TURKEY AND PRTS IN AFGHANISTAN: SETTING THE RECORD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002901

SIPDIS


STATE FOR EUR/SE


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2014
TAGS: MOPS PREL TU AF
SUBJECT: TURKEY AND PRTS IN AFGHANISTAN: SETTING THE RECORD
STRAIGHT

REF: A) ANKARA 920 B) ANKARA 1005 C) ANKARA 1162 D)
ANKARA 1318 E) STATE 50477 F) ANKARA 1711
G) ANKARA 2293 H) ANKARA 2822


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman. Reasons: 1.5
(B and D).


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SUMMARY
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1. (C) The Turkish press is reporting that Washington is
debating whether to respond positively to Turkey's proposal
to establish a PRT in Takhar province if the Turks refuse to
go west or south. We provide a chronology of Turkey's
PRT-related consultations and considerations leading up to
their most recent proposal to establish a PRT in Takhar.
Turkey has been receiving conflicting messages which have
resulted in frustration in Ankara and contributed to their
strong stand on Takhar. End summary.



2. (SBU) The Turkish press reported May 20 that Washington is
considering how to respond to Turkey's latest proposal to
establish a PRT in Takhar province. The article suggested
there is a debate between USG officials who advocate
rejecting the GOT's proposal and encourage the GOT to
establish a PRT in the west or south, and those who would
endorse the Turkish proposal if the Turks could not be
persuaded to go elsewhere. We understand from e-mail traffic
that this story may be true. To help policymakers understand
where the Turks are on their PRT proposal, and how they got
there, we lay out the following chronology of the issue.
While we recognize this list is not exhaustive and may not
include discussions with Turkish officials that have taken
place outside of Ankara, it reflects our understanding of the
GOT's evolving position on PRTs and Turkey's willingness to
be flexible within reason.


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3. (C) TURKISH PRT PROPOSAL: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
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--Early February 2004: Turkish Minister of Defense Gonul
advises SECDEF and other Allies that Turkey is considering
establishing a PRT in northern Afghanistan (ref a).


--February 18: MFA advises that MFA/TGS have agreed to
establish a PRT and will seek PM Erdogan's backing soon. If
the PM is supportive, the GOT will approach the USG to
discuss location and seek our official reaction (ref a).


--February 20: MFA/TGS agree to establish a PRT in northern
Afghanistan; request official reaction from Washington.
Their proposal includes a core presence in Faryab province,
and a willingness to consider including Jawzjian and Badghis
provinces. If the reaction from the US is positive, Turkey
intends to approach UK officials, who reportedly had
indicated in the past that the UK would be willing to have
Turkey cover some of the regions currently covered by the
UK-led PRT bases in Mazar (ref b).


--February 27: MFA officials note Ankara is still waiting
for a reaction from the USG to Turkey's proposal (ref b).
Meanwhile, the Turks begin to receive discouraging messages
about their proposal from others, including D/SACEUR, who
discourages them from establishing a PRT in the north. With
no reaction from Washington to their proposal, the Turks ask
if the USG and/or NATO share D/SACEUR's views.


--Early March: Fearful that PRT discussions were progressing
at NATO and SHAPE without consideration of their proposal and
still no response from Washington, the Turks inform the UK of
their desire to establish a PRT in Maimana. On March 4, HMG
informs Ankara that the UK intends to establish a PRT there,
UK troops were already on the ground there, and that Norway
has expressed a willingness to contribute (ref c). At the
same time, D/SACEUR asks the Turks to consider establishing a
PRT in Feyzabad -- a request TGS rejects. However, the MFA
informs us that Turkey would be willing to consider
establishing a PRT in Takhar province that would also cover
Badakhstan (ref c).


--March 9: Some three weeks after receiving the GOT's PRT
proposal, we (on instructions from Washington -- ref d) ask
the GOT to "maintain a flexible position" on PRT location to
help NATO and Turkey achieve maximum benefit. The MFA agrees
to work with SHAPE and the PRT ESC in Kabul to identify an
acceptable area, noting that the Turkish MNR had been
instructed to work with SHAPE.
--March 9: The MFA informs us that the Turkish MNR at SHAPE
had sent D/SACEUR a letter proposing three possible
alternative locations for a Turkish-led PRT: a) Faryab
province only b) Faryab province and Jowzjan, and c) Faryab
and Badgis provinces. The MFA said that Turkey wanted to be
as flexible as possible, but noted that logistics and
capabilities would guide the GOT's final decision. The MFA
added that if SHAPE were to come up with an alternative
location for a Turkish-led PRT, the GOT would be willing to
consider it -- assuming its location was somewhere in the
north of Kabul.


