IMPLICATIONS OF CONTINUING MALAISE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000685

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM NI
SUBJECT: IMPLICATIONS OF CONTINUING MALAISE

REF: A. ABUJA 586


B. ABUJA 582

C. ABUJA 581

D. 03 ABUJA 2205

E. 03 ABUJA 1385

F. ABUJA 588

Classified By: CDA RICK ROBERTS FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Recent coup rumors (Ref A) and political
assassinations (Refs B and C) have added fuel to a fire that
has been on slow burn among Nigeria's political class and
Nigerians as a whole (Ref D) since last August (Ref E),but
there seems little likelihood of a real coup in the next few
months. Indeed Nigerian newspapers contend, and many
Nigerians believe, that the recent Ref B "Mustapha coup
attempt" was staged by Obasanjo to cover his political
failures. Most Nigerians continue to be alienated from their
society as well as their government, especiallly in the
north. Virtually none see positives of the Obasanjo
administration -- from transparency to the new NEEDS economic
reform program -- as benefitting them or theirs personally.
There has not been a military coup in large part because of
Obasanjo's success in re-fashioning senior ranks into his own
image, Christian/southern and believing in civilian rule.
That could end up as the catalyst for a coup, if Buhari's
suit overturns Obasanjo's 2003 election and Obasanjo ignores
such a court decision, but Nigeria is more likely to muddle
on through the muck toward whatever positives Obasanjo ends
up producing before the next election in 2007.


2. (S/NF) SUMMARY CONTINUED: Nigerians widely associate the
U.S. with Obasanjo's administration, although the USG has
done little to support Obasanjo's second administration, or
to distance ourselves from its failures and continuing
problems, or to push for correction of those problems outside
what the GON is already doing. Washington did not support
Obasanjo publicly on removing subsidies on gasoline, for
example, and is perceived as critical of Nigeria's taking
Charles Taylor from Nigeria. The USG is seen by Nigerians as
having supported the flawed 2003 election, and when northern
or Muslim Nigerians feel they are being ruled by "others,"
they lump the USG in with the GON, southerners, Christians
and the West among those "others." Post analyzed Nigerians'
mood at length in Ref D; this cable analyzes the long-term
consequences for U.S. interests -- both regime stability and
perceptions of the U.S. -- and what we can do about them.
END SUMMARY.

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OBASANJO'S PROBLEMS...
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3. (C) Since President Obasanjo came to power in 1999, the
average Nigerian has seen little if any improvement in the
quality of his life or in his ability to influence his
government. Rampant unemployment plagues Nigeria's working
class and most of those eligible for government pensions
receive only empty promises. There have been few results
from the GON's widely publicized transparency efforts, and
many Obasanjo administration figures are widely thought to be
involved in corruption, political assassinations, resource
waste, budgetary fraud and general mismanagement. Those who
are seen as clean and earnestly working for change are also
seen as powerless to make fundamental changes in the Obasanjo
administration, let alone Nigeria's future. As a result,
Nigerian and foreign investment outside of the energy sector
is minimal and unlikely to grow at rates necessary for
fundamental change to come from economic progress.


4. (C) The average Nigerian's view of his/her government is
just as bleak as his/her economic prospects. Most Nigerians
believe the 2003 federal and state elections were rife with
fraud and, according to the influential Lagos Daily "The
Guardian," fully 91 per cent of those it surveyed believed
the latest 2004 local elections were rigged. Nigerians still
favor democracy; we are far from the level Sudan reached in
1989, where Sudanese welcomed Islamic dictatorship turning
out the crony-democracy of Sadiq al-Mahdi. But most
Nigerians have gone beyond debating whether election results
were manipulated, to questioning whether Nigeria is any more
democratic today than it was at the beginning of Obasanjo's
first term. With more than 70 percent of Nigerians living in
poverty on less than one dollar per day, and with a GON that
Nigerians tend to see as an enemy unless it is giving him or
her money directly, it is little wonder that most Nigerians
feel alienated from their government as well as their society.


