TURKEY'S CYPRUS ENDGAME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002026

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2014
TAGS: CY PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S CYPRUS ENDGAME

U) Classified by A/DCM Scot Marciel, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).



1. (C) Summary: Assuming an April 24 approval by both
Turkish and Greek Cypriots, Turkey's AKP government is poised
to play out its Cyprus endgame with the military, President
Sezer, and the Parliament. In a stormy April 5 meeting of
Turkey's National Security Council (NSC),the military and
President Sezer expressed deep concern about whether the EU
will follow through on Verheugen's promises to make a Cyprus
agreement primary law. The UK is working with the EU to
prepare a concrete response to Turkish concerns. If primary
law concerns are met, the AKP government parliamentary
majority appears sufficient to approve the agreement despite
possible defections among nationalistic deputies. President
Sezer must approve the agreement; there is a danger he may
not approve absent further guarantees on making the agreement
primary law. The GOT hopes for a clear message of financial
support from the April 15 pre-donors conference to answer
concerns about displaced Turkish Cypriots. Turkish public
opinion on the agreement is generally positive, but there is
a reservoir of permanent opposition. End Summary.



2. (C) Despite AKP's big win in the March 28 municipal
elections, Erdogan faces the tough political challenge of
gaining Turkish acceptance of the draft Cyprus settlement.
This is a challenge with immediate ramifications for the
strength of his prime ministership and leadership of the
party. He has undertaken -- and was unambiguously stuck with
full responsibility by the military in the April 5 NSC
meeting -- to sell the settlement to his AKP parliamentary
group and to work for acceptance by the Turkish Cypriots.


NSC Stormy Over Primary Law



3. (C) After Burgenstock, Turkey's National Security Council
(NSC) discussed Cyprus on April 1 and again on April 5. The
NSC statement following the April 5 meeting was pointed,
declaring that the agreement does not meet all Turkey's
demands, "although it has some positive points." The
statement laid responsibility for implementing the agreement,
including making it primary law, squarely on the AKP
government.



4. (C) On April 6, MFA U/S Ziyal told UK Ambassador
Westmacott that the April 5 meeting was difficult and stormy,
according to what Westmacott relayed to Ambassador Edelman.
Although the military's earlier redlines had been met and
they could not point to deficiencies in the agreement,
military reps on the NSC expressed deep concern over whether
the EU would follow through on Verheugen's promises to make
the agreement primary law. Westmacott told Ambassador
Edelman that London is working with the EU to prepare
something more concrete to meet Turkish concerns; Westmacott
sees no need for specific USG action at this point.



5. (C) MFA Northeastern Mediterranean Affairs DDG Eguz
corroborated Ziyal's account of the April 5 meeting. Eguz
said both President Sezer and the military focused on the
primary law issue, and also the fate of TCs who will be
displaced by the agreement. Like Ziyal, Eguz expressed
serious concern about the primary law issue. Eguz thinks it
"self-evident" that the Greek Parliament will approve making
the agreement primary law if the GCs have passed the
referendum. However, he emphasized that some in the NSC
deeply mistrust Verheugen's guarantees and want to see an
"irreversible" act toward making the agreement primary law.



6. (C) On the issue of displaced TCs, Eguz said the GOT
needs a clear message of financial support from the April 15
pre-donors' conference.


Parliament



7. (C) If the agreement passes both referenda and primary
law concerns are met, AKP's solid parliamentary majority (367
of 550 deputies) currently appears sufficient to approve the
agreement. Approval will require a simple majority of those
present. Abstentions will in effect count as votes against.
DDG Eguz expects the agreement to go to Parliament April 25
or 26.



8. (C) AKP vice chairman for policy Dengir Firat told us
April 2 that AKP will not adopt a group decision requiring
parliamentarians to vote in favor. PM Erdogan remains
personally opposed to that approach and will instead seek to
"convince" parliamentarians. In this regard Erdogan is in
firm control of the party and is willing to expend enormous
political capital to secure a settlement. Most AKP
parliamentarians know little about the details of the
agreement and look to Erdogan for leadership. According to
Firat, AKP will prevent deputies opposed to the agreement
from speaking out against it or campaigning against it either
in Turkey or on the island. Main opposition CHP, drubbed in
Turkey's March 28 municipal elections, is unlikely to mount
an effective opposition campaign outside of its own 175
deputies.

