Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ABUJA2060
2004-12-14 12:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

AU-LED TALKS ON DARFUR IN ABUJA ROCKED BY

Tags:  PREL PHUM EAID MARR SU DARFUR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002060 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM EAID MARR SU DARFUR
SUBJECT: AU-LED TALKS ON DARFUR IN ABUJA ROCKED BY
INTENSIFIED FIGHTING

Classified By: AF SPECIAL ADVISOR BRUCE EHRNMAN FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND
(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002060

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM EAID MARR SU DARFUR
SUBJECT: AU-LED TALKS ON DARFUR IN ABUJA ROCKED BY
INTENSIFIED FIGHTING

Classified By: AF SPECIAL ADVISOR BRUCE EHRNMAN FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND
(D)


1. (C) Summary. African Union-led peace talks on Darfur hit
a new snag on Monday, December 13, when rebel movements
announced suspension of their participation until the
Government of Sudan meets a series of demands, including a
halt to the current GOS military offensive to "open the
roads." Movement leaders subsequently agreed to return to
the table that evening, but Sudan Liberation Army/Movement
(SLA/M) told the AU early December 14 that they would not
return to the table until the current Government military
offensive in Darfur has stopped, and GOS forces have returned
to their previous positions. Sharing concern for what it
considers a very serious violation of the ceasefire and other
agreements, the AU has told the GOS delegation that it will
end this round of talks unless the Government can commit
today to halt the offensive immediately. The Joint
Commission will hold an emergency session tomorrow, December
15, to consider the situation on the ground in Darfur. End
Summary.


2. (C) The present round of AU-led talks on Darfur in Abuja,
Nigeria, have been plagued by reports of increasing violence
on the ground since they began December 10. New levels of
violence, in which large concentrations of GOS and Jingaweit
forces have assembled to conduct operations to "open the
roads," now have led the SLA/M to suspend their participation
in the talks. Reports from the CFC in Darfur state that the
GOS has launched a major offensive, and that Jingaweit forces
have attacked and burned at least four villages. (Rebel
leaders claim that twelve villages have been burnt.)


3. (C) Late December 13, SLA/M rep read a "joint SLA/M - JEM
statement" announcing that the movements were suspending
their participation in the talks unltil several key demands
were met by the government and the international community.
The statement also included a new set of negotiating
objectives that would give the Darfur process equal standing
with the Naivasha north - south negotiations and require any
new Sudan constitution to be consistent with the outcome of

the Darfur peace process. Following strong statements by the
AU, U.S., and other international participants, which
included a challenge to use this opportunity to demonstrate
that the parties can successfully address violence through
the AU and the Abuja process, the movements appeared to have
agreed to return to the session on the morning of December

14. However, Following new reports of intensified violence
on the ground, the SLA/M informed the AU that it would not
return to the table until the GOS had stopped the offensive
and returned its forces to their original positions.


4. (C) In consultation with the international partners, the
AU has refused to accept a suspension of the talks at this
time, but is conducting separate discussions with each of the
parties on December 14. Based on confirmation from the CFC
in Darfur that the government remains on the offensive
despite remonstrations by the CFC/AMIS (Ceasefire
Commission/African Union Mission in Sudan) and the
international community, the AU has taken an unusually tough
line with the GOS, telling delegation leader Magzoub
al-Khalifa that unless he could assure the AU mediation that
the GOS could and would halt the offensive immediately, the
AU could not continue to conduct this round. When al-Khalifa
sought to deflect the question by castigating the SLA/M
behavior, Mediation acting chairman Sam Ibok demanded a
clear, specific answer. Al-Khalifa said he would do whatever
was necessary to facilitate the talks. Ibok asked him to get
a more specific answer from Khartoum.


5. (U) Consultations with the movements will take place
later today. In informal discussions with the US and other
partners, the SLA/M states that its key requirement is an end
to the offensive. It disassociated itself with JEM's
political objectives outlined in the joint statement, which
seek to carve out a separate niche to gain greater status for
the movement in a process JEM seeks to put at odds with
Naivasha. That said, even the SLA/M underscores that
Naivasha does not meet their concept of a satisfactory
comprehensive agreement. We have stressed to both movements
that they will have to work on the national level within the
process that the Naivasha agreement will begin, taking
advantage of opportunities provided by an increasingly open
and democratic political structure. Naivasha will not be
reopened.


6. (C) Comment. We have told all the parties that violence
should not prevent talks, and that they should focus their
efforts on using the available mechanisms to end the
fighting. We have also underscored that attacks on civilian
transportation on Darfur's roads by the movements is
unacceptable, but that the Government's pretext that it needs
to protect free movement through a major military action is
also unacceptable. That said, the AU has taken an
increasingly tough - and very welcome - stand with the GOS
delegation, requiring it to drop standard pretenses that it
bears no responsibility for any of the violence or conditions
in Darfur. Sam Ibok has been an able chair; the arrival
December 14 of AU Special Representative for Sudan, Baba
Kingabe, has further stiffened the mediation. Ibok made
clear to the GOS that if the talks collapse, he will focus
responsibility on Government-inspired violence in Darfur, not
on the movements. No one wants the talks to fail; rather,
there is strong hope that the GOS will pull back. We
anticipate that the SLA/M will participate in the Joint
Commission session on December 15.


7. (C) Comment continued: The absence of the most senior
SLA/M leaders, Abdulwahid Nur and Mini Minawi, has left the
movement's delegation somewhat adrift and without
flexibility. Minawi has called U.S. reps several times with
complaints about AU behavior and excuses for his absence. We
are told the SLA/M leadership crisis will be resolved in the
next day or two, but we have heard this before. Another
reason for the SLA/M leadership's absence may be preparation
for the "all-Darfur" conference scheduled for Tripoli on
December 25, which will include both movements, the GOS, and
participants from Darfur's traditional leadership structures.



8. (U) Minimize considered.
CAMPBELL