan for opening
the Halki Seminary and do what he can to speed up the
resolution of cases involving abducted American children.
End Summary.


Political and Economic Context



3. (C) Erdogan arrives at Sea Island under conflicting

domestic pressure between some pious members of his AK Party,
who want to create more space for religion in Turkish
society, and the secular establishment and military, who are
deeply suspicious that Erdogan and AK want to impose an
Islamist agenda on Turkey. Turkey's EU candidacy, supported
across the political spectrum, is a major constraining force
in this tension. Turkey's close relationship with Israel
continues. However, some AK politicians and Islamist media
have harshly criticized the relationship in light of recent
events in Gaza and killings of Hamas leaders, prompting a
spate of rumors about Turkey's diplomatic relations with
Israel and the Palestinians. Turkey will co-sponsor the
BMENAI's Democracy Assistance Group, but is extraordinarily
sensitive about not being lumped together with "target"
countries and not being considered a "model" country --
particularly not a "model" of a "moderate Islamic" country.



4. (C) Turkey's economy has recovered from its 2000-2001
economic crisis but remains vulnerable; its high debt load
makes it especially vulnerable to interest rate changes.
Over the next several weeks, Turkey will decide whether and
how to proceed with the IMF and the U.S. bilateral financial
agreement. The markets have been unsettled in the last few
weeks as domestic political tension, global withdrawals from
emerging markets and uncertainty about Turkey's future
economic policy coincided.


Iraq and the PKK



5. (S) Since the Iraq War, Turkey has generally been helpful
on Iraq, but Ankara has a number of concerns about Iraq's
future, e.g., Kurdish autonomy, the Turkmen minority's
status, PKK presence. We have reassured the GOT that IGC
member (and self-proclaimed PKK sympathizer) Mahmoud Othman
will not be part of the IIG and that the quality of Iraqi
Turkmen representation will be higher in the IIG than it was
in the IGC. Erdogan will certainly press the President, on
each occasion, on steps to promote stability and unity in
Iraq.



6. (S) However, Turkey believes that the US is not
fulfilling its commitment to end the PKK's safe-haven in
northern Iraq. In the past few months, Turkey has seen an
up-tick in PKK violence in southeast Turkey by infiltrators
the GOT believes came from northern Iraq. In response, the
Turks this month deployed troops to high ground in Iraq
overlooking the Turkey-Iraq border. The widely-shared
Turkish perception of U.S. inactivity against the PKK
terrorists in Iraq is hurting our ability to generate Turkish
public support for our broader efforts in Iraq and hampers PM
Erdogan's ability to stake out pro-U.S. positions. Unless we
take some visible steps against the PKK in Iraq before the
President's late June visit to Ankara and Istanbul, Erdogan
will be unable to avoid making U.S. inaction against the PKK
a lead point on his agenda with the President. More intense
PKK actions in Turkey around the Summit would be dangerous
and politically embarrassing. We again strongly recommend
deciding on some of the steps described in Ankara 2902 and
2236 as deliverables for the President in his meetings with
Erdogan.



7. (S) The steps we recommend include:


-- Committing to aggressive patrols around Iraq's Makhmour
Camp to prevent PKK intimidation while the UN screens Turkish
refugees there;


-- Closing the PKK's front Kurdistan Democratic Solution
Party offices in Iraq;


-- Initiating with Turkey a joint information operations
campaign to further weaken the PKK in Iraq;


-- Conducting small scale military actions vs. the PKK in
Iraq;


-- Issuing arrest warrants and trying to arrest high value
PKK targets in Iraq;


-- Shutting off PKK lines of supply in Iraq and securing
border areas where the PKK is present;


-- Getting the KDP, PUK, IGC and IIG to state their support
for coalition action against the PKK terrorist organization.



8. (S) In June 2003, the Turkish cabinet approved a decree
(duration one year) allowing the use of Turkish bases and
ports for humanitarian and reconstruction operations covered
under UNSCR 1483. It does not allow use of Turkish
facilities for the stationing of assets to be used in
combat-related operations (i.e. stationing of fighters). The
decree -- which did not require parliamentary approval and
expires at the end of June 2004 -- provided Turkish
authorities sufficient legal basis to approve two important
Iraq-related requests from the US: stationing of aerial
refueling tankers at Incirlik Air Base (IAB) and the use of
IAB to rotate US troops out of Iraq. EUCOM intends to ask
the Turks to extend the authorization for the tankers and for
permission to establish a multi-directional cargo hub at IAB
to support OIF and OEF operations. A future troop rotation
hub may also be useful. The Cabinet must extend the decree
before the GOT can consider these requests. We have asked
the GOT to renew the decree; our contacts tell us that the
GOT is "mid-way" through the process and they do not foresee
any difficulties.


