Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ANKARA2231
2004-04-20 15:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKISH MFA LAYS OUT SERIOUS BUT FIXABLE PROBLEMS

Tags:  CY GR PREL TU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002231 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2014
TAGS: CY GR PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA LAYS OUT SERIOUS BUT FIXABLE PROBLEMS
WITH DRAFT CYPRUS UNSCR

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002231

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2014
TAGS: CY GR PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA LAYS OUT SERIOUS BUT FIXABLE PROBLEMS
WITH DRAFT CYPRUS UNSCR

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (C) This is an action request. See paragraph 8.



2. (C) Summary: In an April 20 meeting with Ambassador
Edelman and UK Ambassador Westmacott Turkish MFA officials
laid out objections to the timing and language of the draft
UNSCR on Cyprus. The Turks prefer a UNSCR be passed after
the referendum but understand a pre-referendum resolution may
help bring AKEL on board. MFA officials are seriously
concerned about implied reference to UNSCR 186; omission of
references to the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee and
rights of guarantor powers; and implications that the new UN
force will have "enforcement" power. Failure to address
these concerns might break the balance in Ankara,
particularly with the military. End Summary.



3. (C) MFA Deputy U/S Ilkin said the timing of the UNSCR is
premature; it should be after the referendum. The Turks took
Ambassador Edelman's point that the UNSCR is an effort to get
the GCs, particularly AKEL, to yes.



4. (C) Taken as a whole, the MFA thinks several aspects of
the draft fail to conform to the spirit and letter of the
Annan Plan.



5. (C) Ilkin noted the draft UNSCR made refers to "all
previous resolutions on Cyprus." By implication, this
includes UNSCR 186, which recognized the ROC as the sole
government of Cyprus. This, Ilkin argued, contradicts
Annan's "virgin birth" concept. Ilkin also noted that the
draft makes no reference to the Treaties of Alliance and
Guarantee. This is a sensitive point for the Turkish
military. While the Turks prefer no reference to UNSCRs,
Ambassador Edelman confirmed they will probably be satisfied
on these two points if the text is changed to read "all
relevant resolutions and treaties."



6. (C) Ziyal and Ilkin both expressed concern about the
draft's reference to Chapter VII. Ilkin said this changes
the UN force from a peacekeeping force to a "peace
enforcement" force. Cyprus Department Head Bilman noted that
the draft preamble refers to "a strengthened United Nations
operation to provide, inter alia, monitoring, verification
and supervision" of implementation. Bilman worries that the
phrase "inter alia" could be taken to imply enforcement. The
draft also omits a footnote in the Annan Plan Bilman said was
the subject of much bargaining in Burgenstock and was
crucial to gaining the Turkish military's assent: "58.
Observation: The United Nations operation would not assume
direct responsibility for the enforcement of law and order."



7. (C) We strongly recommend SCC Weston and USUN work
together for the following changes to the draft UNSCR:


-- Substitute the phrase "all relevant resolutions and
treaties" for "all previous resolutions on Cyprus."


-- Explicitly limit the reference to Chapter VII to the arms
embargo and explicitly exclude its relevance to peacekeeping
operations.


-- Delete the phrase "inter alia" and insert a reference to
footnote 58.



8. The MFA is sending us talking points detailing their
objections and requested changes. We will forward to the
Department, Embassy Nicosia, and USUN as soon as we receive
them.



9. (C) Comment: Even if the referendum fails on the GC
side, Ziyal worries this draft language, if unchanged, could
haunt the Ankara consensus and provide ammunition for
anti-solution forces in the military, bureaucracy and
Parliament as Ankara tries to move forward on Cyprus after
April 24. We share his concerns. End Summary.
EDELMAN