Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ANKARA1711
2004-03-23 07:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

AFGHAN COORDINATOR TAYLOR'S VISIT TO ANKARA

Tags:  AF MARR PREL TU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 001711 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2029
TAGS: AF MARR PREL TU
SUBJECT: AFGHAN COORDINATOR TAYLOR'S VISIT TO ANKARA

REF: A)ANKARA 1382 B)STATE 50477 C)ANKARA 1318
D)ANKARA 1162 E) ANKARA 1005


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 001711

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2029
TAGS: AF MARR PREL TU
SUBJECT: AFGHAN COORDINATOR TAYLOR'S VISIT TO ANKARA

REF: A)ANKARA 1382 B)STATE 50477 C)ANKARA 1318
D)ANKARA 1162 E) ANKARA 1005


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).



1. (C) Summary: Afghan Coordinator Taylor held wide-ranging
and candid consultations with MFA and TGS officials in Ankara
on March 12. Turkish officials stressed the theme of
"Afghanistan for Afghans" throughout the talks, arguing their
commitment to stabilization and reconstruction efforts there
are not motivated by a desire to support one ethnic group
over another. They reiterated their interest in establishing
a PRT in northern Afghanistan and are waiting for SHAPE to
respond formally to their proposal. MFA officials exhibited
varying degrees of flexibility on location and reluctantly
accepted the importance of having SHAPE and the Afghan
government coordinate in the overall PRT decision-making
process. The Turks also reiterated their interest in
increasing their contributions to ANA and police training,
but hinted that such steps would likely be predicated on
establishing a PRT. The Turks likewise intend to move ahead
(independent of the PRT decision) with plans to deepen their
involvement in education, medical and agriculture
reconstruction projects in the north, while making clear that
a PRT would greatly facilitate such efforts. End Summary.



2. (C) Afghanistan Coordinator Ambassador Taylor and JCS/J5
South Asia Branch Chief Col Schrader, accompanied by Embassy
officials, held wide-ranging consultations with MFA and TGS
officials March 12 in Ankara. MFA Deputy U/S for Bilateral
Affairs Ali Tuygan led the Turkish delegation that included
senior MFA officials from South Asian and NATO Affairs, as
well as an officer from the Turkish General Staff (TGS). The
delegation also met separately with TGS Deputy J3 for
Operations Major General Bekir Kalyoncu and other TGS
officers.


--------------
AFGHANISTAN FOR AFGHANS
--------------


--------------
ELECTIONS
--------------



3. (C) Ambassador Taylor said the US, the UN and the Afghan
government were focused on the elections. Timing was key.
Noting that the Afghanistan constitution calls for
presidential and parliamentary elections to occur

simultaneously, he said the US believed it was important to
make every effort to try to convene both elections by June

2004. Taylor reported that the UN got a late start on
election preparations. Much would depend on the UN,s
ability to increase registration throughout the country.
Admitting that the cost caused some sticker shock for
international donors, Taylor said the registration process
will cost USD 90 million and simultaneous elections will cost
USD 46 million. He stressed the need for the international
community to provide adequate resources for voter
registration/election day voting, and the necessary security
forces to ensure that Afghans are able to vote free of
intimidation. President Karzai is also committed to
convening the elections in June and wants to avoid any delay.





4. (C) Tuygan opened the meeting by thanking Ambassador
Taylor for coming to Ankara to hold formal discussions with
GOT officials on Afghanistan. He reaffirmed Turkey,s
commitment to reconstruction and stabilization efforts in
Afghanistan, and stressed the theme of &Afghanistan for
Afghans8 throughout the talks. As Afghanistan works through
an important period, the international community must work to
ensure movement toward a more balanced representation of all
ethnic groups to avoid past patterns of one group dominating
another. Ensuring a sense of fairness and justice will be
important to pave the way for a smooth transfer of power.



5. (C) Deputy U/S Tuygan said that he agreed in principle
that it was important to stick to a specific date. But if
the registration process does not reach an adequate level
within a reasonable amount of time, it would not be a good
idea to go ahead with elections. He added that if elections
must be postponed, it should be for as little time as
possible. In the event that presidential and parliamentary
elections need to be split, they should be as close together
as possible. In the end, the Afghans must decided for
themselves.


