ISLAM AND POLITICS IN JORDAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 007752

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL KISL PTER JO
SUBJECT: ISLAM AND POLITICS IN JORDAN

REF: A. AMMAN 6213

B. AMMAN 7619

C. AMMAN 6215

D. AMMAN 5109

E. AMMAN 2764

F. AMMAN 3380

Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) There has been a steady and unmistakable increase in
the influence of Islam in Jordanian society over the last two
decades. The younger generation, in particular, has embraced
its Islamic roots. Surprisingly, participation in the Muslim
Brotherhood and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front
(IAF),has not significantly risen as Jordanians no longer
feel the need to join these groups to confirm their religious
identity. The IAF leadership, still effectively controlled
by elder-generation East Bankers, remains more pragmatic than
its rank and file (mostly Palestinian) members. However, its
anti-U.S. rhetoric is on the rise and its public statements
on Iraq and other issues have, at times, approached the
boundaries of the GOJ's tolerance. The IAF's opportunistic
alliance in parliament with social conservatives and populist
mavericks have paralyzed passage of key elements of the
King's reform agenda; PM Fayez's tenure may hinge on success
in breaking that logjam when Parliament reconvenes in
mid-November. While Islamic extremists remain a small
percentage of Jordan's population, their numbers may be on
the rise, are loosely organized, and increasingly difficult
to counter. End Summary.

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LOOKING TOWARD HEAVEN
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2. (C) As almost anyone in Jordan will tell you, Islam has
had a growing influence on Jordanian society over the last
two decades. Whether exhibited by the wearing of headscarves
by women, or by attendance at prayers in the country's
mosques, Jordan (including relatively cosmopolitan Amman) is
at least outwardly a more religiously devout place than in
the recent past. During the 1970s, for example, headscarves
were by far less common than miniskirts at the University of
Jordan, whereas today a large majority of females on campus
choose to cover their hair. According to societal observers,
going to mosque regularly no longer raises eyebrows, and more
Jordanians than ever are performing daily prayers in public.


3. (C) The resurgence of Islam has not bypassed younger
Jordanians. Dr. Fares Braizat, Director of Polling at the
Center for Strategic Studies (CSS),told PolOff that a recent
CSS poll showed that young adult Jordanians between 18 and 24
years in age (excluding Christians) are, in general, more
conservative and devout in their religious views than their
parents. He further noted an increase in the number of
Jordanians who identified themselves as Muslims first, and as
Jordanians second. Braizat and other sociologists theorize
that Islam may have filled a void created by the decline of
Arab nationalism and the collapse of socialist and communist
ideology. Another theory is that Jordanians may have more
tightly embraced Islam as a way to confront a perceived
onslaught of Western social and cultural values.

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MB, IAF MEMBERSHIP STALLS
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4. (C) Despite growing religious devotion, the Jordanian
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its political offshoot, the
Islamic Action Front (IAF),have not seen a noticeable
increase in its active membership. Dr. Ibrahim Gharaibeh,
former MB member and social researcher who closely follows
the Islamic movement, explained to PolOff that as Jordanian
society has grown more religious in character, devout Muslims
no longer feel a need to join the MB to publicly confirm
their faith. "Twenty years ago almost everyone who went to
mosque every day was in the Muslim Brotherhood," said
Gharaibeh, "but today most regular worshipers are not." MB
tactics aimed at boosting membership, such as the funding of
mass wedding ceremonies for poor Jordanians, have not had a
noticeable impact.


5. (C) The IAF, the largest and best organized political
party in Jordan, is sometimes portrayed in a radical light.
Yet local observers almost uniformly characterize its
leaders, particularly the 14-member Executive Bureau, as
ultimately pragmatic and loyal to the Hashemite family.
Despite frequent public clashes on policy issues, when push
comes to shove, the IAF's desire to maintain its favored
status with the regime has shown it is willing to cave under
GOJ pressure, even at the expense of its own credibility.
Senator Mohammad Al-Azaydeh, who left the IAF in 1997 but
retains ties with the party, told PolOff there was a "gap"
between the IAF leadership (primarily East Bankers) and some
of the rank and file (predominantly of Palestinian origin),
who favor a more confrontational approach. However, he
believes that the Executive Bureau was fully capable of
keeping its members "under control."
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GROWING CONCERN ABOUT EXTREMISM IN JORDAN
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6. (C) While the MB and IAF may be able to keep their
members in line, and the GOJ maintains a close hold on their
activities, there is growing concern about religious
extremism in Jordan, particularly among non-affiliated, poor,
and disaffected youth. The Zarqawi-directed bomb plot last
April involving local Jordanian extremists was a wake up call
to many ordinary Jordanians about the growing danger of
radical Islam. Gharaibeh contended that, despite the
increased interest in Islam, only a very small fraction of
Jordanian Muslims were extremist in their views. Yet he
conceded that the absolute number of Jordanians espousing
Islamic extremism was most likely growing in number,
prompting the King's recent directives to challenge these
messages (ref A). Elaborating on the recent confrontation
between the GOJ and Islamists over unlicensed mosque
preachers (ref B),a local daily recently pointed out that
Jordanians are tuning out official sermons, which they know
are vetted by the regime, and increasingly tuning in other
sources of religious guidance. These include radical
Islamist messages (of the Salafist and Takfiri bent) that are
circulated more informally through leaflets, cassettes, and
during discussions in private homes beyond the reach of the
security services. Contacts both inside and outside the
government worry that the young in particular are
increasingly susceptible to radical messages and willing to
carry out violent acts in accordance with these teachings.
As an example, Jordanian authorities point to four young
Jordanian-Palestinians intercepted in July trying to
infiltrate Israel as influenced by Takfiri teachings (ref C).

