Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04AMMAN3231
2004-04-27 17:10:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

JORDANIAN RESPONSE TO GME INITIATIVE:

Tags:  PREL KDEM PHUM PGOV JO 
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271710Z Apr 04
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 003231 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL KDEM PHUM PGOV JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN RESPONSE TO GME INITIATIVE:
U.S.
CREDIBILITY LOW BUT PROPSALS NOT TOO BAD

REF: SECSTATE 86312

-------
SUMMARY
-------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 003231

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL KDEM PHUM PGOV JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN RESPONSE TO GME INITIATIVE:
U.S.
CREDIBILITY LOW BUT PROPSALS NOT TOO BAD

REF: SECSTATE 86312

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (U) In response to ref, Post solicited
feedback from our interlocutors within the GOJ,
academia, and the NGO community about the G-8
Greater Middle East Initiative papers. The
response was generally favorable, but activists
cautioned that implementation will be difficult
given low U.S. credibility in the region related
to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Iraq.
That said, all agreed that G-8 sponsorship for a
regional reform initiative would make it less
controversial than U.S. sponsorship. Our
contacts commended the inclusion of references to
previous Arab reform documents as a way to show
how the GMEI complements regional efforts, and
offered suggestions to counter criticism that it
is being imposed from "outside." Activists
appreciated the effort to involve representatives
from all sectors of society, and cautioned
against letting resistant governments make
excuses to stall reform. They suggested that
coordinating through the G-8 would also help
eliminate redundancies in regional reform
programming and funding, as well as connect
like-minded activists with a view to increasing
cooperation and replicating successful
approaches. End Summary.

--------------
SUGGESTIONS TO ENHANCE GMEI'S REGIONAL FLAVOR
--------------


2. (U) Interlocutors from the GOJ, NGO
community, and academia offered suggestions to
further enhance the Greater Middle East
Initiative's (GMEI) "regional flavor" and counter
criticism that the ideas are being imposed from
the "outside." A senior GOJ official who read
the papers said that the initiative's inclusion
of language from previous Arab documents on civil
society and democratic development, including the
Alexandria Library, Arab Business Council, and
Sana'a Declaration, was a positive way to
highlight the fact the GMEI is building on
regional reform efforts. He said that the Arab
League should take a similar approach when they
meet in May to devise an Arab reform document.


3. (U) Regarding the idea of allocating funding
through a board of directors, one contact
proposed selecting "credible" intellectuals from
the region to serve on the board. He also

suggested that the G-8 publicize the meetings
held in Arab countries with local activists (such
as the roundtable discussion in Amman with U/S
Grossman) to show that the USG indeed is making
the effort to consult, not impose.


4. (U) They believe the proposed Foundation for
Democracy could select the most appropriate
models of democratic institutions that exist in
Europe, the U.S. and other countries to follow in
the Middle East (e.g. parliamentary as opposed to
presidential government, or French versus
Anglo-Saxon legal or educational traditions). A
professor of political science suggests creating
equivalent bodies on the regional and national
levels that can connect more effectively to all
levels of the population and advance democratic
tenets in a country-specific and culturally
sensitive manner.

--------------
ACTIVISTS LAUD ALL-INCLUSIVE APPROACH
--------------


5. (U) Interlocutors roundly applauded the
proposals' efforts to include government,
business, and civil society representatives in
developing and implementing the initiative. With
regard to the Forum for the Future, activists
emphasized that no one sector should dominate,
and government in particular should not be
allowed to veto or stymie progress in "sensitive"
areas such as press freedoms and women's rights.
One suggestion is to hold in parallel to the G-8
a conference of civil society groups from the
region and democracy NGOs from the G-8 countries,
which could then compare initiatives and
assessments of progress towards democratization.

--------------
AVOIDING DONOR REDUNDANCY IS KEY
--------------


6. (U) Our contacts also approve of the effort
to coordinate donor support among G-8 members.
"There is too much money flying around in
different directions" which is funding often
redundant projects, according to one activist.
With regard to the Democracy Assistance Group,
the NGO representatives like the idea of a
clearing house which would ensure donors are not
double-funding the same project. They also
support creating a data bank which would register
projects aimed at strengthening democratic
institutions in different countries, so that
civil society groups could benefit from similar
experiences in the region.

-------------- --
HOW TO MAKE IT ALL WORK: STRUCTURAL SUGGESTIONS
-------------- --


7. (U) NGO representatives and academics like
the idea of forming committees composed of civil
society representatives from participating Arab
countries to start the Foundation for Democracy,
Democracy Assistance Group, and the Forum for the
Future, They say it is important that these
representatives be independent of their
governments, but enjoy broad trust among their
constituents. However, the challenge will be
determining participation. They warn that
identifying appropriate activists could
inadvertently spur individual competition and
jealousies between community leaders. To avoid
this common problem, one solution might be to
include a wide gathering of civil society
representatives, possibly chosen by independent
but outside organizations like the National
Endowment for Democracy or the German foundation
Stiftungen, which have experience and contacts in
the region. This large gathering could elect a
smaller regional steering committee of civil
society representatives, which could set regional
goals, brainstorm, coordinate funding and oversee
the screening and selection of project proposals.


8. (U) One academic said it is essential that
the reform program have measurable indicators so
it does not devolve into a tool that enhances the
(undesirable) status quo or that the reform
effort stalls at the initial dialogue stage.
Obviously, dialogue is essential to make
connections and start the ball rolling, but the
initiative will have to identify and empower
specific means and tools for change to maintain
momentum. Clear criteria defining progress would
help ensure that projects translate into real
reform (and societal progress).

--------------
ALL ROADS LEAD BACK TO PALESTINE (AND IRAQ)
--------------


9. (U) Activists worry that low USG credibility
in the Middle East and ongoing turmoil in Iraq
and the West Bank/Gaza will continue to hinder
even a G-8 backed initiative. One warned that
many regional leaders will try to use Iraq and
Palestine as an excuse not to deal with reform in
their countries. For the badly needed reform
efforts to succeed, the people, according to our
interlocutors, must be convinced that the U.S. is
committed to a just solution to the conflicts,
and they must see a sincere effort underway to
fight what many perceive as anti-Arab and
anti-Islam feelings/activities in the West.
Failure to do so, according to our Jordanian
contacts, will only increase extremism in the
region and make the G-8's reform efforts
infinitely more difficult in the long run.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


10. (U) Our NGO and civil society interlocutors
in this project -- many of whom met with U/S
Grossman in March to discuss the GMEI -- provided
positive and concrete suggestions not colored by
a political message. That said, all pointed to
low U.S. credibility on the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and Iraq as the main obstacles to wide
acceptance of the much-needed GMEI. We note that
the positive and constructive reaction from
Embassy contacts -- some of whom are interested
in USG funding for their own related democracy
and civil society projects -- is not
representative of most Jordanians, who we expect
would calibrate their reaction more closely with
the negative political climate in the region.

Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman or access
the site through the State Department's SIPRNET
home page.
GNEHM