UPCOMING UN AND U.S. ACTION ON CYPRUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002774

SIPDIS


FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR EDELMAN


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2014
TAGS: CY PREL TU
SUBJECT: UPCOMING UN AND U.S. ACTION ON CYPRUS


REF: A. NICOSIA 0860

B. 30 MARCH 2004 RIES EU MEETINGS

C. ANKARA 2341


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (C) With the SYG's report on the Cyprus negotiations and
the referendum set to come out soon, it is important that we
engage in a full-court press for a strong follow-on UNSCR
despite the formidable UNSC obstacles and other political
hurdles. The SYG's report, and the resulting UNSC debate and
resolution, are critically important to our twin strategic
goals of comprehensively settling Cyprus and assisting
Turkey's EU vocation. I read with concern ref A's account of
the GC campaign to orchestrate a report excluding relevant
information unfavorable to the GCs. I expect a similar
effort in the UNSC. As Ambassador Klosson noted, I hope the
SYG's report and resulting UNSC action include what happened
in the negotiations and through the referendum -- and why.



2. (C) Fairness demands no less. The UN rightly castigated
Turkish and TC obstructionism after the Copenhagen and the
Hague; this time should be no different. Failure to
completely and accurately reflect what happened and why
leaves a distorted post-referendum UN record. That record
currently consists of bland press releases on April 28 and

29. The April 28 press release of U/S Pendergast's briefing
notes that "now was not the time to go into details" in
several key areas. That time is now.



3. (C) The UN's language will influence Turkey's fate in the
EU, which links Turkey's EU bid to cooperation with the SYG's
Good Offices Mission. The EU will use the report and
resulting UNSCR to judge Turkey's performance in this area.
By December, EU memories of the negotiations and the
referendum will have faded. Some EU Turkey-skeptics are
inclined to hold any failure to reach settlement against
Turkey (see, e.g., ref B). Unambiguous UN language is the
only effective antidote.



4. (C) The tone of the UNSCR and the SYG's report will also
influence the Turks' willingness to re-engage in future UN
efforts toward a comprehensive settlement. Despite the
positive initial international response to GOT efforts in
support of a Cyprus settlement, the Turks have a lingering
distrust of UN involvement in Cyprus. They will view the
SYG's report and UNSCR as leading indicators of whether the
GOT's pro-solution policy brought real benefits for Turkey
and the TCs.



5. (C) I am also concerned that we have not yet been able to
show or even announce the steps we will take to reach out to
Turkish Cypriots. We have been telling the Turks steps are
coming, but lack of any more concrete news is beginning to
cause problems. The MFA told us last week that military
hardliners opposed to settlement who had remained silent over
the past few months are beginning to complain, with
increasing intensity, that nothing has changed for the TCs.
Over time, this damages USG credibility and threatens
Ankara's tenuous pro-settlement consensus (ref C). U/S Ziyal
has called me in to discuss Cyprus tomorrow, and I expect
some pointed questions about where we are in our
decisionmaking process.
EDELMAN