DELTA VIOLENCE: KEEPING OUR POWDER DRY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001673

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2014
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV EPET PINS CASC ASEC NI DELTAVIOLENCE
SUBJECT: DELTA VIOLENCE: KEEPING OUR POWDER DRY

REF: A. LAGOS 1982 AND PREVIOUS

B. ABUJA 1656 AND PREVIOUS

C. ABUJA 1486

Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.5 (B & D).


1. (S) Summary: Although the military situation has been
relatively quiet the past few days, there is much political
movement among the major players. A senior Defense Ministry
source confirmed press reports that militia leader Asari,
whom GON forces were trying to kill last week, is in Abuja
today, September 29, to meet with President Obasanjo. For
now, the situation is too fluid for meaningful USG action,
and militia leader Asari's targeting of expatriates and oil
production could be ended by a deal even before the targeting
was to take effect October 1. That targeting could also,
however, become more real (only Shell has reduced staff so
far, not even a full drawdown),and in any case there will
remain the deeper and wider problem of:

-- the well-armed militias,
-- the GON's not putting them out of business,
-- their (USD 1 billion-plus) business stealing oil that
funds both militias and GON officials; and
-- the long-term threat of this environment to U.S. citizens
and oil imports. End Summary.


2. (S) Dokubo Asari's militia, one of many in Nigeria's
oil-rich Delta, this week threatened expatriate oil workers
and demanded a halt to oil production from October 1 until
the GON meets his demands for political and economic changes
in the Delta. The GON has attacked his militia the past few
weeks, but he and it are still at large and capable of
attacking oil company workers and facilities. His threats
may be political theater, however, and a political resolution
to his personal grievances could occur at any time.


3. (S) Today, September 29, Asari is in Abuja to meet with
President Obasanjo. The political situation among the GON,
the Delta's well-armed militias, and the politicians who use
those militias such as Governor Odili, moves rapidly. The
past two days have been relatively quiet militarily, perhaps
as the various players recheck their alliances and the
balance of power on the ground. ChevronTexaco's Managing
Director for Nigeria told us September 28 that he is more
worried about human rights violations and collateral damage
from GON operations against Asari's militia than about the
threat from Asari's militia.

DATT TRIP TO PORT HARCOURT


4. (S) The Defense Attache and DAO/MARA staff visited Port
Harcourt September 27-28. The city had the outward
appearance of normalcy, with a very minimal security force
presence on the streets. The people there reported an
intensification of military activity and militia violence
over the past three weeks, including GON formation of a
"joint military task force." One DAO contact indicated that
on September 8, Asari and the GON had agreed on a ceasefire
that held about a week, only to be broken by military action
o/a September 15 when a military MI-35 helicopter attacked a
number of localities in the vicinity of Tombia and Buguma,
approximately 30km southeast of Port Harcourt. An RSO
contact indicated that this was part of a planned 90-day
military campaign to eliminate Asari.


5. (S) Estimates of the strength of Asari's militia ranged
from a few hundred to a few thousand. One DAO contact
described a meeting of the militia's "central command" on
September 27 to decide the group's next steps, attended by
312 "commanders."

OUTLOOK FOR USG ACTION


6. (S) Post believes the situation is too fluid for
meaningful USG action on Asari at this time. Over the next
weeks, maybe days, the situation may bring major changes.
The critical point now is that the GON does not have
sufficient forces in the Delta to finish off Asari's militia
on the battlefield now or for the next few weeks, hence only
political deals or Asari's capture/death would fundamentally
change the threat from his militia. Asari's fate, in turn,
could make the Delta somewhat worse, but certainly will not
resolve the overall Delta threat above (see Ref C).
CAMPBELL