--March 12: Senior MFA and TGS officials reiterate to
visiting Afghan Coordinator Amb. Taylor that Turkey is
interested in establishing a PRT in Afghanistan and is
waiting for D/SACEUR to respond formally to the GOT's latest
proposal. MFA officials exhibit flexibility on location and
accept the importance of having SHAPE and the Afghan
government coordinate in the overall PRT decision making
process (ref e).


--April 9-16: GOT sends an inter-agency recon team to
Afghanistan to meet with Afghan, US, ISAF and officials from
other countries to finalize their decision-making process on
PRTs. Prior to the visit, the GOT was considering two
provinces -- Takhar and Baghlan. During their meetings in
and outside of Kabul, the Turks receive conflicting messages
from various actors on the ground regarding desired location
of a Turkish-led PRT: Afghan MOI Jalali reportedly was
positive on either Takhar or Baghlan; LTG Barno and others
encouraged the Turks to consider Baghlan, while some ISAF
officials said that the Dutch intended to establish a PRT
there and encouraged the Turks to look West or South. The
ESC reportedly does not decide on the Turkish proposal.


--April 22: MFA informs us that, based on the results of the
recon visit to Afghanistan, MFA/TGS would recommend to PM
Erdogan that Turkey establish a PRT in Takhar (ref f).


--May 4: FM Gul informs NATO SYG that Turkey's priority is
to establish a PRT in Takhar. Turkey's mission in Kabul is
instructed to inform the ESC during its May 10 meeting of
Turkey's position.


--May 14: The MFA advises us that PM Erdogan has approved
the Takhar proposal and agreed to provide funding. The MFA
instructs its missions in Brussels, Kabul and Washington to
inform appropriate authorities. The MFA specifically
requests Washington's support.


--Mid-May: The PRT ESC issues a map identifying 10 priority
locations for PRTs in Afghanistan, including two locations in
northern Afghanistan. Takhar is not one of them, but Baghlan
is.


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COMMENT
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4. (C) Since mid-March, the Turks have gone along with our
recommendation to work directly with SHAPE and the ESC PRT to
identify an exact location for a PRT. Recognizing the
sensitivities surrounding their relationship with Dostum,
Ankara abandoned its initial proposal (core presence in
Faryab, willingness to consider including Jawzjian, Badghis
provinces) and suggested alternative locations they
understood to be consistent with the priorities outlined by
NATO and Afghan authorities. The Turks remain frustrated by
what they perceive to be mixed and confusing messages coming
from Brussels and Kabul, and wonder why the USG -- their main
Ally and the leading advocate of a greater international role
in Afghanistan --- was silent on the issue of PRTs for so
long.



5. (C) The Turks are sticking to their latest proposal:
establish a PRT in Takhar province or nowhere at all. While
we suspect Ankara would be willing to consider an alternative
location in northern Afghanistan, we do not envision a
scenario under which PM Erdogan or TGS CHOD GEN Ozkok would
reverse course and agree to establish a PRT in the west or
the south. PM Erdogan has already signed off on Takhar and
agreed to fund the PRT there; TGS has never supported a
Turkish contribution to PRTs, and only reluctantly supported
the MFA when it was assured the military contribution would
be minimal and the location would be in a familiar part of
the country where the chances of success were greater than
failure. One element of the consideration is what MFA U/S
Ziyal characterized as a historically negative relationship
with Afghan Pashtuns (ref h). In the absence of support for
a Turkish-led PRT in the northern half of Afghanistan, the
Turks may be close to cutting their losses and pull out of
the PRT business altogether.



6. (C) As Washington prepares for the June NATO Summit in
Istanbul and the President's meeting with PM Erdogan in
Ankara beforehand, it may be time to ask whether it is more
important to have the Turks in the PRT tent or outside it.
While a Turkish-led PRT in the north may not significantly
bolster NATO's stabilization capabilities in Afghanistan at
this stage, it may be preferable to no Turkish contribution
at all. From a bilateral standpoint, US support for a
Turkish-led PRT will be instrumental in our ability to
persuade the Turks to contribute to other stabilization and
reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan (i.e. ANA training,
anti-narcotics efforts, reconstruction efforts, troops for
Afghan elections, and ISAF).



7. (U) Kabul minimize considered.
EDELMAN