Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ANKARA2691
2004-05-12 15:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

ISAF SHORTFALLS: TURKS CONTEND THEY HAVE THE

Tags:  MOPS PREL TU AF 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002691 

SIPDIS


STATE FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/SE, PM


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2014
TAGS: MOPS PREL TU AF
SUBJECT: ISAF SHORTFALLS: TURKS CONTEND THEY HAVE THE
POLITICAL WILL, BUT LACK THE RESOURCES


REF: A) USNATO 457 B) ANKARA 2475 C) ANKARA 1881 D)
STATE 068430


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman. Reasons: 1.5
(B and D).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002691

SIPDIS


STATE FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/SE, PM


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2014
TAGS: MOPS PREL TU AF
SUBJECT: ISAF SHORTFALLS: TURKS CONTEND THEY HAVE THE
POLITICAL WILL, BUT LACK THE RESOURCES


REF: A) USNATO 457 B) ANKARA 2475 C) ANKARA 1881 D)
STATE 068430


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman. Reasons: 1.5
(B and D).



1. (C) During a recent discussion on Turkish helos for
Afghanistan (ref b),NATO Department Head Alper Coskum
confirmed what MFA officials had told us in late March (ref
c): the Turkish military does not possess Role 2 and
Casualty Staging Medical Unit capability. Coskun said the
Turkish General Staff (TGS) also had informed the MFA that it
did not possess the dedicated aircraft requested by COMISAF.
TGS reportedly instructed the Turkish MNR at SHAPE to inform
Allies accordingly.



2. (C) TGS Deputy J5 for Strategy MG Arslan (who accompanied
TGS CHOD GEN Ozkok to Brussels for the May 5-6 NATO CHOD
meetings) told pol-mil counselor May 11 that the NATO CHODs
correctly identified political will and resources as the keys
to filling ISAF shortfalls. For Turkey, Arslan argued there
is no question of political will; it is a matter of
resources. He noted that while Turkey may have seven
brigades that are capable of being deployed, deployments
require resources, and the Turkish military did not have the
requisite resources.


--------------
COMMENT
--------------



3. (C) Arslan's statement that Turkey possesses the political
will to help NATO meet ISAF shortfalls tracks with what we
have heard from other TGS and MFA officials. Arslan is
correct that in the case of Turkey, one of the keys to
securing Turkish contributions to coalition operations is
money, as we have seen in the case of the three helos for
ISAF. MFA officials tell us that TGS is not prepared to fund
contributions to ISAF or other operations in Afghanistan out
of its existing budget, and that TGS will continue to request
funding from the PM before making commitments. It is
conceivable that the Turkish military may not have within its
normal budget sufficient resources to finance contributions
to operations such as ISAF, and that any contributions
financed by the military may come at the expense of other
operations or modernization programs. That said, the Turkish
military has access to other funds (in addition to any
funding the PM may provide) that furthers its modernization
program and increases its ability to contribute to operations
such as ISAF: Foreign Military Financing (FMF). During our
recent discussions with PM and MFA officials, we noted that
the USG recently apportioned $35M in FMF for Turkey for FY04,
and that this funding could be used to facilitate Turkish
contributions to ISAF.



4. (C) Regarding the areas that NATO SYG is looking to Turkey
to provide for ISAF (ref a),we doubt that the Turkish
military will reverse its long-standing position and provide
infantry companies for Stage One. We suspect TGS may be open
to contributing a limited number of infantry to support the
vote registration and election process. TGS already has
stated that it does not have a Role 2 medical facility
capability. On the three previously committed helicopters,
MFA officials told us following CHOD Ozkok's statement during
the May 5-6 meeting that the three helos would be in
Afghanistan by the end of the month that, while PM Erdogan
had not formally authorized the $1.5M requested by TGS, the
MFA did not believe Ozkok would have made such a statement in
Brussels if he was not confident the Turkish military could
deliver the helicopters as promised.



5. (C) Ambassador telephoned MFA U/S Ziyal to follow up on
the President's telephone call to PM Erdogan, and the DCM did
the same with PM Foreign Policy Advisor Ambassador Arat (ref
b). Ziyal (after consulting with TGS D/CHOD GEN Basbug) said
there were two main issues associated with the President's
request: one, the Turkish military had lost a number of helos
during the past year and did not have many helos left in its
inventory; and two, funding.



6. (C) If Washington decides to approach the GOT at the
senior levels to reinforce the NATO SYG's efforts, we suggest
that it remind GOT officials of the availability of the FMF
funding to help Turkey contribute to coalition operations,
assuming the USG is prepared to allow Turkey to use FMF
funding for such purposes.
EDELMAN