DELTA QUIET (FOR NOW)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001715

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC NI
SUBJECT: DELTA QUIET (FOR NOW)

REF: A. ABUJA 1675


B. ABUJA 1673

C. LAGOS 2034 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Charge Rick Roberts for Reasons 1.5 (B & D).


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Since last week's negotiations in Abuja
(Ref A),no major violence has been reported from Rivers
state or the Delta region. While one group reportedly
"disarmed," another was a no-show. With more talks scheduled
to begin October 8, militia leader Asari remains wary of the
GON's intentions. Other observers are equally skeptical of
the GON's sincerity and the possibility of a resolution to
the conflicts rooted in Nigeria's flawed 2003 elections. The
absence of a response from the GON brings into question the
continued viability of the Nigerian state as currently
structured and creates an environment that could encourage
more violent opposition to GON policies or create a martyr to
the cause of increased autonomy for Nigeria's regions. END
SUMMARY.

SITUATION ON THE GROUND
--------------


2. (U) Since the negotiations in Abuja that ended on
October 2, no major flare-ups of violence have been reported
in the oil-rich Delta region, although one helicopter attack
on a group of Asari's "commanders" reportedly took place
October 1 while Asari was in Abuja. Furious initially, Asari
reportedly calmed down and ordered no retaliatory attack by
his group. Asari returned to Rivers State midday October 2
and ducked the receiving party at the airport, entering his
vehicle and departing for one of his camps. He returned to
the town of Buguma, one of his primary headquarters, to
triumphant celebrations by hundreds of armed supporters.


3. (SBU) A scheduled militias disarmament meeting took
place this week, but Asari's rival Ateke Tom showed up alone
and made a show of "disarming" his militia. Asari sent a
message instead, that he was still "accepting applications"
for membership in his group. (COMMENT: Tom also publicly
"disarmed" his militia some weeks ago to much fanfare, but to
little military effect if he keeps having arms to turn in.
Nobody believed Governor Odili's ally, Tom, was disarmed the
first time either. END COMMENT.) At another event scheduled
to show the reconciliation between Tom and Asari, Tom was the
no-show. Asari took the platform again and called for
interested parties to apply for membership in his group.

NEGOTIATIONS
--------------


4. (U) Asari has returned to Abuja for the next round of
talks with the government, but his statements indicate no
intention to disarm his fighters. He says that he thinks the
GON is not very sincere, and that there is "every
possibility" that disarmament will not go ahead. The
Asari-GON negotiations last week covered five of the ten
points highlighted in the talks, supposedly agreeing on:

-- disbanding of all militias and total disarmament;

-- immediate cessation of hostilities by militias and the
GON;

-- GON commitment to promote the development of the Niger
delta;

-- a pledge to be peaceful and law abiding; and

-- a commitment to the unity of the country.

Outstanding issues include:

-- resolution of chieftancy issues in Okrika;

-- resolution of chieftancy issues in Kalabari;

-- establishment of committees to work for "wholesome
community development" in the Delta;

-- comprehensive disarmament and observance of fundamental
rights; and

-- rehabilitation and re-integration of disarmed youths into
"productive and gainful employment."


5. (C) Asari remained in Abuja from September 29 until
October 2, sources near him report, but was unable to see
President Obasanjo until late October 1 or early October 2.
According to one source, Asari refused to meet Obasanjo
without his own security men. The source claimed that Asari
threatened to walk out if his men, armed with side arms and
hand grenades, were not allowed into the meeting. The
President reportedly acquiesced. At the end of the meeting,
Obasanjo assured Asari of his security, but Asari demanded a
"hostage" to travel with him to Port Harcourt. Asari chose
Andy Uba, Special Advisor to the President on Domestic
Affairs.

QUESTIONS OF CREDIBILITY
--------------


6. (C) In addition to Asari's own doubts, other observers
remain skeptical. The leader of an Ogoni organization, Ledum
Mittee, told PolOff that this first Asari agreement was
"worthless" and that he expects more trouble to follow.
Other Ijaw leaders criticized Asari, and complained that if
Obasanjo wanted to calm the region he would have to make
deals with each of them in the same fashion. The leader of
the Ijaw Youth Council added a threat to occupy flow stations
and "stop production" in conjunction with a labor-led general
strike (septel) planned for October 11. From the neighboring
South East region, Igbo leader Chukwuemeka Ojukwu compared
GON security services "constantly harassing" politicians on
one hand, while negotiating with militia leaders like Asari
on the other. "Asari kills hundreds of soldiers and damages
oil facilities and is treated like royalty," Ojukwu mused,
and perhaps "we (the Igbos) need more guns to attack the
pipelines" to get Obasanjo's attention.

COMMENT
--------------


7. (S/NF) This outbreak of violence -- rooted in GON's
flawed election, the disaster of GON environmental,
development and political policies in the Delta, and the
GON's failure to prevent the corruption-driven growth of
militias nationwide -- brings into question the continued
viability of the Nigerian state as currently structured. If
Obasanjo gives Asari a good deal, it could well encourage
other groups with grievances to pursue their claims more
forcefully. If the negotiations are used instead as a tactic
to buy time until eliminating Asari, it runs the risk
creating a martyr to the cause of increased autonomy for the
250 plus tribal and ethnic groups in the country, as well as
an environment for further massacres on the level of Odi
(2000) or Zaki-Biam (2001).
ROBERTS