TURKISH MILITARY WANTED YES/NO CYPRUS OUTCOME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002664

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2029
TAGS: PREL MOPS GR CY TU PINR
SUBJECT: TURKISH MILITARY WANTED YES/NO CYPRUS OUTCOME

REF: ANKARA 2204


(U) Classified by DCM Robert S. Deutsch. Reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).



1. (C) Summary: The Turkish General Staff is appreciative of
US and UK assistance in forging a balanced although
problematic Cyprus plan. TGS wanted the yes/no outcome from
the referenda, although it has no clear idea of where to go
from here. The Turkish military worries that Cyprus might
use its EU membership (or be used by others) to block
Turkey's accession. End Summary.



2. (C) TGS wanted a positive vote on the Annan Plan in
northern Cyprus and a negative vote in the south, according
to TGS/J5 Greece/Cyprus Chief RADM Mucahit Sislioglu (please
protect). He told PolMilCouns May 10 that while the Turkish
military was satisfied with the security provisions of the
plan, there were problems with other parts of the plan and
implementing it would have been "difficult." The biggest
worry for TGS was the cost (both financial and in human
terms) of relocating Turkish Cypriots displaced by land
returns. However, TGS did not oppose the plan because
relocations were mainly a matter for the government and not
the military to handle, and because TGS calculated that Greek
Cypriots would reject the plan. In fact, Sislioglu said he
told Prime Minister Erdogan in Switzerland in the final days
of the negotiation that the security provisions would likely
increase the no vote in the south by 20% and increase the yes
vote in the north by 15%. Nonetheless, Erdogan and Foreign
Minister Gul hoped that the plan would pass on both sides of
the island.



3. (C) Recalling TGS Chief Gen Ozkok's April 13 press
conference (reftel),Sislioglu said Ozkok had not wanted to
address the issue in public. Nonetheless, he was under
considerable pressure from "people" who wanted to know TGS's
position. Sislioglu said that he personally drafted Ozkok's
remarks which emphasized the negative aspects of the
agreement, but anticipated that the statement would prompt a
question about the positive aspects and prepared Ozkok for
it. He said he chose to emphasize the negative because the
public and the government needed to realize and prepare for
the difficulties that laid ahead in the event the plan was
adopted. At the same time, the positive security aspects of
the plan in the answer to the inevitable question would worry
the Greek Cypriots and reassure the Turkish Cypriots.



4. (C) Comment: Sislioglu, Ozkok and TGS Deputy Chief Basbug
were the only military officers who knew everything the
military was doing with the government and in the
negotiations. (Sislioglu lamented that his Cyprus staff
didn't have enough English to be useful, so he was "working
like a lieutenant," drafting papers, briefing the NSC, and
negotiating the security aspects of the agreement.) Last
April, there were as many "people" pressing for an
explanation of TGS's policy on Cyprus in the military as
outside it. Sislioglu admitted that Ozkok's words were
chosen carefully to send messages to several groups. These
included not only to the GOT and Greek Cypriots, but the
Turkish military as well. End comment.



5. (C) Sislioglu was complementary of the AK Party
government, noting that the negotiations turned out the way
they did largely due to the strong political decisions made
by the government. He noted that although the plan had
elements that the military did not like, it was the product
of a negotiation in which both sides had to compromise. He
agreed that the final product was a balanced agreement. He
expressed appreciation for the assistance of both the USG and
HMG; while Washington and London's help was not evident at
the beginning of the process, he said, it was quite clear in
Switzerland that both governments were working hard to be
helpful.



6. (C) Sislioglu was not sure of the way ahead. He worried
that as time goes on, anger at the GOC for opposing the plan
would fade and the diplomatic advantages Turkey and Turkish
Cypriots had gained from supporting it would evaporate.
Nicosia now had a stronger hand by virtue of its EU
membership and could cause problems for Turkey's EU
aspirations. For example, France might hide behind Cyprus to
keep Turkey from getting an accession negotiation date in
December, he feared.

7. (C) Comment: Sislioglu appeared to admire PM Erdogan and
his government's decisiveness on the Cyprus issue while being
critical of the government's acceptance of territorial
concessions. Although the military appears to have been
prepared to back the Annan Plan, it was with some reluctance.
We expect the military would resist any further concessions
if negotiations were reopened. End comment.
EDELMAN