Measures to Overcome North Cyprus' Isolation



9. (C) We are beginning to implement a number of measures
intended to respond positively to the constructive approach
the Turks and Turkish Cypriots demonstrated toward the
UNSYG's Good Offices Mission, to reduce the economic
disparity between the northern and southern parts of Cyprus,
and to help lay the foundation for eventual reunification.
We understand Erdogan expects this to be a major topic for
his discussion with the President.



10. (U) We have already taken some symbolic steps:


-- Secretary Powell met with "TRNC PM" Talat in New York on
May 4.


-- Although Ambassador Klosson has met with "TRNC PM" Talat
privately many times before, he met with Talat in his office
for the first time on May 21.


-- Ambassador Edelman invited the "TRNC Ambassador" to Turkey
in his personal capacity to an Embassy function for the first
time on May 26.


-- We have begun issuing expanded-validity visas to holders
of "TRNC" passports



11. (C) The Turks want more steps taken to reduce Turkish
Cypriot isolation. We could move ahead on additional steps
under consideration:


-- Limited expansion of North Cyprus Missions in Washington
and New York.


-- On the economic and commercial side, we are proceeding
deliberately, coordinating with the EU and navigating a
thicket of national and international legal considerations as
we consider how to expand trade and give economic assistance.


-- Erdogan will likely press hardest for direct flights to
the "TRNC" (Turkish Transportation Minister Yilidirim raised
this with Secretary Mineta on May 24). We are actively
considering this and coordinating with the EU and ICAO. This
and other steps will not come as quickly as Erdogan would
prefer, but he will appreciate assurances that our intention
to help the TCs is unshakable.



12. (U) On May 26, the "TRNC" lifted its requirement that
Greek Cypriots show passports to enter the North, a goodwill
measure we had long advocated. We should thank Erdogan for
the GOT's constructive input into this decision.


Economic Steps



13. (C) In addition to promoting further economic reform and
strengthening of Turkey's regime for combating terrorist
finance, there are three specific deliverables we are pushing
ahead of the President's end-June visit. All three relate to
our bilateral effort to enhance economic-commercial relations
through increased trade and investment.


-- The Turks want us to introduce legislation providing for
Qualifying Industrial Zones in Turkey. Prime Minister
Erdogan raised this with the President in January, and is
likely to do so again in June.


-- Turkey needs to resolve one or more investment disputes
involving U.S. companies, such as by introducing in
Parliament industrial zones legislation to resolve Cargill's
zoning problem. We need to resolve the discussion of QIZ
scope with the Turks and identify our legislative vehicle.


-- We should urge Turkey to agree to a purchase by Turkish
Airlines of Boeing aircraft (the GOT and Turkish Airlines are
now talking with both Boeing and Airbus, with an eye to
making a decision shortly).


EU Candidacy



14. (C) Turkey's EU candidacy remains Erdogan's top
political priority and the aim for a date to begin accession
negotiations si the governor that so far has kept domestic
political tensions from getting out of hand. We will want to
reiterate our plan to be helpful with EU members, but Turkish
implementation remains key. Some areas where Turkey could
help itself include religious freedom, minority rights (e.g.,
Kurdish broadcasting) and rule of law.


Reopening Halki



15. (U) The continued closure of Halki Seminary is an
irritant to Turkey's relations with the EU, Greece and us.
We should urge Erdogan to come up with a concrete proposal to
re-open Halki. Under Turkish law, all schools, public or
private, must be under Education Ministry authority. A
recent Education Ministry study suggested three different
alternatives for opening it consistent with Turkish law.
However, the GOT and the Patriarchiate have not reached an
agreement on how to reopen the seminary in a manner
acceptable to both sides.


Child Abduction Cases



16. (U) We are working with the Turkish police and courts on
several cases of U.S. children abducted to Turkey. There has
been some progress, but the court system does not work
effectively. Due to delays in the court system Turkey is not
in compliance with the Hague Convention regarding abducted
children.


-- We should ask for Erdogan's help to speed up these cases.
In particular, we hope the family court decision in the
Corapcioglu (cho-rap-chee-oh-loo) case will be issued before
the end of June. (PM Blair's visit in May resulted in the
first-ever return of a British child.) We are hoping for a
decision returning the child to the mother and granting
permission for them to leave Turkey while the remaining
appeals are pending.


Armenia



17. (C) Since Armenian President Kocharian will not attend
the NATO Summit, we see little chance of moving ahead on
Turkish-Armenian relations in the short run.
EDELMAN