Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04AMMAN5684
2004-07-08 15:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

ACTIVISTS LAUNCH CAMPAIGN AGAINST GOJ SECURITY

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM IZ JO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

081540Z Jul 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 005684 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ JO
SUBJECT: ACTIVISTS LAUNCH CAMPAIGN AGAINST GOJ SECURITY
SUPPORT FOR IRAQ, CRITICIZE THE KING


Classified By: DCM David Hale for Reasons 1.5 (b),(d)

-------
SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 005684

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ JO
SUBJECT: ACTIVISTS LAUNCH CAMPAIGN AGAINST GOJ SECURITY
SUPPORT FOR IRAQ, CRITICIZE THE KING


Classified By: DCM David Hale for Reasons 1.5 (b),(d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Media reports of King Abdullah's purported readiness
to send troops to Iraq elicited a quick "clarification" by
the Foreign Ministry while prompting opposition activists to
launch a petition campaign against the government's Iraq
policy. One of the campaign organizers accused the King and
GOJ of acting against the clear weight of public opinion.
This opposition to the GOJ's support for Iraq is most
noteworthy for its almost direct public criticism of the
King, generally perceived here as a red line, but the King
was dismissive of its impact in a conversation with DCM. End
Summary.

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MEDIA FLAP
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2. (C) While in England promoting foreign investment in
Jordan, King Abdullah gave an interview July 2 to the BBC.
When asked whether Jordan would be willing to commit troops
to Iraq, the King made clear this had not been discussed with
the Iraqi Interim Government, but added that "if the Iraqi
side would ask directly for our help it would be difficult
for us to say to them no," and also stated that "our message
to the Iraqi ... Prime Minister is tell us what you want,
tell us how we can help and you have 110 percent from us."
Taking these statements out of context -- and, according to
the King, dropping additional qualifications he had added
about needing an Iraqi request -- the international press
hurriedly, and mistakenly, reported that Jordan was prepared
to send troops to Iraq. These reports ignited a flurry of
phone calls to the Foreign Ministry (Ali al-Ayad, Director of
FM Muasher's Private Office, told PolOff he had to turn off
his cell phone as it was on the verge of "blowing up") and
prompted the GOJ to issue a "clarification" explaining that
GOJ support for Iraq did not include the deployment of troops
as this would not be appropriate for countries sharing a
border with Iraq.

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ACTIVISTS SPEAK OUT AGAINST GOJ
--------------


3. (U) The possibility of sending Jordanian troops to Iraq
touched a raw nerve in Islamist political circles opposed to

the GOJ's Iraq policy. The Islamist Arabic weekly Al-Sabeel
reported July 6 that "independent political activists" had
launched a campaign to collect signatures for a petition
against any decision to dispatch Jordanian forces to Iraq "to
help repress the Iraqi people." The petition claimed that
the government was ignoring "all democratic norms by pursuing
a policy against public opinion" and further accused the GOJ
of "shady deals for training Iraqi policemen to serve the
occupation."


4. (U) Also on July 6, the Arabic satellite news channel
Al-Arabiyah broadcast a telephone interview with Layth
Shubaylat, the former president of the Jordanian Engineers'
Association and a long-time thorn in the regime's side.
Shubaylat is one of the organizers of the petition drive and,
prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, he had orchestrated a
statement signed by 99 prominent Jordanians opposing
involvement in the Iraq war. Shubaylat claimed that the
governor of Amman had summoned him for an immediate meeting,
and then sent a group of policemen to his home when he
refused to come until the following day. Shubaylat
criticized the GOJ's reaction to his campaign -- "This is not
how dialogue is held" -- and asserted that the petition
reflected a broad consensus "not only among the opposition,
but also among the loyalists." He alleged that even those
who held government office opposed GOJ policy on Iraq, but
that they "keep silent to keep their posts."

--------------
CRITICIZING THE KING?
--------------


5. (C) Not only did Shubaylat attack the GOJ in his
interview, but he also indirectly, though unambiguously,
criticized King Abdullah himself. Specifically, when asked
by the Al-Arabiyah reporter about the King's statements to
the BBC, Shubaylat replied, "According to the constitution,
the Jordanian government is responsible for the statements
and decisions of the King. Thus the government is
responsible for this statement. The Jordanian people do not
at all accept dispatching Jordanian troops to fight Iraqis in
Iraq where there is an Iraqi resistance."


6. (C) Because of the nature of Shubaylat's criticism, the
Jordanian establishment has taken notice of, but dismissed
his campaign. At a farewell lunch for the Ambassador, a
prominent businessman who went to school with Shubaylat
described the petition as "nonsense" and asked what had
happened to his old friend. The Secretary General of the
Ministry of Political Development, rolling her eyes,
dismissed the petition as rude but insignificant, and doubted
whether it would have any influence on government policy or
public opinion. An editorial in the English-language daily
"The Jordan Times" on July 8 accused the petitioners of
distorting the facts and argued that helping Iraq is in
Jordan's best interests. As for the King himself, he told
DCM July 8 that "you could have set your watch" by
Shubaylat's predictable response, which he dismissed as the
voice of figures who seek failure, not success, in Iraq.

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COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) Shubaylat's harsh criticism against the GOJ's Iraq
policy, though certainly controversial, is not unprecedented.
But by directly linking the government's Iraq policy to the
King, he has undoubtedly pushed the generally accepted red
lines of public dissent.


8. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.

Visit Embassy Amman's classified website at

http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman

or access the site through the State Department's SIPRNET
home page.
GNEHM