2007 PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE BUBA MARWA

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001552

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV NI ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: 2007 PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE BUBA MARWA

Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.5 (B & D).


1. (C) Ambassador lunched August 29 with retired Brigadier
General Buba Marwa, an announced candidate for president in
2007 whose posters already adorn Abuja and other cities.
Marwa is quite confident of winning in 2007, believing that
two of his three main potential rivals will not enter the
race and that he has support in each of the six Nigerian
political zones. He asked for the meeting, brought his wife
and three aides to the luncheon, and used the occasion to
both sound out the American Embassy and make his case why he
would be good for the U.S. as Nigeria's President from 2007.


2. (C) Marwa's case boiled down to three points: first that
he was close to the U.S. and had lived there for ten years;
second that the experience had turned him into an
American-style problem solver; and third that he would win
the election. Marwa noted that he had served in the U.S. as
a soldier and as a diplomat in Massachusetts, Kansas,
Kentucky, Pittsburgh, Washington and New York, the latter two
in Nigeria's Missions to the U.S. and UN. He remarked upon
his graduate degree from Harvard, saying the experience made
him approach issues with an American sense of solving
problems instead of letting them slide as some Nigerian
leaders did. It was as close as he came to criticizing a
President Obasanjo who is widely regarded, including by
Marwa, as close to the USG. Marwa claimed he had plans, not
elaborated, for solving Nigeria's problems in the Delta and
in the north.

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ELECTION DYNAMICS
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3. (C) Marwa told of winning support across Nigeria through
his experience (a northern Muslim governor of Lagos in the
south during military rule) and his foundation's largess. In
addition to funding a chair at Kansas University, Marwa's
foundation has long funded scholarships for students across
Nigeria at the secondary and college level. These made him
an especially potent force among younger Nigerians, and youth
groups were a mainspring of support in areas where he would
have no ethnic/religious ties. The youth wing of the Igbo
communal organization Ohnaeze, for example, had pledged its
support and would bring the Igbo to his cause even if there
was an Igbo running for one of the minority parties against
him. He claimed even more open support in the South-South
region than in the Southeast, benefiting there too from
demographics of a growing youth-voter population.


4. (C) Marwa treated support in Lagos and the Southwest as a
given, and travels there often. Although he did not remark
upon "zoning the next presidency to the North," he spent most
of his analysis to the Ambassador and Political Counselor on
his northern rivals. He believed former head of state
Ibrahim Babangida would probably not run, shying away in the
end from a candidature into a king-maker role. 2003 ANPP
candidate Muhammadu Buhari probably would not run either,
Marwa thought, but Buhari would work hard to deny the
Northwest to Babangida.


5. (C/NF) VP Atiku would run, Marwa believed, but would lose
to Marwa's appeal and Obasanjo's ill will. Marwa claimed
Atiku had huge financial resources, much more than Marwa.
(Comment: Marwa is widely thought to be running on money
looted from GON coffers by deceased military head of state
Sani Abacha and his associates, and it was unclear whether
Marwa meant Atiku had larger personal resources or had larger
resources including the GON.) Marwa believed that Obasanjo's
ill will toward his VP would cause the ruling PDP to dissolve
into factions, and that many would come to his standard. He
was, he said, the only one all Nigerians could rally behind.

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COMMENT
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6. (C/NF) Marwa is widely viewed within the political elite
as the stalking horse for Babangida, who, as he points out,
will likely shy away from a run at the Presidency. Marwa
derives more than a small measure of his support from
Babangida in addition to his own resources from the Abacha
regime. His glowing assessment of his own popularity suffers
from the usual Nigerian habit of self-promotion and his
support, especially outside Borno and Lagos states, is
directly dependent on his finances. While he is probably not
nearly as popular as he believes in either the South-South or
the Southeast, he has the potential to become an important
candidate as 2007 approaches.
CAMPBELL