THE SECOND IRAQ-TURKEY BORDER CROSSING; ANKARA'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001840

SIPDIS


STATE FOR U/S GROSSMAN
NSC FOR FRANK MILLER


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2014
TAGS: ECIN ETRD IZ PREL TU
SUBJECT: THE SECOND IRAQ-TURKEY BORDER CROSSING; ANKARA'S
THOUGHTS ON A WAY FORWARD

REF: A. ANKARA 1788

B. ANKARA 1653


Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman for reasons 1.5 (b) and
(d).



1. (U) Summary: Iraq and Turkey agreed in December 2003 to
build a second border crossing; however, they have not been
able to reach agreement on the location and associated
issues, such as the connecting road in Iraq and financing
(ref b). Although the backlog at the border has improved
somewhat of late, we are concerned that traffic will increase
significantly as normal trade increases and as material and
equipment is delivered to Iraq for large infrastructure
projects. We recommend that Washington consider funding a
feasibility study to help Iraq and Turkey reach agreement on
the second border. End Summary.


Border Talks Stalled



2. (C) Although political/security concerns are a
significant factor, both sides use economic arguments to
promote their competing proposals. The Turks say that their
proposal to build a second crossing to the west with a 50 km
road to Mosul would diversify routes (reduce potential
bottlenecks) and avoid the rough terrain of the current route
through Zakho. The Iraqis counter that a crossing nearer to
the present Habur Gate would be cheaper and would not require
bridges across the Tigris or significant new roads. These
arguments have not been resolved because neither side has
done the necessary feasibility studies to examine the costs
and benefits of the competing proposals. Although the
political/security concerns will need to be worked out by the
Turks and Iraqis, we think that we can help them resolve the
economic issues by funding a feasibility study of the
proposals. We recommend that State Department officials
discuss this proposal with TDA.


Next Steps



3. (SBU) We have discussed this idea with local TDA rep.
Jennifer Snyder, who explained that a feasibility study would
require at least 6 months to complete. She said the Turkish
government and an entity in Iraq must request the study, and
there must be adequate potential financing to complete the
project. Turkish officials offered to finance the entire
project but were not clear about the details. The first step
would be for TDA to hire a consultant to examine the sites
and prepare the terms of reference and budget for the
feasibility study. It may be possible, Snyder noted, for TDA
to hire the consultant even before receiving a formal request
from the Turkish government. She said the consultant could
prepare a preliminary cost estimate of the competing sites.



4. (U) If Washington agrees, we will approach Turkish
authorities about the proposal and ask them to submit a
formal request to TDA. We will consult with TDA and CPA
about a corresponding request from an Iraqi entity.


Potential Problems



5. (C) Although we hope the GOT will endorse our offer,
Turkish officials may be somewhat reluctant to agree to an
independent examination of the cost/benefits of the two
proposals. On the political side, Turkey is extremely
sensitive about issues in Iraq, especially concerning the
Kurds and Turkmen (ref a). The Turkish-proposed route would
skirt the Kurdish-majority territory in northern Iraq and
connect to the Turkmen city of Tal Afar. Turkish officials
on the margins of the February talks in Ankara confided that
the site of the crossing was of secondary importance; what
mattered to them was the road through Tal Afar. In addition,
an independent study would highlight the higher cost of the
Turkish proposal and might reveal some cost padding by the
Turks. In January, Turkish officials on the margins of the
talks in Cizre estimated the cost of their proposal at about
$80 million and offered to take care of the financing. One
option they floated was to swap Iraqi crude to cover the
construction costs, which we suspect would not turn out to be
a great deal for Iraq.


Comment: A More Ambitious Vision



6. (SBU) The recommendation for a TDA study would help to
address an important near-term need to enlarge the capacity
at the border to process needed supplies and growing
bilateral trade. However, we think that Washington should
also begin to think about the medium and long term
opportunities presented by the growing commercial
relationship between Iraq and Turkey. Our experience with
Turkish cooperation on our Caspian policy may provide a model
for using Turkey as a hub for Iraq's energy and commercial
ties to the West. Turkey has been a committed partner in our
initiative to bring Caspian energy resources to world markets
and bolster the independence and development of the Caspian
countries. Some Turkish officials have suggested that we
build on that model of Turkey as a energy hub -- in this case
Turkey would provide the corridor for Middle Eastern
(primarily Iraqi) energy to Europe and other world markets,
helping us achieve our goal of greater diversity and security
of energy supply routes. Separately, Turkish officials have
been eager to take advantage of the liberation and
reconstruction of Iraq to build a strong commercial
relationship with Iraq. These Turkish initiatives can help
to promote U.S. policy goals for Iraq and the Greater Middle
East. And as Turkey moves closer to the EU, its success as a
progressive, predominantly Moslem country can be a compelling
model for the aspirations of Iraq and others to emulate. We
propose that Washington consider additional TDA
infrastructure studies of projects using Turkey as an energy,
commercial and transportation corridor linking Iraq and the
Greater Middle East to Europe. End Comment.
EDELMAN