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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ANKARA1060
2004-02-24 15:48:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

NONPROLIFERATION CONSULTATIONS: TURKEY WILLING,

Tags:   KNNP  MNUC  PARM  PREL  TU 
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						S E C R E T ANKARA 001060 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2014
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL TU
SUBJECT: NONPROLIFERATION CONSULTATIONS: TURKEY WILLING,
BUT IS IT ABLE?

REF: STATE 38506


(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch for reasons 1.4, b/d.




1. (S) Because the Ambassador's schedule did not allow for a
timely delivery of reftel points, DCM delivered them to MFA
Director General for International Security Affairs Morali on
February 24. DCM emphasized that the disarmament of Libya
has created an opportunity to learn more about how the Khan
network and other proliferators circumvented export controls.
Unfortunately this new information also exposed weaknesses
in Turkey's export and nonproliferation controls, and A/S
Wolf would be coming to Ankara later in the week to discuss
potential cooperation in closing these loopholes. Morali
replied that Turkey was a determined partner in attempting to
create as "leakproof an environment as possible". He noted
that the appropriate laws and interagency authorities were in
place, and therefore its system was sound. Nevertheless,
Turkey is a large country with porous borders and 100 percent
control might be impossible. Morali reiterated that the GOT
would listen to Wolf with a "very favorable disposition" and
would welcome any advice on improving export controls. In
response to the DCM's suggestion that sanctions might have to
be discussed, Morali said the US should not be concerned
about Turkey's readiness to cooperate. Morali was not able
to offer much information about who was responsible for
investigating and penalizing companies suspected of not
complying with Turkish export controls. He suggested those
questions be posed to the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade.
The DCM plans to meet with the U/S of Foreign Trade February


25.




2. (S) On February 23, Pol-Mil Counselor spoke to MFA Deputy
DG for Disarmament Ilicak. According to Ilicak, the GOT
received information from the IAEA two weeks previously about
the Turkish trade with Libya and began investigating, but the
DDG complained that the IAEA did not provide adequate
information. He hoped Ankara might receive a photo of the
labeling so the Turks could discern whether there was data
that they could use to trace the shipment. Also, the company
names the IAEA provided are Teknoelektrik Ticaret and 3E
Industria Elektronik ve Ticaret Sirketi. (Comment: These are
not same as those we have seen in informal channels, although
Ilicak who was holding a report from the Turkish Mission in
Vienna during this meeting, did not appear 100 percent sure
of the names himself.)




3. (S) Comment: In Turkey, there often is a gap between
policy and implementation. Chronically short on resources
and know-how, the GOT takes refuge in the belief that its
exporters are generally above-board. Morali speculated that
Turkish goods and technology found in Libya were probably
dual-use items purchased prior to existing export controls.
The DCM told Morali he should not be so sure.
EDELMAN