5. (C) The mood in the country, the President's widening rift
with his chosen members of the National Assembly and
conflicts with some PDP governors make continued infighting
likely within the ruling party. Obasanjo has been taking
actions for several months that hurt the interests of his
Vice President, Atiku Abubakar, and many believe the
President's supporters will get Atiku indicted for corruption
within the coming weeks. Maybe not, as Atiku would be
motivated to use his insider knowledge to attack Obasanjo and
his family, and whatever Obasanjo or his supporters have on
Atiku could keep them out of jail if Atiku succeeded
Obasanjo. But Atiku's recent moves have reduced his
political viability for 2007 (Ref F),even above whatever
Obasanjo does. ANPP Presidential candidate Muhammadu Buhari
is still waiting on the outside for the courts to overturn
the 2003 results and order new elections, and an Atiku
supporter on the inside of the Administration showed POLOFF
what he claimed the "real" 2003 results -- Buhari winning 53
percent of the vote nationwide.


6. (S/NF) If Buhari wins his court case, Obasanjo will have a
difficult choice to make. He could stretch out the matter in
the Supreme Court, to which the Appeals Court's decision will
be appealed no matter who wins, or let the "Independent
National Electoral Commission" (INEC) dawdle so long
organizing new elections that another court will judge the
case moot. But Obasanjo is just as likely to disregard an
adverse election tribunal ruling and insist that he serve out
his term of office "for the good of the country," depending
on a military he does not trust to keep the peace and, more
importantly, protect his government. He has done everything
possible to remake the senior officer corps into his own
self-image -- Christian/southern and committed to civilian
rule -- and keep it loyal by a tight budgetary leash, but
these could be his undoing. The overwhelming majority of the
Nigerian officer corps remains committed to civilian rule,
not their civilian ruler. A growing minority of these
financially marginalized officers question whether the
current regime is in fact a democracy. That minority could
achieve critical mass if forced to choose between Obasanjo
and civil strife on one side, or supporting rule of law and
getting paid on the other.


7. (S/NF) The recent "security breach" (Ref A) highlights a
continuing concern among Nigerians: that Obasanjo is inclined
to see foreign affirmation as more important for his
political survival than serious reforms in either the
political or economic arenas. According to a family member,
Obasanjo has little faith in the Brigade of Guards which
garrisons Abuja, or in the military leadership in general.
One Obasanjo relative showed POLOFF a text message calling
for "all politicians" to come to the President's Ota farm for
Easter services to show "solidarity and pray for the
survival" of the regime. The Personal Assistant to Chief
Alex Ekwueme, Obasanjo's rival for the 2003 PDP nomination
and a prominent Igbo politician, told POLOFF that Ekwueme had
been "ordered" to Ota for that gathering. The Assistant said
Ekwueme "would go along because he is afraid for his safety,"
but another politician who attended told POLOFF that less
than twenty people gathered for the Easter services. Even
many of Obasanjo's own relatives did not show.

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...HAVE BECOME OUR PROBLEMS
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8. (S/NF) While the economy burns and and lack of trust in
public institutions is the smoke, President Obasanjo is busy
playing to the international community. Opposition
politicians and much of the public question the legitimacy of
Obasanjo's mandate and await the result of Buhari's legal
battle. The President continues to seek foreign affirmation,
which he receives for his economic team's nascent program if
for little else, but it is unclear whether Obasanjo plans to
take the difficult and, sometimes painful, decisions
necessary to put Nigeria's economy on the right track. Some
of the Embassy's Nigerian contacts speculate that the
President's economic advisors will be sacked when there
international community starts asking tough questions about
performance rather than just accepting the GON's statements
at face value. It does not help that Nigeria's publicly
announced economic statistics for estimated 2003 GDP growth
vary by several percentage points and are not reliable.
Obasanjo privately has expressed frustration that his
economic reform program has not received more public support,
nor understanding from western governments. To shore up what
he perceives as weak or non-existent support, Obasanjo has
taken the unusual step of arranging for his economic team to
address the foreign intelligence community.


9. (C) This is a critical time in U.S.-Nigerian relations.
The USG is widely seen as the sponsor of Nigeria's
"democratic" process and is widely accused of supporting
Obasanjo and the past flawed elections against the will of
the Nigerian people. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and
the global war on terrorism as a whole are seen by many of
Nigeria's 60 million or more Muslims as a war against Islam,
and feed their more important feelings that the USG is part
of an "other" ruling them that includes the GON, southerners,
Christians and the West more generally. Faced with these two
realities of Nigerian public sentiment, U.S. policy should
play more to the polity than to the elites.