--------------
PRTS
--------------



6. (C) Both Deputy U/S Tuygan and MG Kalyoncu noted that
earlier in the week Turkey had submitted three options for
establishing a PRT in northern Afghanistan to SHAPE (ref A).
Tuygan noted that Turkey,s initial proposal to establish a
PRT was made in response to the fact that the existing UK PRT
did not cover all of the northern region, and the premise
that the UK would welcome it. For security, cultural, and
linguistic reasons, a Turkish-led PRT in the north
represented the best chance of success for Turkey. DDG for
NATO Affairs Ceylan stressed that there were important
logistical and operational reasons why Turkey believed it was
important to establish a PRT in the north.



7. (C) Ceylan said it was important for NATO and the Allies
to follow established NATO procedures during its operations
in Afghanistan. He noted that SHAPE,s Stage 1 and Stage 2
priorities for the deployment of PRTs had created confusion
among the Allies, including Turkey. He added that Turkey had
also received some mixed signals from the US since putting
forth its proposal on February 20 (ref B). Turkey,s
proposal had been included in the list of requirements
generated by SHAPE at the March 11 Force Generation
Conference. The GOT believed that the three options put
forth by Turkey provided SHAPE with a considerable degree of
flexibility to consider, and added that Turkey was currently
waiting for a formal response from SHAPE.



8. (C) Ambassador Taylor welcomed the Turkish proposal to
establish a PRT in Afghanistan. While recognizing the
importance of integrating individual countries, proposals
into SHAPE,s operational planning requirements, Taylor
stressed the importance of the Afghan national government )
through the PRT executive committee in Kabul ) in guiding
the location of PRTs. From the outset, President Karzai has
played a leading role in determining the location of PRTs )
including US-led ones. It is important for SHAPE to continue
to discuss the location of PRTs with Afghan authorities.



9. (C) Ambassador Taylor added that he had just come from
London, where he had discussed the issue of PRTs with the
British and the Italians. Both welcomed Turkey,s offer as
another expression of the Alliance's willingness to succeed
in Afghanistan. He noted that the areas within northern
Afghanistan identified by SHAPE as Stage 1 appeared to be
covered by the existing and soon-to-be-formed UK PRTs. The
UK already led an existing PRT, and intended to establish a
forward operating base in Mazar and a second PRT in Faryab
province in the northwest. He added that the Italians had
offered to take over the US-led PRT in Herat and to establish
a forward operating base in the province as well that would
provide a supporting function to PRTs in the region. Taylor
said that the Italians had expressed an interest in working
with the Turks in that region. Taylor said that based on
his understanding of the current situations, there appeared
to be an opportunity to find an acceptable solution ) for
SHAPE, the Afghan central government and Turkey ) that
involved a Turkish-led PRT in Badghis, based on the fact that
Badghis appeared on the Turkish list. Tuygan replied &let's
wait and see how SHAPE responds to our proposal.8 Kalyoncu
was more direct: &if one of our three proposals is not
accepted by SHAPE, we will not do anything.8 (Comment: This
comment likely reflects that the Turkish military is a
reluctant participant in Turkey's PRT proposal.)


-------------- --------------
TURKEY: COMMITTED TO NOT SUPPORTING ONE GROUP OVER ANOTHER
-------------- --------------



10. (C) Tuygan stated that Turkey,s interest in establishing
a PRT in the north was not to support a single group (i.e.
Dostum). We want to be 100 percent sure, he emphasized, that
there is no question about our objectives. The Turkish
military demonstrated in exemplary fashion in the past, both
in the Balkans and more recently in Afghanistan as leader of
ISAF II, that it is capable of acting in an even-handed and
neutral manner. Tuygan noted that Turkish soldiers helped
repair not only mosques but also churches in the Balkans. MG
Kayloncu argued that Turkish soldiers are trained to be
neutral before they deploy abroad and have behaved
accordingly. He noted that when disputes erupted between
different groups in the Balkans and there was a need for
arbitration or mediation by a third party, the parties often
times turned to the Turkish battalion commander.