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HIJACKING THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE?
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7. (C) Societal tensions between East Bank Jordanians and
those of Palestinian descent have filtered into the IAF
hierarchy, Azaydeh said, but the East Bankers still held the
upper hand in resolving internal policy disputes. The IAF's
political advocacy on Palestinian issues, however, is not
lost on (secular) Jordanian-Palestinians. Palestinian
contacts tell us that fear of reprisals from the security
services (and East Bankers) keep most secular
Jordanian-Palestinian activists from advocating publicly on
issues important to their community, such as the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, citizenship rights, or
discrimination in Jordanian society. As a result, the IAF
has emerged as the main public voice for the cause of
Palestinians in Jordan. Earlier this month, for example, it
was IAF MPs who met with PM Fayez, the Justice Minister, and
the Interior Minister to discuss concerns that the GOJ had
plans to withdraw citizenship from Jordanians of Palestinian
origin. The emergence of the IAF as a voice for
Jordanian-Palestinians is a development does not sit well
with many of our Jordanian-Palestinian contacts. They say
that because the IAF's new role ensures that "Palestinian"
issues remain "oppositionist" issues, not to be taken
seriously (ref D). It also feeds the perception of many East
Bankers that the Palestinians are the root of Jordan's
troubles, feelings that persist since the 1970 civil war.

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CAPITALIZING ON ANTI-U.S. SENTIMENT, BLOCKING SOME REFORMS
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8. (C) Beyond the Palestinian issue, the IAF also is trying
to broaden its popularity by increasing its focus on economic
and foreign policy issues that appeal to the religious and
the secular alike, according to post contacts. Its
opposition to unpopular tax hikes (ref E) struck a chord with
the public and is also tapping into strong anti-U.S.
sentiment in Jordan with more denunciations of the American
administration. In April of this year, the IAF's Muslim
Scholars Committee issued a "fatwa" on the obligation to
oppose the U.S. administration for its "aggression against
the Palestinian and Iraqi peoples." A similar ruling was
announced in May after the Abu Ghraib scandal (ref F),and
the party has announced the cessation of any and all forms of
cooperation with the U.S. government. More recently, the
same committee issued a fatwa declaring that joining the
Iraqi military or police was a "sin against God," as was
providing food or supplies to American forces in Iraq. It
further called for jihad in Iraq and for support for Shiite
leader Muqtada Al-Sadr. Jordan's other political parties are
in disarray, awaiting a new parties law that theoretically
may bolster moderate, secular forces. But for now, the only
organized, active, popular alternative to the IAF on a
national scale is the network of professional associations,
which traditionally filled the void created by long bans on
party formation. Unfortunately, association leaders are
caught in an Arab nationalist time warp -- making them both
anathema to the King and regime and a fairly feeble rival to
the Islamists on certain issues. On other matters, such as
anti-normalization, the two sides have successfully
capitalized on their overlapping memberships to find common
cause against the government.


9. (C) Despite the IAF's vitriol in denouncing some GOJ
positions, many of our Jordanian interlocutors dismissed
these statements as "just talk." "They sometimes push at the
boundaries with their edicts," said Gharaibeh, "but they know
the government will usually leave them alone if they don't go
beyond words." The IAF recognizes that some issues may be
too sensitive for public debate. Attempts by Islamists to
secure backing for the return of expelled HAMAS activists,
for example, have been discreet and low-key. In Parliament,
they have successfully joined opportunistically with social
conservatives and others to block elements of the King's
reform agenda -- posing such a significant challenge that the
King ended the summer extraordinary session early, in
disgust. The longevity of PM Fayez's tenure may well depend
on whether he succeeds in breaking this logjam when
parliament reconvenes after Ramadan. The King has also made
clear publicly that the government must do a better job to
ensure that the "correct" message of Islam is spread through
the mosques.

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COMMENT
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10. (C) The monarchy's successful taming of the Islamic
"opposition" over the years -- while banning alternative
secular political voices -- is coming back to haunt the
regime. Building frustration about the regional political
situation, mounting anti-U.S. sentiment, the seeming
disconnect between the regime and the masses, and popular
impatience with aspects of the economic reform program, are
coalescing to increase the appeal of radical Islamic calls to
action. For its part, the GOJ remains confident that it can
channel and manage Islamic political sentiment with a
combination of cooptation, surveillance, and, when necessary,
carefully applied threats of repression. In post's view, the
regime's strategy will continue to meet with success in the
medium term. Over the longer haul, however, the monarchy
will need to deliver the democratic political rights it has
promised, if the King's ambitious plans for a prosperous and
stable Jordan are to succeed.


11. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.

Visit Embassy Amman's classified website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ or access the site
through the State Department's SIPRNET home page.
HALE