Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04AMMAN7862
2004-09-21 13:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

KING FACES IN TWO DIRECTIONS AS HE PROCEEDS WITH A

Tags:  PGOV PREL ECON KISL JO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 007862 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON KISL JO
SUBJECT: KING FACES IN TWO DIRECTIONS AS HE PROCEEDS WITH A
CABINET RESHUFFLE

REF: AMMAN 7336

Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 007862

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON KISL JO
SUBJECT: KING FACES IN TWO DIRECTIONS AS HE PROCEEDS WITH A
CABINET RESHUFFLE

REF: AMMAN 7336

Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. The King will proceed with a cabinet
reshuffle and new government mandate in October, but in two
contradictory directions: reinforcement of the cabinet
reformists while redoubling efforts to silence Islamists and
troublesome political activists in the professional
associations. End summary.


2. (C) Royal Court Minister al-Rifai reconfirmed to Charge
on September 22 that the King planned a cabinet reshuffle
that would retain Fayez as Prime Minister but reinforce the
powers of the key reformists. The changes will come
following a cabinet retreat, in which the current government
would review their accomplishments (a short session, Rifai
quipped),and the new team, once announced, would also go on
a retreat to set its new mission. Rifai said the reformed
cabinet would dispense with a deputy prime minister, in favor
of a set of "team leaders" who could organize activities
across line ministries. He cited three such teams --
administrative reform, economic development, and
socio-economic reforms. This change almost certainly signals
the departure of Deputy PM/Trade and Economy Minister
Halayqa, whose title and theoretical power as DPM were
conditions for membership in the current government. As the
at times vicious frenzy of maneuvering over the impending
cabinet shuffle accelerated, Halayqa appears to have become
the scapegoat of many of his cabinet rivals, who say his
lackluster performance demonstrates the irrelevance of the
whole concept of a deputy prime minister. The "team leaders"
approach appears tailor-made for the aggrandizement of
Planning Minister and leading reformist Bassam Awadallah, who
-- whether leader or not of each team -- can be counted on to
have the loudest voice and greatest energy level in any group
setting.


3. (C) Rifai said the flip side of reinforcing reforms
would be cracking down on opposition elements that have
"crossed the line." He said the King is determined to have
the Islamic Action Front (IAF) and the secular professional
associations "stop attacking us, our policies, and our
friends." If the new Fayez team fails to achieve that aim,
and to move the government's bills through parliament, its
tenure would be short. Rifai acknowledged that this course
of action would be tricky, given the IAF's strong profile in
the country. But as the government moved forward on a new
parties law (which Rifai did not expect to occur within the
life of the next parliament),a level playing field was
needed. The IAF could not be the only party with access to
charitable funds, nor could professional associations
continue to play politics. While clipping the wings of
Islamic oppositionists, Rifai said the Hashemites would be
promoting a more moderate, tolerant message and identifying
the extremist rhetoric and activism as being outside Islam.


4. (C) While pleased with Jordan's robust growth this year
of over seven percent, Rifai described the King as concerned
that the growth of income was distributed unevenly. He said
few would support needed tax increases if more was not done
to spread the wealth -- hence a renewed public focus by the
leadership on poverty alleviation and job creation.


5. (C) Comment: Rifai inadvertently cast a spotlight on
the irony of the King's approach: strengthening government
reformists (including FM Muasher, who, rumors to the
contrary, still appears secure in his job) while cracking
down on oppositionists. The public generally accepts both
the IAF and the associations as part of Jordan's political
furniture. The public is also generally receptive to some of
their messages, particularly when it comes to government
nepotism, corruption, and foreign policy issues. Many
Jordanians, even if they do not support the IAF, see it as a
moderating and basically stabilizing factor, as it has been
in alliance for years with the Hashemites as a bulwark first
against the leftists and now against some more extreme
Islamic tendencies. Rifai's suggestion that the GOJ is
moving nowhere fast on the political parties law (and
presumably the elections law) reinforces a widely-held belief
among Jordanians that the GOJ only pays lip-service to
political reform. There is an irony (and danger) in the
government's approach. By strengthening reformers, but
failing to implement key political reforms to facilitate
active popular participation and create viable alternatives
to the IAF, the GOJ will find it hard to create the "level
playing field" Rifai says the King is looking for.


6. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.

Visit Embassy Amman's classified website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ or access the site
through the State Department's SIPRNET home page.
HALE