GEORGIA ASKS TURKEY TO CLOSE BORDER, FREEZE AJARAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001585

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2014
TAGS: GG PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: GEORGIA ASKS TURKEY TO CLOSE BORDER, FREEZE AJARAN
ASSETS; TURKS BALKING

REF: 16 MARCH PASCOE/TEZGOR TELCON


(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (C) Summary: Georgian Embassy says GOG asked Turkey
March 15 to close its border crossing with Ajara and freeze
Ajaran assets. Turks have temporized and probably will not
respond positively. Turkish MFA Caucasus DDG Tezgor claims
the GOT (1) supports Georgian territorial integrity and
sovereignty; (2) hopes the confrontation can be resolved
peacefully; (3) does not like Abashidze, but thinks Ajara
should remain autonomous. Tezgor asserts he has "no doubts"
Russia supports Georgian territorial integrity and
sovereignty, and thinks Russia should be consulted about how
to resolve the confrontation. End Summary.


GOG Requests Border Closing, Asset Freeze; Turks Temporize



2. (C) Georgian DCM Tabatadze told us March 16 the Georgians
demarched Turkish MFA DirGen Akinci March 15 to request that
Turkey close the Turkey-Ajara border crossing at Sarp. While
claiming Turkey fully supports the GOG, Akinci temporized,
asking the GOG to send a formal written request to the MFA
and merely undertaking to "discuss" the matter once the
formal written request arrives. Tabatadze said the formal
GOG request is forthcoming. Tabatadze "cannot rule out" the
possibility the GOG will send a special envoy to Turkey to
reiterate the GOG requests.



3. (C) Tabatadze attributes what he characterizes as MFA
reluctance on the GOG requests to concern over the possible
Russian reaction and to the reaction of Turks in the area who
depend on cross border trade. In this regard, as of
mid-morning March 16, Russian tanks were occupying the short
stretch of road between Batumi and Sarp. At the same time,
even if the Turks move to freeze Ajaran assets, Tabatadze
doubts they will find much in Turkey.



4. (C) Tabatadze said the GOG is having difficulty judging
whether the Turkish Consul General in Batumi is playing a
helpful role because "we see no results." Turkish FM Gul and
PM Zvania spoke by telephone late March 15; Gul asserted that
the Batumi CG is "sending messages" that Turkey supports
Georgian territorial integrity.



5. (C) Tabatadze is also concerned that "nationalist"
elements in Turkey (he singled out the National Action Party)
may urge Turkish support for Ajaran separatism.


GOT Unlikely to Respond Positively to GOG Requests



6. (C) The GOT does not appear inclined to respond
positively to the GOG requests. Although he did not admit
the GOG requests despite our repeated questions March 16, MFA
Caucasus DDG Tezgor several times implied clearly that the
GOT considers Saakashvili's call for an economic blockade
rash. He expressed concern that a blockade would provoke a
chain of events similar to President Gamsakurdia's 1992
blockade of Abkhazia.



7. (C) Tezgor claimed the GOT is satisfied the situation is
"under control" and continues to observe events. He said
Turkey will use its "good offices" to help resolve the
situation peacefully, but now is "not the right moment."
Tezgor said the GOT will wait for the situation to calm down.


GOT Supports Territorial Integrity and GOG Authority -- Sort
Of



8. (C) Tezgor asserted the main focus of the GOT approach is
to support Georgia's territorial integrity and central
government authority. Asked why the March 15 MFA statement
was not more forceful on those points, Tezgor replied the
statement is "sufficient for this time." He claimed the GOT
is privately "saying many things to both sides."



9. (C) Tezgor asserted the GOT does not want Russian troops
to compromise Georgia's territorial integrity or sovereignty.
He claimed the GOT has not reiterated this message to the
Russians since the confrontation started because the Russians
already know the Turkish position. Told of reports of
Russian tanks astride roads near Batumi, Tezgor mused that
this might have a "deterrent" effect on Saakashvili.

10. (C) Tezgor said the GOG and Ajara need to come to an
understanding. He criticized Abashidze for governing Ajara
like a "kingdom." He acknowledged Abashidze's possible links
to criminal activity and said the GOT does not like
Abashidze, but argued that Ajara historically has been
autonomous. Expressing what he called "pragmatic" concern
about what would happen if the GOG tries to take autonomy
away from the region, Tezgor averred that autonomy must be
maintained. He added that any understanding needs to take
the Russian reaction "into consideration."



11. (C) Asked how the GOT position on Ajaran autonomy fits
with supporting territorial integrity, Tezgor replied that
each country is different. Asked what Turkey would do if its
President were prevented from entering a Turkish province,
Tezgor agreed Saakashvili should be able to enter any part of
Georgian territory but asserted that "we need to be patient."





12. (C) Although DCM Tabatadze said the GOG will try to
enforce a blockade of the Batumi port, Tezgor is unconcerned
about possible incidents between GOG vessels and Turkish
merchant ships due to the small number of GOG maritime assets.


MFA Requests Consultation, Elaboration of U.S. Plan



13. (C) Tezgor asked about the U.S. position on the
standoff. We said the U.S. is concerned that the situation
not escalate into violence and that it be resolved consistent
with Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity. Tezgor
speculated the U.S. is planning "in secret"; we said no, we
are openly consulting with all major actors to help foster
resolution. Tezgor made an "official request" that the U.S.
brief him on its plans for resolving the standoff. He also
asked that the USG work with Turkey and consult before taking
any "steps." He worried that lack of "feedback" from the
U.S. is leading Turkey to "take poor decisions." (In ref
telcon, DAS Pascoe subsequently discussed U.S. efforts with
Tezgor and promised to stay in touch.)



14. (C) Tezgor urged the U.S. to cooperate with the Russians
in finding a solution. He asserted "no doubt" that Russia
supports Georgian territorial integrity and sovereignty.



15. (C) Comment: DCM Tabatadze has long expressed concern to
us at what he sees as a pro-Russian slant in Turkey's Georgia
policy. From his side, Tezgor has long been complaining to
us that he sees no comprehensive, muscular, long-term U.S.
strategy for the Caucasus. In the past six months he has
become markedly cagier with us and, more in line with his
Russophile colleagues DirGen Akinci and fellow DDG Seben
(Russia portfolio),has begun to assert that Russia has an
important role to play. At the same time he has expressed
keen interest in in-depth consultations on U.S. strategy
either in Washington or Ankara. End comment.
EDELMAN