KING DISCUSSES PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 009215

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV KISL KPAL IS JO
SUBJECT: KING DISCUSSES PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP AND
ISLAMISTS WITH CODEL ACKERMAN

REF: AMMAN 9152

Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) King Abdullah endorsed Abu Mazen and dismissed
Qaddoumi as an "eccentric" during a meeting with CODEL
Ackerman November 11. The King was concerned about Islamist
political activity in Jordan and said that it was time for
moderate Muslims world-wide to be more vocal in denouncing
violence. He emphasized Jordan's support for a right of
return, but only to a Palestinian state. End Summary.

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After Arafat
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2. (C) King Abdullah told CODEL Ackerman November 11 that he
looked forward to working with new, responsible leadership in
the West Bank and Gaza in the wake of Arafat's death. The
King said that he had spoken to POTUS and endorsed Abu Mazen
as a "good man." He elaborated that Abu Mazen has always been
a moderate who opposed the violent intifada. In contrast, he
characterized Qaddoumi as an "eccentric" beholden to Syria.
The King felt that Abu Mazen's success would depend on the
amount of authority he was given, the support he received
from outside, and Israel's attitude. While the King saw Abu
Mazen as someone the Israelis could talk to, he also saw him
as a transitional figure -- with Marwan Barghouti possibly
emerging in the long-run as the Palestinians' choice.
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Opposing Radical Islam
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3. (C) In response to Ackerman's congratulations on the
"Amman Message" (reftel) promoting peaceful Islam, the King
emphasized that it was time for moderate Muslims to be more
proactive and vocal in denouncing violence. He stated that
the Amman Message was just the beginning of his efforts to
reach out to the "silent majority" of Muslims who reject
extremism. He hoped it would lead to fatwas condemning
violence. The King explained that the intended audience of
the message included Muslims in the U.S., Europe, and Asia in
order to counter revolutionary Salafism everywhere.

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Islamists in Jordan
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4. (C) King Abdullah termed the Islamist opposition in Jordan
"a nuisance," but said that it could develop into a real
problem if not addressed quickly. He was fighting a tendency
within the government to be complacent and conflict averse by
getting GOJ officials to "tighten the screws" on political
Islamists. At the same time, the King wanted the government
to develop better means to engage and assist needy Jordanians
(such as a recent visit by Prime Minister al-Fayez to the
poor) to off-set the Muslim Brotherhood's charitable, NGO,
and medical care network.

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Right of Return
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5. (C) Asked to comment about the Palestinian argument for a
right of return, the King stated that when a two-state
solution was reached, Jordanian-Palestinians would be welcome
to stay in Jordan (if they held valid
residency/identification cards) or move to an independent
Palestine. He emphasized that Jordan supported a right of
return only to a Palestinian state (i.e., not to Israel).


6. (U) CODEL Ackerman did not have the opportunity to clear
this cable.


7. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.

Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman or access the site
through the State Department's SIPRNET home page.
HALE