RESULTS OF G-8 COUNTERTERRORISM ACTION GROUP

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001054

SIPDIS

USNATO SEE PARA 8.

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER EFIN JO
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF G-8 COUNTERTERRORISM ACTION GROUP
MEETING IN AMMAN

REF: SECSTATE 14279

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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) DCM on February 5 hosted a discussion ref agenda
items in preparation for the G-8 Counterterrorism Action
Group (CTAG) meeting in Washington on February 20.
Participants were counterparts from G-8 missions in Amman, in
addition to representatives of interested states and
organizations (Australia, Spain, and the European Union;
Swiss were unavailable). They provided snapshots of their
country's counterterrorism support for Jordan, helped
identify possible overlaps in training and other assistance,
and highlighted areas for possible future assistance under
CTAG auspices. Participants reacted favorably to the U.S.
proposal to explore the feasibility of helping Jordan create
a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) to track and ultimately
disrupt terrorist and criminal financial flows. Along this
vein, Post is arranging a meeting with Central Bank
authorities to discuss Jordan's current practices and
identify specific needs in this regard. End Summary.

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CT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR JORDAN
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2. (SBU) DCM on February 5 convened his counterparts from
G-8 missions in Amman, in addition to representatives from
other countries and organizations, for a discussion of ref
agenda items in advance of the Counterterrorism Action Group
(CTAG) meeting in Washington on February 20. The DCM led the
discussion with a brief summary of U.S. training and
assistance to support Jordan's counterterrorism program. He
noted that U.S. support for Jordan over the last year has
included training on WMD awareness, mail security, and
airport security management. The U.S. is also working to
help improve Jordan's border patrol operations and its crisis
response practices. Other courses during FY2004 include
International Money Laundering, Post-Bomb Blast Crime Scene
Investigations, and Public Corruption.


3. (SBU) The French DCM noted his country maintains a very
strong cooperative counterterrorism relationship -- mainly
operational -- with Jordanian authorities. The French have
provided training courses in maritime security as well as
others for the PSD. The British also have a strong
operational cooperative relationship with all three elements
of Jordan's intelligence apparatus -- PSD, GID, and military
intelligence -- and the U.K. is looking to expand its
training program as it expects additional funding in the near
future for new projects and is working on a aviation security
assessment, according to the British DCM. Jordanian
officials also will participate in an upcoming conference in
March in Dubai about transportation security.


4. (SBU) The British DCM said his mission is struggling to
get a better handle on Jordanian interagency coordination on
CT matters, which they assess is poor. In the end, it works,
he said, because one of the three agencies usually takes over
and works a problem to its resolution. The U.K. has provided
improvised explosive device disposal training. It has not
held a hostage rescue course in the last two years but is
hoping to renew the program.


5. (SBU) The Canadians also maintain a good operational
relationship and have provided significant technical
assistance in the past. Its maritime security assistance
program has been stalled for the last two years for unrelated
political reasons but there is discussion about its
resumption. He suggested that Canada might be in a good
position to help create a database for CTAG participants to
catalogue and update ongoing CT programs, as well as to offer
technical assistance on the financial side.


6. (SBU) The EU representative mentioned that the
Jordanians had requested assistance in upgrading an
unspecified system designed to fight corruption and money
laundering. The Spanish representative presented the meeting
with a copy of the Madrid Declaration that recognizes the
needs of victims of terrorism.

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NO KNOWN ASSESSMENTS OF JORDAN'S CT NEEDS
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7. (U) None of the participants were able to identify any
assessment conducted by CTAG donor countries, other donor
countries, or international organizations about Jordan's
CT-related needs.

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AREAS OF OVERLAP
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8. (SBU) Participants discussed potential areas of
overlapping assistance, such as in the area of border
security. The Japanese DCM noted that his country was in the
final stages of negotiating an agreement to provide Jordan
with vehicles for border security. Noting that several
colleagues had noted during their presentations programs to
help improve Jordan's border security, he expressed concern
of possible duplication of efforts. The British DCM
mentioned that NATO had discussed providing assistance based
on a list of requirements for Jordan, but it does not yet
have a training budget. NATO sent a team to Jordan to assess
Jordan's needs, but because of the slow process perhaps CTAG
would be a better venue through which to provide such
assistance. Post requests that the U.S. NATO mission in
Brussels inquire about potential NATO assistance in this area.

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FUTURE CT ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS
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9. (SBU) Participants discussed Jordan's CT needs that are
not being addressed by ongoing or planned CT assistance.
Participants responded favorably to the U.S. proposal to
explore the potential feasibility of helping Jordan create a
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in Jordan to track and
ultimately disrupt terrorist financial flows. Post provided
attendees with background information on FIUs, and offered to
arrange a meeting with financial experts in Jordan's Central
Bank to discuss the idea further. Participants agreed that
Jordanian involvement in the process is essential,
particularly given the covert nature of many bilateral
counterterrorism programs, to identify overlaps as well as
gaps in assistance. With regard to the FIU, the group deemed
it essential to work closely with the Jordanians to
understand the extent of the problem here in Jordan,
determine what system is currently in place to detect and
disrupt terrorist and criminal financial flows, and Jordan,s
specific needs in this area. The goal, of course, is to
avoid creating a duplicate bureaucracy fighting the problem
in Jordan.

Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman or access the site
through the State Department's SIPRNET home page.
GNEHM