Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ANKARA1928
2004-04-02 06:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR THE APRIL 2004 VISIT OF GENERAL

Tags:  PREL MOPS CY IZ TU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 001928 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2014
TAGS: PREL MOPS CY IZ TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE APRIL 2004 VISIT OF GENERAL
JUMPER, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman; Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 001928

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2014
TAGS: PREL MOPS CY IZ TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE APRIL 2004 VISIT OF GENERAL
JUMPER, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman; Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).



1. (C) Summary: Your visit to Turkey comes at a time when
the US-TU relationship is generally on the mend. It has been
more than a year since the 1 March vote and 6 months since
the 7 October vote and the "soft landing". Once again,
generally, the US-TU relationship is best approached from a
multi-faceted perspective, not just a one-issue
relationship-Iraq. This is a particularly dynamic period for
Turkey as it is dealing with several high stakes issues:
Cyprus, EU Accession, Istanbul Summit, and just-completed
local elections. Further, Turkey is also dealing with a
range of other important issues: Iraq: PKK & the TAL, GME,
Med Dialogue and enhanced NATO engagement in the region, the
Global Posture Review, and Afghanistan. End Summary.


--------------
Current Events
--------------



2. (C) Your visit comes on the heels of Turkish DCHOD General
Basbug's March counterpart visit to the United States.
General Basbug's meetings were characterized by candid and
sometimes difficult discussions. Basbug expressed Turkish
frustration and disappointment at a lack of US progress
towards dealing with the PKK-Kadek and contended the US
needed to demonstrate its resolve and take tangible action.
On Iraq, Basbug noted Turkish concerns about the TAL, the
transfer of authority in June, Iraqi territorial integrity,
rights of the Turkomen, and keeping TU Special Forces in Iraq
until the PKK/KADEK threat is removed, even if that is after
July.



3. (C) Your visit also follows the 29 March meetings between
MG Jeff Kohler (EUCOM J-5),MG Arslan (Strategy, TGS J-5),
and MG Kalyoncu (Deputy, TGS J-3). They discussed a variety
of topics, focusing primarily on the Caucasus. The general
atmosphere was that the Caucasus Working Group has been
revitalized and is performing well. Other initiatives, like
the Caucasus Clearinghouse, bilateral training, support, and
Caspian Guard are viewed by both the US and TU as adding to
regional stability.



4. (C) Additionally, one week prior to your arrival, Turkey
held nation-wide municipal elections. Prime Minister

Erdogan's AK Party, as expected, made further gains. This
was the first major election since the AK Party came to power
in 2002. With a larger vote total, the AK Party will likely
be held to a higher standard; they will be held responsible
for issues across the spectrum in Turkey. The AK Party will
have more authority, but more responsibility as well.


--------------
Greater Middle East Initiative (GME)
--------------



5. (C) Turkey wants to know what GME means in the region and
what the US is looking for from Turkey in the way of
support/assistance; how do we intend to work this with
countries of the region and NATO. GME has been the subject
of considerable press commentary in Turkey. It has been
mostly negative and reflecting chronic suspicions about U.S.
motives and paranoia that the U.S.'s real aim is to turn GME
against Turkey and remove the Kemalist State structure.
Recently, however the basics of the GME Initiative appear to
be gaining somewhat greater acceptance among Turkish
Officials as more information and details are presented. One
official noted he thought most people in the region would
support it if it were presented in a clear and concise
manner. He also pointed out that the US needed to make more
efforts to explain the initiative to win over world public
opinion. Turkish officials have been careful in underscoring
the need to avoid characterizing Turkey as a Muslim or
Islamic state (which it is not),
instead of as a secular democracy with a predominantly
moderate Muslim population that it is.


--------------
CYPRUS
--------------



6. (C) TGS is being careful not to comment in public on the
course of Cyprus negotiations. TGS only cautiously agreed to
the government's wish to move Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash
and the Turkish Cypriots back to the bargaining table and it
appears TGS insisted on a number of red lines. However, TGS
remains concerned lest a settlement (1) draw a line between
the two communities which TGS considers militarily
indefensible; (2) lead to a reduction of Turkish troops below
6,000 prior to Turkey's EU entry; and (3) impose what TGS
considers onerous reporting requirements for troop movements.
We continue to emphasize (1) the credit redounding to Turkey
broadly (not just the government) from its initiative to
re-open negotiations; (2) the crucial importance to Turkey's
success overall (well beyond the question of a start date for
EU accession negotiations) of a settlement in Cyprus; and (3)
the importance of Turkey's maintaining its constructive,
common sense, cool-handed line in the negotiations, i.e., to
av
oid being provoked by the Greek Cypriots into abandoning the
negotiations.


--------------
EU Accession
--------------



7. (C) Turkey's current focus on EU accession has been a
ready vehicle for the internal changes Turkey needs to be
successful. Although the Copenhagen Criteria are a de facto
external discipline, there is widespread sentiment that these
are things Turkey needs to do for its own good.



