Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04AMMAN202
2004-01-08 18:23:00
SECRET
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

KING ABDULLAH TELLS CODEL SHAYS U.S. MUST STAY

Tags:  PREL KPAL IS IZ JO MEPP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000202 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2014
TAGS: PREL KPAL IS IZ JO MEPP
SUBJECT: KING ABDULLAH TELLS CODEL SHAYS U.S. MUST STAY
COURSE IN IRAQ, SUPPORT MAJOR STEPS IN MEPP


Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm for Reasons 1.5 (b),(d)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000202

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2014
TAGS: PREL KPAL IS IZ JO MEPP
SUBJECT: KING ABDULLAH TELLS CODEL SHAYS U.S. MUST STAY
COURSE IN IRAQ, SUPPORT MAJOR STEPS IN MEPP


Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm for Reasons 1.5 (b),(d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) King Abdullah told CODEL Shays January 6 that Jordan
strongly backs U.S. efforts in Iraq, but warned against
handing over authority or withdrawing coalition troops
prematurely. He expressed concern over terrorists
infiltrating Jordan's borders, especially along the Saudi
frontier, saying increased assistance could help mitigate the
problem. Both King Abdullah and Queen Rania urged the U.S.
to provide objective Arabic-language media coverage within
Iraq and to develop methods to counter pervasive
anti-Americanism in the region. The King was gloomy about
progress in the Arab-Palestinian conflict, criticizing both
sides and denouncing the Israeli security wall as
short-sighted. End Summary.

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IRAQ
--------------


2. (C) CODEL Shays, accompanied by the Ambassador, met with
King Abdullah and Queen Rania January 6 at the royal family's
residence in Amman. The King noted that Jordan fully
supports U.S. reconstruction efforts in Iraq and was
providing training for Iraqis in many different fields. He
expressed sharp concern, however, over whether Iraqis would
be prepared to administer the country if the proposed
transfer of authority took place this summer. There are many
"disconnects" between the different factions in Iraq, some of
whom have strongly opposing agendas, that have to be resolved
before full sovereignty is restored to the Iraqi people.
Premature elections in Iraq could prove disastrous, the King
argued, and those within the Iraqi Governing Council who were
pressing for an early transfer of power were likely motivated
by their own personal agendas and a desire "to be in the
driver's seat."


3. (S) The King agreed that Saddam Hussein's capture would
lead to a gradual decline in attacks from supporters of the
old regime. Attacks from Islamic terrorists, however, would
most likely continue, necessitating the creation of a strong
intelligence service within Iraq. According to the King,
terrorists were still crossing into Iraq from both Syria and

Saudi Arabia, along with anti-aircraft rockets and other
weapons. While the Saudis were finally trying to take some
action to stem this flow, the King deemed this "too little,
too late" and worried that Al-Qaida and its allies were
preparing for "the next level" of attacks both within Iraq
and elsewhere. Withdrawal of U.S. forces depended on the
Iraqis' capability to maintain security in the country.
Military and security training programs needed time and the
U.S. had to be "practical" about turning over security
responsibilities. The King advised the U.S. to "gradually"
lessen the number of its forces at the appropriate time to
lower U.S. visibility and to show its commitment to ending
the occupation.

--------------
BORDER SECURITY
--------------


4. (S) In addition to security inside Iraq, the King
expressed worries about security along Jordan's borders,
claiming that terrorists were infiltrating Jordan from Syria.
He emphasized special concern for security along Jordan's
long border with Saudi Arabia. As Jordanian forces were
already stretched too thin trying to patrol Jordan's borders
with the West Bank and Iraq, Jordan simply could not
adequately cover the Saudi frontier. The border's rugged
terrain, including narrow passes hidden from sight, only
increased the opportunities for people and weapons to be
smuggled into or through Jordan. More aircraft and high-tech
equipment could help increase security, but would not fully
solve the problem.

--------------
ARAB MEDIA AND ANTI-AMERICANISM
--------------


5. (C) Queen Rania interjected that the lack of objective
media outlets was a significant problem in Iraq, as well as
the rest of the Arab world. Because the Iraqi public cannot
readily hear U.S. views or pro-Western Iraqi leaders via the
media, Iraqis instead rely on biased Arab news channels and
rumors for their information. King Abdullah added that Arabs
were, unfortunately, "infatuated with conspiracy theories"
and preferred to focus on empty rhetoric, rather than grapple
with real solutions to complex problems. In the case of
Saddam Hussein, far too many Arabs concentrated solely on his
populist grandstanding against the U.S. instead of asking
what the dictator had really accomplished for the Iraqi
people and for Arabs.


6. (C) The Queen labeled pervasive anti-Americanism "a
danger" that needed to be effectively countered in "subtle
ways," including exchange programs and people-to-people
contact, rather than through propaganda. She shared her
vision of an American university in Jordan staffed with U.S.
professors who would teach American values and be a positive
source of commentary for the media. The Queen hoped that
even Israelis would be attracted to study at such an
institution.

--------------
MIDDLE EAST PEACE
--------------


7. (C) The King stated that both Israel and the Palestinians
were failing to take the necessary steps to solve the ongoing
crisis. While the Palestinians were still struggling to form
a credible government "with Arafat always lurking in the
corner," Israel was creating more barriers to peace by
building its security wall. Although the wall might be
attractive to some as a short-term security measure, it was
very damaging to long-term prospects for peace and,
therefore, to Israel's long-term security. Within 5-6 years,
Palestinians would exceed 50% of the combined population of
Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, but Israeli actions were at
odds with this demographic reality. King Abdullah said that
he was "not optimistic" about the situation and foresaw only
efforts at "damage control" in the next six months, with the
U.S. and others asking both sides to take mere "baby steps"
to lessen the ongoing violence. What is really needed are
bold, major steps for peace.


8. (C) The King concluded by thanking the CODEL for U.S.
economic and military assistance. He characterized Jordan as
"an island in a sea of chaos," but said that continued
military aid was "critical" if Jordan was to retain its
stability while being pulled in so many directions on the
security/military front (e.g., aiding Iraq's security and
stepping up border patrols). Moreover, Jordan's bold
economic and social reform program, of which U.S. assistance
is a central component, "has to succeed." If the Jordanian
"experiment" were to fail, the King predicted that
hard-liners and the "old guard" throughout the region would
use this as ammunition to resist change.


9. (U) CODEL Shays did not have an opportunity to clear this
message.


10. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.

Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman or access the site
through the State Department's SIPRNET home page.
GNEHM