GEORGIAN FM JAPARIDZE'S FIRST VISIT TO TURKEY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001036

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2014
TAGS: ECIN ECON EPET GG PGOV PREL RS TU
SUBJECT: GEORGIAN FM JAPARIDZE'S FIRST VISIT TO TURKEY


REF: A. TBLISI 0342

B. TBLISI 0311

C. 2003 ANKARA 6198

D. TBLISI 391


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12858,
reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).



1. (C) Summary: Georgian FM Japaridze reportedly gave
Turkish FM Gul a positive readout of President Saakashvili's
recent Moscow trip but said Saakashvili had emphasized that
Georgia will remain oriented toward the West, will insist on
Russian withdrawal from bases in Georgia, and will not agree
to Russian demands that no foreign forces be deployed in
Georgian territory. Japaridze averred that relations between
Ajaran leader Abashidze and Saakashvili have improved; Gul
claimed Turkey has worked to tamp down Ajaran separatism.
Gul pushed for increased contact between Abkhazia and
Turkey's Abkhaz community and for opening Abkhazia to Turkish
business. The two FMs also discussed controls at the
Georgian-Turkish border, possible increased Turkish
assistance to Georgia's Interior Ministry, and energy
pipelines. In wake of the visit, the Georgian Embassy in
Ankara continues to have strong reservations about Turkey's
views regarding Russia's role in Georgia. End Summary.


Japaridze Meets with PM Erdogan, FM Gul



2. (C) Georgian FM Tedo Japaridze visited Ankara for the
first time Feb. 17-18, meeting with PM Erdogan and FM Gul
(President Sezer was out of the country). In a Feb. 18
telephone readout for the Ambassador, whom Japaridze had
known well as Georgian Ambassador in Washington, Japaridze
emphasized how pleased he was with the visit.



3. (C) In a subsequent briefing for us, Georgian DCM
Tabatadze claimed the Turks were "keen" to meet with the GOG
prior to Gul's February 23-25 visit to Moscow. According to
Tabatadze, Japaridze's one-hour meeting with FM Gul focused
on regional affairs and security. Japaridze's meeting with
Erdogan was shorter and focused on economic issues.
Tabatadze confirmed that Japaridze left pleased with his
visit and sees Gul as a good interlocutor. However, both
Tabatadze and, he said, Georgian Ambassador to Turkey
Lebanidze found Gul poorly briefed on Caucasian affairs.


Georgian-Russian Relations



4. (C) Tabatadze said Japaridze gave Gul a positive spin on
President Saakashvili's February 11-14 visit to Moscow; the
Georgians' aim was to re-start Georgian-Russian relations
with a clean slate. However, Japaridze asserted to Gul that
Saakashvili told Putin two things are non-negotiable:
Georgia's pro-Western orientation and the need for Russian
withdrawal from bases in Georgia. At the same time Georgia
is prepared to guarantee Russian security through joint
patrols along the entire length of the Russia-Georgia border
(ref A).



5. (C) Gul reportedly expressed interest in the progress of
the Georgia-Russia Framework Agreement (ref B). Japaridze
reportedly answered that Georgia will never agree to Russian
demands that the GOG guarantee no deployment of foreign
forces on Georgian territory, but asked Gul to reassure the
Russians during his upcoming trip that Turkey does not intend
to establish bases in Georgia.


Abkhazia



6. (C) Gul reportedly suggested that increased
"people-to-people" contacts between Abkhazia and Turkey's
ethnic Abkhaz community could help reduce Russian influence
in Abkhazia and reduce tensions between Abkhazia and Tblisi.
(Comment: This suggestion appears to run counter to one
Turkish MFA assessment about Turkey's Abkhaz community: in
September, the MFA Caucasus Department Head said that some
members of Turkey's Abkhaz community, with help from the
Russian Embassy in Ankara, were smuggling arms and materiel
into Abkhazia from Turkey (ref C). End comment.)



7. (C) In reporting Gul's strong request to Japaridze that
Tblisi formally open Abkhazia to Turkish business, DCM
Tabatadze claimed some Turkish companies are already doing
business there. Gul reportedly asserted to Japaridze that
the CIS embargo of Abkhazia is not working: Russian
companies are doing business there and some Russian officials
have visited. More Turkish business in Abkhazia, Gul argued,
will reduce Russian influence. Downplaying the idea that
Turkish access will promote Abkhazian separatism, Gul
predicted most Turkish businesspeople would not be from
Turkey's Abkhaz community. According to Tabatadze, FM
Japaridze told Gul he will consider this proposal.


Ajara



8. (C) Japaridze asserted to Gul there is now a "good
understanding" between Ajaran leader Abashidze and President
Saakashvili (ref D). DCM Tabatadze added that he expects
Abashidze to visit Saakashvili in Tblisi within the next
several days. Gul reportedly welcomed the news, telling
Japaridze that the Turkish Consul General in Batumi has been
pressing Abashidze to "play by the rules" and avoid
separatism. Japaridze "highly appreciated" Gul's message.


Border Controls



9. (C) Gul reportedly pressed Japaridze to relax the visa
regime for Turkish truckers entering Georgia. Japaridze
promised to consider this. However, later in the meeting,
Japaridze noted Russian pressure to tighten visa controls on
Turks entering Georgia: the Russians point to cases of
Turkish fighters killed in Chechnya who bore passports with
Georgian entry visas. Gul reportedly also complained about
corruption at the border; Japaridze replied that the new
government is determined to fight corruption.



10. (C) The two FMs also discussed the possibility of
opening a third border crossing between Georgia and Turkey.
Tabatadze noted that one possible location is near a
now-closed Russian base, and might help replace the economic
activity lost when the base closed.


Turkish Assistance to Georgian Ministry of Interior



11. (C) Tabatadze said Gul also proposed expanded Turkish
assistance to Georgia's Ministry of Interior, including
grants, officer training and Turkish advisors. The Turks
proposed helping the GOG reconfigure Ministry of Interior
security forces to look more like Turkey's jandarma, which is
in charge of security outside Turkey's urban areas.
Japaridze said he would consider it.


Pipelines



12. (C) Both FMs agreed on the importance of BTC in
fostering regional security and prosperity, and agreed that
any delay in construction is in neither Georgia's nor
Turkey's interest. Japaridze raised the possibility of a
pipeline from Novorossiysk to parallel BTC in Turkey and
reduce the amount of Russian oil shipped through the
Bosphorus. According to Tabatadze, the Turkish side
expressed interest, but wanted to know the Russians'
reaction; the Georgians replied that Putin has formed a group
to study the proposal.



13. (C) Comment: DCM Tabatadze said the visit left him with
the clear impression that Turkey wants to expand its role in
Georgia. At the same time Tabatadze, who has been a reliable
interlocutor for the past two years, reiterated his concern
that, despite training programs and other assistance, Turkey
is searching for ways to work with Russia on the Georgia
question rather than concentrating on helping Georgia extract
itself from Russia's shadow. As just one example, he cited
Japaridze's interlocutors as consistently emphasizing
Russia's role in the region, arguing that Turkey, the U.S.
and Georgia should find ways to make Russian involvement
constructive. End Comment.
EDELMAN