11. (C) Specifically turning to Dostum, Tuygan said that
Turkey has been advising Dostum for some time that ×
have changed in Afghanistan,8 and that he needs to make the
transition from a regional player and act like a political
leader of a party. He argued that by establishing a PRT in
the north, Turkey could take advantage of its ties and
influence with the parties there to bring about positive
developments. He said that Turkey believes that Dostum has
made some progress in this area given the circumstances.
Tuygan argued that last fall there was considerable pressure
on Dostum to expedite the DDR process at the very time when
there was increase in Taliban activity in the south and a
move to the north. Too radical a push for change in the
north at such a time would have led to incredible instability
there. While Turkey is committed to continuing to tell
Dostum to comply with the DDR process, Tuygan argued that a
sense of justice is needed and it will be equally important
that it be done on a fair, equal basis across the country.



12. (C) Taylor acknowledged that similar language, cultural
affinity and familiarity with the local population could all
be positive factors in helping Turkey succeed in the north.
However, these factors cut both ways. In Afghanistan, where
a number of ethnic rivalries are at play, perceptions )-
especially among the Afghans ) are important. If Turkey was
in the north and a dispute between ethnic groups was to break
out, there might be a perception that Turkey would side with
one group over another.


--------------
DONOR'S CONFERENCE IN BERLIN
--------------



13. (C) Ambassador Taylor said the upcoming Afghan donors
conference in Berlin at the end of the month was a defining
moment for the Afghans and the international community.
Noting that the Secretary and other important world leaders
were committed to attend, Taylor urged MFA officials to
encourage FM Gul to attend the conference. (Note: After the
morning session at the MFA, Ambassador Taylor met FM Gul
before the latter spoke to the press, and encouraged him to
attend the conference. Gul was non-committal. MFA officials
had told us the previous night that there may be an
extraordinary NSC meeting on Cyprus around the same time as
the conference and therefore Gul may not be able to attend.
End note.)



14. (C) Ambassador Taylor added there were a number of
important objectives. First, it would be an important time
for the international community to pledge much-needed
resources for the immediate term (i.e. upcoming fiscal year)
in Afghanistan. Second, it would serve to press the Afghan
government to make important political decisions, including
when to convene elections. Third, the Afghans and the
international community needed to step up their commitments
in security sector reform.



15. (C) Taylor said that Afghan Finance Minister Ghani will
present a study showing that Afghanistan will need USD 28
billion in the coming 7 years. Taylor and Tuygan agreed that
this figure should not be our goal in Berlin. The measure of
success, they agreed, was donor pledges to cover the GOA's
budget needs for the coming fiscal year.



16. (C) JCS Col Schrader outlined US plans for the training
of the Afghan National Army (ANA),provided the Turkish
delegation with papers identifying the needs of the ANA, and
asked GOT officials to consider offering mobile training or
embedded training teams. Amb. Taylor added that police
training was another area in need of assistance, noting that
the regional training centers (RTCs) established by the US
and others at PRTs were making major contributions to overall
police training efforts in Afghanistan. Deputy U/S Tuygan
noted that Turkey remained interested in contributing to the
ANA training efforts in principle, but hinted that the
Turkish military might be constrained by budgetary limits,
given the large number of active training programs elsewhere
(i.e. Georgia, Albania, Azerbaijan). MG Kalyoncu merely
noted the requirement.



17. (C) MFA officials provided Ambassador Taylor with a
detailed briefing of Turkey,s assistance projects. Turkey
has exceeded its original pledge of USD 5 million and has
committed an additional USD 5 million over the next three
years. Turkey,s program will continue to emphasize projects
in education, health and agriculture. Turkey has built and
restored a number of clinics and is looking for some help to
manage the hospitals. Taylor encouraged Turkish officials to
contact USAID officials in Kabul. He also suggested that a
USAID official could be assigned to the Turkish PRT, which
would help both sides coordinate assistance efforts. Tuygan
noted that Turkey was currently providing training to 15
Afghan diplomats in Ankara ) the fourth group of 15 over the
past year and a half.



18. (U) Ambassador Taylor has cleared this message.



19. (U) Kabul minimize considered.
EDELMAN