10. (C) Our long-term interests are in Nigeria achieving a
transparent and accountable political process, and a
transparent and robustly growing economy, as well as
continuing common approaches to regional energy and security
issues. Our policy should reflect the first two aspirations
as much as the latter two already achieved, even more reason
to favor the polity over any specific politicians. Helping
Nigerians build long-term national stability is the only way
to maintain our current benefits. While this is not greatly
different from our current professed policy, the change is in
emphasis. In the past, we did not plan for and work toward
progress, but rather hoped for it. Pursuing this policy
would require becoming more proactive in the pursuit of our
goals rather than passively offering money and allowing the
mistakes to continue.

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STARTING TO SOLVE THEM
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11. (S/NF) Six years is long enough that the current system
should have begun producing measurable results. On the
political side, our ignoring the shortcomings of the 1999
elections, ignoring the warning signals that INEC would fail
a second time (in the interest that 2003 elections be on
time) and then ignoring the flaws of 2003 election, have
spent a lot of money but not produced more democracy in 2004.
There are not many positive results on the economic side
yet, either. We must address Nigeria in a clear fashion,
increasing our public comment on both successes and failures.
Where the "successes" are belied by reality, we need to say
so. Even so, it is important to remember that influencing
Nigeria requires that we balance strong but private criticism
with unequivocal public comments that do not force a negative
reaction from Nigerian institutions naturally averse to
outside criticism.


12. (C) In the Nigerian domestic arena, we need to focus on
good governance and transparency both economically and
politically. Since we cannot be sure how the Nigerian
situation will evolve over the next few months, we need to
emphasize a mantra: "It is the process, not the person."
Depersonalizing our approach will allow us to maintain
relations with all the players in the process. In
emphasizing our commitment to transparency and good
governance, we should hold out for real progress, and not
settle for paper commitments. Any assistance provided to the
Nigerian government should come with an appropriately strong
level of Nigerian public oversight and access to the
processes (not to be confused with oversight and access by
implementing partner NGOs, which are part of the system and
often not Nigerian). These actions should serve to improve
the USG's image with the general public and to convince the
increasingly alienated citizens of Nigeria that they have a
stake in the process.


13. (U) Our principle targets should be:

-- supporting civilian rule, including a continuing demand
for INEC transparency and independence;

-- strongly, but with a critical eye, supporting the NEEDS
economic development and reform program;

-- demanding rule of law and supporting the federal
judiciary, judicial independence and reform;

-- strengthening checks and balances among the three branches
of government in politics and economics; and

-- demanding and promoting anti-corruption efforts, including
strong political and program support for the ICPC and EFCC to
be independent, unbiased and effective.


14. (C) We should also continue and strengthen our outreach
to Nigeria's Muslims and manage our negative international
image. To do so, we will need a message to deliver, not
merely a prettier or more expensive envelope. This effort is
one best coordinated with our global efforts to convince
Muslims that our foreign policy is not naturally anti-Muslim,
although success in Nigeria will not outpace our successes
with Muslims worldwide, nor entirely remove our
identification in Nigerian Muslims' thinking with being part
of the "other." The bridge to overcome being seen as part of
their opponents is in our support for real democracy in
Nigeria.

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NIGERIA IS NOT A BASKET CASE
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15. (S/NF) There is much to build on. Most Nigerians may not
be benefitting yet, but the economy is statistically growing
and there is much potential in the NEEDS development and
reform program. President Obasanjo's Economic Team is trying
to make headway on the anti-corruption and transparency
front, perhaps as Obasanjo's legacy, and is already setting
out economic policies that could have a very positive impact
in the future. Conversations with private sector risk
assessors indicate that the Obasanjo regime's intentions on
economic reform are considered credible. Extraordinary
efforts by the Finance Minister to pay outstanding debt have
resonated particularly well recently with the foreign
investment community.


16. (S/NF) The USG needs to be more active. When the
Obasanjo administration takes good steps, we need to give
more public support for those steps. When the Obasanjo
administration fails to take important steps -- such as not
submitting huge All-Africa Games contracts to its own
internal "Due Process" review, or stuffing the "Independent
National Election Commission" with non-independent
commissioners -- we need to make ourselves heard on those,
too. We need to position ourselves as simultaneously the
GON's best friend and most persistent critic.
ROBERTS