THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS IN NIGERIA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000582

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM ASEC NI
SUBJECT: THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS IN NIGERIA

REF: A. LAGOS 637


B. ABUJA 572

CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES RICK ROBERTS FOR REASONS 1.5
(B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: While security in general is at its lowest
point in recent memory, many of the recent wave of killings
(septel) are attributable to two political trends, one local
and one national. The majority of national politics
incidents appear to stem from internal disputes in Obasanjo's
ruling PDP, while a few were apparently intended to
intimidate opposition party leaders whose popular support
threatened ruling party interests. The local politics
pattern follows the pattern of a politician employing a gang
under one rubric or another -- as bodyguards or militia or
support group -- and the gangsters pursue his political
rivalries by rubbing out those he does not like. The Odua
Peoples Congress (OPC) are famous as such gangsters for hire
(Ref A),although there are several other organized
equivalents around the country generically referred to as
"Area Boys." Politics in new democracies can be a blood
sport, witness Taiwan's election and fistfights thereafter in
its legislature, but the recently accelerated pace of
assassinations in Nigeria and the lingering uncertainty over
the still contested 2003 elections do not bode well for
curbing political violence. END SUMMARY.

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THE SETTING
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2. (C) Nigeria has experienced general sporadic violence
for many years as ethnic groups wage intermittent war on each
other, armed robbery has become common, and security forces
have intervened ostensibly to reduce both while raising their
income by shaking down passersby with guns in full display.
Politics too has seen such violence, which has waxed and
waned as politics have become more and less important under
civilian and military governments. Nigeria has become a
violent society, with more than enough guns and people who
are willing to use them.


3. (C) Political assassinations have been used to eliminate
challengers both within parties (Dikibo, 2004) and from rival
parties (Harry, 2003) as well as to silence critics
(Yar,adua, 1996) and intimidate survivors (Kudirat Abiola,
1997). Assassinatons have also been simple revenge killings
by one member of the political class upon another, at times,
instead of having deeper motives. In national level
politics, assassinations tend to be aimed at the mid-level of
opponents' factions, to camouflage the conflict in a veneer
of local violence. Real local-level assassinations are more
straight forward, elimination of direct competitors and
intimidation of potential protesters, with efforts to hide
the reasons generally limited to verbal denials. At all
levels, control of party (government) resources is both cause
and effect of assassinations.


4. (C) Nigerians have exhibited an ingenuity in carrying
out political assassinations matched only by their well-known
capacity for election rigging (Ref B) and financial fraud.
Violent attacks appear to be the method of choice nowadays,
but historically Nigerian assassins have utilized poison and
mechanical failures too, in attempts to cover the killers,
trails. Yar'adua was poisoned in prison, and Obasanjo
famously narrowly avoided the needle. The recent wave of
killings have mostly been attacks on automobiles passing
through rural areas or midnight assaults on the victim's home
in town. The most recent death, Yauri's, was originally
attributed to a fire and then to a single-car accident,
perhaps the work of a more creative and subtle assassin of
the earlier mold.

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THE NATIONAL TREND
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5. (S/NF) The recent assassination of PDP South-South Zone
Chairman Dikibo provides an instructive look at the "new
wave" assassins' methodology. On February 7, Dikibo was
assassinated en route from Port Harcourt to Asaba, in Delta
state. Police sources told poloff that Dikibo received a
warning on February 5 from "a phone in the Presidency." It
appears that a friend of Dikibo working at the Presidential
Villa security detail overheard something and attempted to
warn him. On the day of his death, the Deputy Governor of
Rivers state placed two phone calls to Dikibo, urging him to
travel to Asaba that evening. Dikibo had planned to leave
early in the day, but was delayed by the unexplained absence
of his orderly. When the orderly returned over two hours
late, he did so without his motorcycle, which he had
regularly parked at Dikibo's residence while traveling. The
second of the two calls came just ten minutes before Dikibo
died. According to an internal police report, the Deputy
Governor wanted to know the precise location of Dikibo: "the
village you are in now," according to the transcript of the
call. Within minutes, two cars overtook Dikibo who was
killed with one shot to the head. Subsequently, Abia
Governor Orji Kalu as well as Dikibo,s family and friends
have alleged that Dikibo complained of threats from "the
party," and his attorney says the threats continue.


6. (S/NF) Whether it was the purpose or not, the deaths of
Dikibo and Northwest Zone Chairman Yauri removed supporters
of VP Atiku from chairing the PDP in two of Nigeria's six
zones. PDP Board of Trustees Chairman Tony Anenih will have
a free hand to replace them with two of his own men, having
largely sidelined PDP Chairman Audu Ogbeh politically. The
attack on the governor of Benue (also an Atiku supporter) had
the added bonus of eliminating Agom, an anti-Anenih member of
the PDP Board of Trustees, putting the pieces in place for
Anenih to move from chairing the Board to chairing the PDP as
a whole if, as expected, Ogbeh is dumped during the course of
the year.

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LOCAL DYNAMICS
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7. (C) Kano, Kogi, Osun, Ondo, Anambra, Imo, Kwara, Enugu,
and Ogun states have all experienced killings from intra-PDP
disputes since 1999. Adamawa, Rivers, Delta, and Plateau,
among others, have also seen non-fatal attacks among rival
politicians. The predominant factor in these incidents has
been the struggle for control of the local party machinery,
although political violence in the Delta has always had an
ethnic flavor and may be in process to become a rivalry of
cartel leaders for control of illicit oil exporting (septel).



8. (C) The recent local government elections provided the
opportunity for governors to ensure that the interim chairs
they handpicked were given the opportunity to win the full
terms in office, sometimes even without resigning from their
civil service jobs to run for the office (Ref B). Many
members of the various political parties in power believed
that party primaries and the general elections should have
been open to opposing politicians as well as the
"Caretakers," and this difference of opinion became violent
in many places. In most cases the victims were, the
"Caretaker" local government chairman, his opponent, or an
election official deemed to be too close to one or the other
of the sides. Kogi and Adamawa states typified this simple
pattern.


9. (C) Plateau State showed the pattern at its most
complex, with economic, ethnic and religious layers added and
the usual gangs serving politicians upgraded into heavily
armed militias. Plateau PDP kingpin Solomon Lar, working
with the Governor, recruited hundreds of thugs" to terrorize
largely Muslim Hausa/Fulani herdsmen in Langtang and Shendam
LGAs into voting PDP. On the other side, ANPP national
officer Jeremiah Useni gathered his own gangs to intimidate
mainly Christian Jukun farmers in an area widely believed to
have voted for the ANPP in the 2003 elections. Lar and Useni
are both Christian. The ensuing clashes fueled an already
tense dispute between the herdsmen and farmers, eventually
killing upwards of 200 people in the past month.

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ONE OTHER COMMENT
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10. (S/NF) While some incidents are surely not related, the
political violence inside the ruling PDP also paints a
picture for Nigerians of a government that is unstable. If
rivals within the government can intimidate through
eliminating each other's mid-level supporters, why not
eliminate the seniors? Nigeria had a shaky start on the road
to democracy in 1999. The flawed contests in 2003 proved
that rigging and violence were effective ways to maintain
control of the political process. With these early lessons,
preparing for 2007 has become a do or die situation for many
politicians throughout the Nigerian political class. Efforts
at gaining or maintaining control of the PDP in 2004 have
translated this literally. The real losers, besides those
who end up dead, are the Nigerians who continue live in fear
of what may come next.
ROBERTS