OBASANJO TO SEND LETTER ADVOCATING LARGER AU FORCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001528

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF AND PM/RSAT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2014
TAGS: PREL MOPS SU NI DARFUR
SUBJECT: OBASANJO TO SEND LETTER ADVOCATING LARGER AU FORCE

REF: STATE 191028

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN CAMPBELL FOR REASONS 1.5 b AND d.


1. (C) The Ambassador met with President Obasanjo September 5
to deliver Darfur demarche. The Ambassador laid out the
proposed draft UNSCR, and provided Obasanjo with a copy of
the excerpts (reftel). Obasanjo read the excerpts and said
he thought they would work well. He has been pushing for a
larger AU troops and monitors deployment in the negotiations,
had inserted that into the agenda of the negotiations, and
had forced the GOS to accept its being part of the agenda.


2. (C) The Ambassador noted that the USG is considering
restricting military air operations over Darfur, in response
to repeated attacks or feigned attacks by GOS aircraft.
Obasanjo said that seemed both positive and possible. He saw
no reason why the AU could not or should not station military
observers at GOS airbases, asking how many airbases there
were to be observed and how many AU observers were currently
available for the mission. He noted that he was trying to
get President Bouteflika of Algeria to send 10 more military
observers to Darfur, and felt Egypt could contribute more
observers too.


3. (C) President Obasanjo agreed to send a letter on
September 6 to the President of the UNSC, and also to UNSYG
Annan, advocating a larger AU military observers force. He
would lay out the humanitarian necessity for such a larger
force, and note his personal letter to Sudanese President
Bashir along similar lines. He hoped the USG could transmit
his letters to the Dutch and the UNSYG in order to save time.
(Note: We will forward the text to the Department and USUN
upon receipt.)

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DARFUR TALKS DYNAMICS
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4. (C) Obasanjo said he had met earlier that day with leaders
of both the GOS delegation and the rebel delegations. He had
told all of them to move on to the next parts of the agenda,
and they had reacted positively. That said, Obasanjo felt
"there will be a time when we need a club (of sanctions) to
move the GOS," especially when the negotiations turn to the
third agenda item, political issues. He did not regard
greater AU force deployment -- even at GOS airbases -- as
sanctions or as a violation of Sudan's sovereignty, noting
that the AU Enabling Act allowed AU deployments of troops
within African countries as non-foreign forces.


5. (C) Obasanjo and the Ambassador praised FM Adeniji's
performance at the talks. Obasanjo said all three Sudanese
sides wanted Adeniji to work with them, and the Ambassador
noted that all three Sudanese sides liking the same person
was a rare occurrence. Adeniji had reported back to Obasanjo
that the GOS was emphasizing its sovereignty, but wanted to
reach an agreement with the rebels at Abuja. Adeniji would
be out of town at the beginning of this week, but would
return September 8. Obasanjo mused that he might seek to get
Adeniji back to the Abuja negotiations sooner.


6. (C) COMMENT: President Obasanjo's strong commitment and
effort have been critical to success at the peace talks. He
has been personally involved both directly at the
negotiations and behind the scenes, as in his letter to
Bashir. He is pulling out all the stops to make the peace
talks and the AU deployment work, and exerting pressure on
the Sudanese government and both rebel groups to accomplish
the same aims we seek.


7. (U) Minimize considered.
CAMPBELL