Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ANKARA2560
2004-05-06 14:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY SAYS "NO THANKS" TO TDA FEASIBILITY STUDY

Tags:  ECIN ETRD PREL TU IZ 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002560 

SIPDIS


STATE FOR P, E, EUR/SE AND NEA/NGA
NSC FOR BRYZA AND MCKIBBEN


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2014
TAGS: ECIN ETRD PREL TU IZ
SUBJECT: TURKEY SAYS "NO THANKS" TO TDA FEASIBILITY STUDY
ON SECOND BORDER GATE

REF: ANKARA 2201


(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch. Reasons 1.4(b,d)


C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002560

SIPDIS


STATE FOR P, E, EUR/SE AND NEA/NGA
NSC FOR BRYZA AND MCKIBBEN


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2014
TAGS: ECIN ETRD PREL TU IZ
SUBJECT: TURKEY SAYS "NO THANKS" TO TDA FEASIBILITY STUDY
ON SECOND BORDER GATE

REF: ANKARA 2201


(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch. Reasons 1.4(b,d)



1. (C) MFA Deputy Director General for Middle East Affairs
Sakir Fakili told EconCouns May 5 that, while Turkish
authorities appreciated the U.S. offer (reftel) for TDA to
conduct a feasibility study on a second Turkish-Iraqi border
crossing, they felt such assistance was unnecessary given
that Turkey already has completed its own study. Fakili
reiterated the GOT view that its proposed crossing/route was
the only viable option, as it would alleviate traffic
congestion on the Iraqi side, facilitate control of the
Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline, and create the conditions for
a parallel rail line.



2. (C) EconCouns said the U.S. interest was in encouraging
Turkish-Iraqi trade, which promoted economic stability and
development on both sides of the border. It was up to
Turkish and Iraqi authorities to determine the location of
the crossing and relevant roads; the U.S. had offered the TDA
feasibility study as a way to accelerate progress. If the
Turks and Iraqis could reach agreement and begin constructing
a second crossing without U.S. help, that would be great, but
it would be unfortunate if disagreement over location
prevented trade from growing. He added that choice of the
route on the Iraqi side of a second border crossing would
seem to be a decision for the Iraqis to make.



3. (C) Fakili acknowledged the last point, but said Turkey
would "insist" on its proposed route. He added that the
Turkish feasibility study had determined the total cost of
the project -- including road and bridge construction on both
sides of the border, as well as the border gate itself -- to
be in the $70-80 million range. Financing was an open
question, and could be discussed if and when Iraqi
authorities agreed to the Turkish proposal.



4. (C) On May 6, PolMilOff was called into the MFA by Iraq
Department Head Serra Erarslan. Eraraslan, on instruction
from Deputy U/S Tuygan, complained that at the weekly border
talks, the US side regularly asks Turkey to increase the
throughput of trucks crossing the border, which Turkey tries
to do. However, she said, the US was unresponsive to Turkish
requests to address the treatment of Turkish citizens,
including truckers, and fees charged to Turks at Ibrahim
Khalil and in northern Iraq. She continued that Turkish
efforts at relations with Iraq in the new era have not been
favorably received by the US, and said the most important
example was the second border gate. Erarslan said that
Turkey's impression was that because the KDP was rejecting
the plan, the US was siding with the KDP. In light of this,
Erarslan concluded, continuing US requests to expedite trucks
at Habur were creating tension with the GOT in Ankara, and
that the GOT was "getting tired of it."



5. (C) PolMilOff replied that the US was decidedly not
siding with anyone on the issue of a second gate, favored the
establishment of the gate and increased Turkey-Iraq trade,
and was, via the TDA offer, prepared to spend US tax dollars
to help the Turks and Iraqis find middle ground, or at least
short and medium term solutions. Rejecting that assistance
and insisting on one plan would lead to a continued deadlock
on the issue. Erarslan replied that if the Iraqis could not
agree with the Turks on the details of a second gate, Turkey
would drop the project and all sides would have to content
themselves with Habur as the only crossing. She expressed
frustration that the Iraqis point the Turks to the US as the
decisive party on Iraq issues, and when the Turks come to the
USG, we point them back to the Iraqis. She said Turkey felt
it had no reliable interlocutor for these issues, and that US
promises, including to stop the illegal charging of fees by
the KDP and to institute the uniform 5 percent levy at Habur
on April 15 were not being kept. We promised to pass these
points back to Washington.





6. (U) CPA Baghdad minimize considered.
EDELMAN