This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T ANKARA 001060
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2014 TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL TU SUBJECT: NONPROLIFERATION CONSULTATIONS: TURKEY WILLING, BUT IS IT ABLE?
REF: STATE 38506
(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch for reasons 1.4, b/d.
1. (S) Because the Ambassador's schedule did not allow for a timely delivery of reftel points, DCM delivered them to MFA Director General for International Security Affairs Morali on February 24. DCM emphasized that the disarmament of Libya has created an opportunity to learn more about how the Khan network and other proliferators circumvented export controls. Unfortunately this new information also exposed weaknesses in Turkey's export and nonproliferation controls, and A/S Wolf would be coming to Ankara later in the week to discuss potential cooperation in closing these loopholes. Morali replied that Turkey was a determined partner in attempting to create as "leakproof an environment as possible". He noted that the appropriate laws and interagency authorities were in place, and therefore its system was sound. Nevertheless, Turkey is a large country with porous borders and 100 percent control might be impossible. Morali reiterated that the GOT would listen to Wolf with a "very favorable disposition" and would welcome any advice on improving export controls. In response to the DCM's suggestion that sanctions might have to be discussed, Morali said the US should not be concerned about Turkey's readiness to cooperate. Morali was not able to offer much information about who was responsible for investigating and penalizing companies suspected of not complying with Turkish export controls. He suggested those questions be posed to the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade. The DCM plans to meet with the U/S of Foreign Trade February
2. (S) On February 23, Pol-Mil Counselor spoke to MFA Deputy DG for Disarmament Ilicak. According to Ilicak, the GOT received information from the IAEA two weeks previously about the Turkish trade with Libya and began investigating, but the DDG complained that the IAEA did not provide adequate information. He hoped Ankara might receive a photo of the labeling so the Turks could discern whether there was data that they could use to trace the shipment. Also, the company names the IAEA provided are Teknoelektrik Ticaret and 3E Industria Elektronik ve Ticaret Sirketi. (Comment: These are not same as those we have seen in informal channels, although Ilicak who was holding a report from the Turkish Mission in Vienna during this meeting, did not appear 100 percent sure of the names himself.)
3. (S) Comment: In Turkey, there often is a gap between policy and implementation. Chronically short on resources and know-how, the GOT takes refuge in the belief that its exporters are generally above-board. Morali speculated that Turkish goods and technology found in Libya were probably dual-use items purchased prior to existing export controls. The DCM told Morali he should not be so sure. EDELMAN