9. (C) Nevertheless, Firat conceded there may well be
defections from AKP, mostly among parliamentarians with roots
in the ultra-nationalist MHP. Firat professes not to be
worried that this will cut significantly into AKP's majority.
Ex-parliamentarian Hasim Hasimi and prominent anti-Cyprus
solution columnist and professor Hasan Unal both estimate the
number of MHP-origin AKP deputies at more than 50.



10. (C) Hasimi doubts that many will defect in the face of
strong leadership from Erdogan. If Erdogan requires an open
vote similar to the October 7 vote on Turkish troop
deployment to Iraq, AKP parliamentarians will have to look
the PM in the eye and openly oppose one of the biggest
efforts of his political career. Still, Unal points out that
MHP's ten-plus percent showing in the March 28 elections
shows MHP might again enter Parliament in a future general
election. He speculated, with some wishful thinking, that
MHP-oriented deputies might seek to defect and form an MHP
parliamentary group if they want to defy Erdogan.


Sezer Might Not Approve Absent Steps on Primary Law



11. (C) If Parliament approves, President Sezer has to sign
or reject the agreement by April 29. Sezer's focus thus far
has been the primary law issue. DDG Eguz worries there is a
"real danger" Sezer may not approve the agreement absent some
further "irreversible" step from the Council on the primary
law issue.



12. (C) If Sezer approves the agreement, prospects for a
successful court challenge appear weak: under Article 90 of
Turkey's Constitution, "international agreements" cannot be
challenged on a constitutional basis.


Public Opinion



13. (U) In the immediate aftermath of Burgenstock, most
Turkish media portrayed the agreement as meeting Turkey's
essential demands. Some media went even further, gloating
about a Turkish "victory" over the Greek Cypriots. Even
nationalist Turkiye newspaper's April 2 headline trumpeted
"The World Sees Cyprus Talks in Switzerland as a Victory for
the Turks." Subsequent media coverage has been more sober,
pointing out both pluses and minuses of the plan for Turkey.



14. (U) Turkish public opinion, which a few weeks ago was
negative on the Annan Plan, was swinging around in favor of
an Annan Plan-based solution before the agreement. Poll
numbers on an Annan Plan-based solution have climbed steadily
over the last four months. A November 2003 poll showed 16%
for, 53% against, 30% undecided; by January, the numbers were
up to 23% for, 39% against, 38% undecided. By March, polls
showed 47% of the public in favor of an Annan Plan-based
solution, 38% against, 14% undecided. However, the same
March poll yielded a contradictory result when respondents
were asked about the GOT handling of Cyprus policy: while
57% of AK's supporters approved, only 38% of the overall
public approved, versus 49% disapproval and 13% undecided.



15. (C) AKP is currently Turkey's best-organized party, and
the rank and file, like its parliamentarians, will follow
Erdogan's lead. However, Firat estimates that AKP's Cyprus
stance cost it 5%-6% in the municipal elections. Unal
attributes MHP's increased voting percentage (10.47% in
March, compared to 8.36% in November 2003 general elections)
to AKP's MHP-origin voters defecting over displeasure about
Cyprus.


Denktash's "No" Campaign



16. (C) Rauf Denktash is in the middle of a "no" campaign in
Turkey, including a vintage stem-winder speech to a friendly
audience in Bursa and meetings with President Sezer and PM
Erdogan. The campaign has aroused those already opposed to
any agreement, but we see no evidence thus far that Denktash
has made inroads beyond that. Our MFA contacts are not
worried the Denktash campaign will undo Ankara's internal
consensus.


Comment



17. (C) EU action along the lines of the April 2 paper Ziyal
passed to Ambassador Edelman (e-mailed to the Department and
Embassy Nicosia April 7) is now more important than ever to
keeping Ankara's internal consensus together. The April 5
NSC meeting reveals the fissure that could develop -- the AK
government on one side, the military and President on the
other -- if this concern goes unmet.



18. (C) In this regard, Erdogan must (1) manage the
calculated public ambivalence of the Turkish military; (2)
blunt the effect of Denktash's anti-settlement media
campaign; (3) keep careful tabs on the thinking of narrowly
legalistic President Sezer; and (4) control the temptation
for major AK figures like Parliamentary Speaker Arinc and
Deputy PM Sener to use the Cyprus issue for their own
political ambitions. However, sharing Erdogan's
self-confidence, AKP contacts, from Firat to various other
deputies, are convinced Erdogan will have no trouble
convincing his parliamentary group to support ratification of
an affirmative TC referendum; we will be making the rounds of
our party contacts to gauge the effectiveness of Erdogan's
forcefully delivered April 6 parliamentary group speech and
the pro-settlement booklet AKP circulated to its deputies.
EDELMAN