8. (C) Turkey's success is not a given. The Turks have done
well in passing laws, but now need to implement them, as well
as to adopt additional legislative reforms. Everyday life
across Turkey yields examples where the basic elements of
individual rights and rule of law are not respected.
Turkey's EU supporters' stress that complacency now will
jeopardize Turkey's chances of getting a date to begin
accession negotiations in December. Even if Turkey does
begin accession talks, the road will be arduous and could
take 6-10 years. Faced with a long haul, the current
political focus and burst of energy for reforms could fail.



9. (C) The Turkish economy has improved significantly over
the past year, greatly reducing fears of renewed financial
crisis and generating hope for sustained, low-inflation
growth. However, this improvement has generated complacency
among government leaders, who fail to understand that the
economy's huge debt and structural weaknesses leave it
vulnerable. Unless Turkey implements reforms systematically,
it will miss the opportunity to move toward sustainable
prosperity and away from the boom-and-bust cycles that have
haunted it.


--------------
Istanbul Summit
--------------



10. (C) The President is scheduled for a bilateral visit
immediately prior to the NATO Summit June 27-29. NRF has
been recommended as a good option to augment civilian
security forces if needed. As Turkey would provide the
preponderance of the ground troops, TU would be in the
forefront. The US is encouraging Turkey to present any
requests for additional security assistance through NATO, but
so far there has only been a formal request to NATO for AWACS
support.



11. (C) The image of the Summit's occurring in Istanbul
provides an opportunity to showcase Turkey and its role in
both the institutions of Europe and the GME initiative.
Turkey's geographic and historic role as a bridge between
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East will provide an appropriate
backdrop to the Summit's emphasis on GME, Med Dialogue,
expanding PfP opportunities with the Caucasus and Central
Asia. Turkey's active support for these initiatives would
further underscore the important role Turkey plays in NATO
and its neighboring regions.


--------------
IRAQ
--------------

12. (C) PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL: Turkey is anxious for action to
be taken against the PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL. Basbug and others
have expressed continued frustration at a perceived US lack
of action against the PKK. In general, many in TGS have felt
Turkey has provided the US with a range of information for
use in combating the PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL and have seen
little in return. Some in TGS see the need for a
well-thought-out comprehensive plan to eliminate the
PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL. They also realize this is a long-term
and laborious effort. However, many within Turkey, and
especially within the TGS, see a real need for immediate
tangible action as a counter to the public/media.



13. (C) Transitional Administrative Law (TAL): GOT reacted
harshly to the terms of the TAL. It views the process of its
development as undemocratic; the result as dividing Iraq into
a pure ethnic federation; and the treatment of the Turkomen
as belittling. The result, it believes is inconsistent with
the presentation to date by the U.S. including in the recent
letter from the President to PM Erdogan. Turkey believes it
has been frozen out of US Iraq operations and treated in a
manner unbecoming an ally. It is not yet clear how far our
explanations of the process so far and in perspective have
gone to put aside those concerns, but the number of
complaints about the TAL have diminished.


--------------
Afghanistan
--------------



14. (C) Afghan Coordinator Taylor held wide-ranging and
candid consultations with MFA and TGS officials in Ankara on
March 12. Turkish officials stressed the theme of
"Afghanistan for Afghans" throughout the talks, arguing their
commitment to stabilization and reconstruction efforts there
are not motivated by a desire to support one ethnic group
over another. They reiterated their interest in establishing
a PRT in northern Afghanistan and are waiting for SHAPE to
respond formally to their proposal. MFA officials exhibited
varying degrees of flexibility on location and reluctantly
accepted the importance of having SHAPE and the Afghan
government coordinate in the overall PRT decision-making
process. The Turks also reiterated their interest in
increasing their contributions to ANA and police training,
but hinted that such steps would likely be predicated on
establishing a PRT. The Turks likewise intend to move ahead
(independent of the PRT decision) with plans to deepen their
involvement in education, medical and agriculture
reconstruction projects in the north, while making clear that
a PRT would greatly facilitate such efforts.


--------------
Incirlik AFB
--------------



15. (C) The Turks are still awaiting a second round of
consultations on global force posture. TGS has heard
rumblings about different potential operational needs or
developments. In fact, during the TU DCHOD's recent visit,
Gen. Pace informally mentioned the possible F-16 move and
noted further additional discussions with Turkey would take
place if Turkey was the preferred option. None of these
issues have been taken to the political leadership at this
point and it would not be useful to get the TGS significantly
out in front in trying to obtain continuous changes to
approved operations. The authority for OIF II concludes on
April 30, and there has been no sustained engagement with the
GOT/TGS on other operational requirements. Of note, the
resolution authorizing the deployment and employment of US
tankers at Incirlik and the OIF troop rotation expires in
June 04. Ambassador Edelman strongly believes DoD should
perform a comprehensive review of the potential desired uses
for Incirlik before approaching the GOT. The USG could
present the total concept and carry out only one set of
potentially protracted negotiations, vice the numerous sets
of negotiations were we to bring our request to the Turks
piecemeal. Turkish interpretations of our general
arrangements form a relatively high political bar for
establishing different operational requirements at Incirlik.


EDELMAN