Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04AMMAN8998
2004-11-03 15:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

NEW CABINET TEAM ACTIVIST ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM KMPI ECON JO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 008998 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KMPI ECON JO
SUBJECT: NEW CABINET TEAM ACTIVIST ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,
PRODDED BY KING

Classified By: CDA David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 008998

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KMPI ECON JO
SUBJECT: NEW CABINET TEAM ACTIVIST ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,
PRODDED BY KING

Classified By: CDA David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary: At the King's instigation, the newly
reshuffled cabinet has embarked on a wholesale reform of the
way government does business -- adopting what amounts to an
MPP for government and ministries, in which mission goals,
performance standards, and resource allocation are to be
seamlessly integrated. While many of the new ministers show
enthusiasm and energy over this innovation, PM Fayez shows
characteristic caution and passivity. Deputy PM Muasher --
entrusted with launching the process and judging ministries'
performance -- already has encountered political opposition
in parliament, with the Speaker (baselessly) demanding a vote
of confidence on the new ministers. In the press, there is
an open debate as to whether the renewed focus on structural
reform is a diversion from the harder issues of social and
political development. While the King's commitment to
structural reform is genuine and the effort essential if
Jordan is to be transformed into a competitive, developed
marketplace, there is some truth that his attitude on
political reform is to "go slow." End Summary.


2. (C) King Abdullah expressed to Charge on October 31 his
satisfaction with the newly reshuffled cabinet. He had met
with the ministers for a portion of their off-site, weekend
retreat at the Dead Sea Marriott. The King felt they had
"got it" in understanding his vision for wide ranging
internal government reform and performance-driven action. He
took particular pleasure in the fact that each minister has
been given specific performance standards and timelines for
delivery. His impatience was palpable:-- "if any minister
does not deliver, they'll be out" in three months, time,
when performance on the first set of indicators will be
judged. In characteristic contrast, Prime Minister Faisal
al-Fayez complained to Charge on November 2 that expectations
for change may be hard to meet. He anticipated significant
political and parliamentary resistance to revamping the
government's inefficient ways, which are motivated by

micro-level impulses for patronage and favoritism. "We have
to do it (meet the King's agenda),but it will be hard," he
said.


3. (C) Two men entrusted with driving this agenda forward,
Deputy Prime Minister Muasher and Minister of State for
Public Sector Reform Masaadeh, laid out for Charge and USAID
Mission Director the details of the internal reform agenda on
November 1. Implementing a vision of a streamlined,
efficient, and transparent public sector will involve a
two-tiered approach. Muasher's office at the Prime Ministry
(called the Government Performance Unit ) GPU) will be
responsible for the first tier, developing and implementing a
reform strategy. The GPU will produce a national public
sector agenda with a set of objectives. From these
objectives, Muasher will develop 10 to 15 key performance
indicators to measure ministries, work over the next ten
years. At the end of each year, ministers must show
advancement within their indicators or face dismissal.
Masaadeh's office of public sector reform will handle the
operational tier. He will establish a reform unit to set
detailed standards for performance and offer training and
technical assistance to help the ministries meet their goals.
Muasher also stressed that there are plans for a complete
overhaul of the cabinet's workings, which like many Arab
governments must decide as a body on matters of minutiae. A
greater delegation of authority will allow the cabinet to
work at a more strategic level. The Prime Ministry itself
will be re-structured to make it a stronger policy setting
body. And with perverse but fitting symbolism, it is said
that the Prime Minister will move his own office across the
street from the Prime Ministry to a largely unused official
residence, thus simultaneously making room for the burgeoning
reform staff and signaling his detachment from them.


4. (C) Another key element in the restructuring is the
development of four ministerial teams or committees for
public sector reform, socio-economic development, human
resources, and legal issues. In Charge's meetings with the
new cabinet, team leaders and members are showing enthusiasm
over the concept, although how some of these highly
competitive personalities will work together in practice
remains to be seen. The King and Muasher both highlighted
for us the novel integration of the budgeting process and
financial services into the development of ministries,
performance goals. The King was pleased that Finance
Minister Abu Hammour was on board with the idea, and
acknowledged that some ministries were unable to perform
because of limited resources provided by a Finance Ministry
left unaware of any ministry performance plans.


5. (C) The need for government restructuring is great, but
the government already has received criticism for being
singularly preoccupied with it at the expense of genuine
political development and reform. The Prime Minister,
government spokesman, and Muasher himself with Charge
insisted that such was not the case, but they are on the
defensive. Political Development Minister Shara told Charge
and Emboffs that political development remained a priority,
but the government would "review carefully" the draft laws on
elections and political parties ) we "can't be hasty" he
said. (Royal Court Minister earlier told Charge the
electoral law would not be submitted to the Parliament in the
next year.) Shara's focus is on nuts and bolts, grassroots
reforms, and drawing the "silent majority" (his phrase) into
the political process. He detailed convincing plans to use
NGOs, women's and youth groups, and UNDP to develop civil
society institutions.


6. (C) Parliament is looking upon all this energy with some
curiosity, even concern. There seems to have been no serious
effort to consult Speaker al-Majali or other members on the
purpose of the changes. This led to an unusual public
complaint from the loyalist speaker, demanding that the
cabinet present itself and a new platform for a vote of
confirmation. Legal Affairs Minister Ensour explained to
Charge that the cabinet is a continuation of its predecessor
and that the restructuring agenda was clearly identified in
the King's initial public letter of instruction ) so Majali
has no legal grounds to object. However, as reflected in the
PM's concern, parliament, filled with traditionalists thanks
to gerrymandering, will be highly uneasy. These brisk
changes are designed to eliminate the very tools of patronage
and featherbedding upon which Jordan's old politics thrived
) and its economy did not. The fact that the smooth, rich,
Westernized, Christian Muasher is chief implementor, and the
fast-talking Palestinian Minister of Planning chief salesman,
will only stoke MPs' suspicions. Given the political
constraints they face, this opposition is likely to manifest
itself in indirect ways, by slowing down the most unpopular
legislation and looking for issues unrelated to the King's
agenda on which to berate the cabinet.


7. (C) COMMENT: Sweeping government restructuring is long
overdue in Jordan and the region, and the King's commitment
to it is genuine. The model being used is a state of the art
tool provided by a leading international consultant. Senior
government officials for the most part share the King's
enthusiasm at most, or at least know their jobs are on the
line. Dig a few layers down in the government, or turn to
parliament, and these concepts of change are met with a mix
of incredulity and trepidation. So the government will face
an enormous challenge in moving forward. The accusation that
public sector reform - however badly needed - is a substitute
for harder social and political reform has some validity.
The King is concerned that significant transformation of the
political system before Jordan's political culture is
sufficiently mature will merely provide an opening to
radicals. At the same time, he wants economic, social and
political reform to advance in mutually-reinforcing ways.
Our concern is that if the King's caution overcomes his
reforming urge now (when Jordan is doing well economically
and is at peace internally),he is sure to keep his foot on
the brake when the next economic downturn or domestic crisis
inevitably develops. End Comment.


8. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
HALE