Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ABUDHABI721
2004-03-14 13:48:00
SECRET
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR A/S BURNS' VISIT TO THE UAE,

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON AF IR IS IZ TC 
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Diana T Fritz 03/15/2007 03:06:30 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
SECRET

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM March 14, 2004


To: No Action Addressee 

Action: Unknown 

From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 721 - UNKNOWN) 

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON 

Captions: None 

Subject: SCENESETTER FOR A/S BURNS' VISIT TO THE UAE, MARCH 21 

Ref: None 
_________________________________________________________________
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 00721

SIPDIS
CXABU:
 ACTION: POL 
 INFO: RSO AMB DCM P/M ECON 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MMWAHBA
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: DCM:RAALBRIGHT ECON:OJOHN CG:JDAVIS

VZCZCADI717
OO RUEHC RUEHDE RUEHZM RUEHXK RUEHBUL RUEKJCS
RHEHNSC RHEFDIA RUEAIIA
DE RUEHAD #0721/01 0741348
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 141348Z MAR 04
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3584
INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 3842
RUEHZM/GCC COLLECTIVE
RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0158
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/DSCA-MEAN/ISA-NESA//
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 000721 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, INR/NESA AND NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON AF IR IS IZ TC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S BURNS' VISIT TO THE UAE,
MARCH 21

Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba, reasons
1.5 (b) and (d)

Ref: (A) Abu Dhabi 629, (B) Abu Dhabi 571

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 000721

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, INR/NESA AND NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON AF IR IS IZ TC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S BURNS' VISIT TO THE UAE,
MARCH 21

Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba, reasons
1.5 (b) and (d)

Ref: (A) Abu Dhabi 629, (B) Abu Dhabi 571


1. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary Burns: I look
forward to welcoming you back to the UAE for your
March 21 visit for the second U.S.-UAE Bilateral
Strategic Partnership meeting. Your Emirati
interlocutors also are eager to see you. We have
requested meetings with Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Shaykh Hamdan
Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and Abu Dhabi Deputy Crown Prince
and UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff Shaykh Mohammed
Bin Zayed Al Nahyan. In addition, we are proposing a
brief interview for you with Abu Dhabi TV, time
permitting.


2. (C) Summary continued: Your discussions with the
Emirati leadership will revolve around the major
current topics raq, Middle East peace talks,
Afghanistan, Iran, Libya, and the new Greater Middle
East initiative. You will want to thank them for
their assistance to Iraq, including their $215 million
pledge for Iraq's reconstruction, for successfully
hosting the follow-up donors conference on February
28-29, and for their commitment to forgive most of
Iraq's $7 billion bilateral debt. You should make a
point of emphasizing to Shaykh Hamdan and Shaykh
Mohammed the value we place in counter-terrorism and
counter-proliferation cooperation. A/S Wolf had
fruitful discussions with Shaykh Hamdan March 13 and
with Mohammed bin Rashid March 14 concerning the A.Q.
Khan investigation. Finally, you will want to
underscore the important strides the U.S. and the UAE
have taken in solidifying our Strategic Partnership,
the fruits of which include an Article 98 agreement, a
TIFA agreement, and a robust Export Controls action
plan. Your schedule will allow for a tour of the new
Embassy compound, "The Dunes," which we occupied on
February 7 and dedicated, with Shaykh Hamdan as our
guest of honor, on March 2. End summary.


3. (S) We propose that you touch on the following key

issues:

-- Provide a readout of the recent developments in
Iraq, including the new charter and the timetable for
political transition, as well as a review of efforts
to keep the Middle East peace talks on track;

-- Be prepared to explain the Greater Middle East
concept and the Administration's support for reform in
the region;

-- Explain the President's nonproliferation initiative
and the role countries like the UAE can play; express
appreciation for UAE cooperation on the A.Q. Khan
investigation and urge the UAE to tighten its export
control regime so that others don't take advantage of
it;

-- Discuss our role in keeping pressure on Iran to
prevent it from developing a nuclear weapons
capability;

-- Brief the UAE on the state of U.S.-Libya relations
following Libya's disclosure that it would cease its
nuclear weapons program;

-- Emphasize our commitment to institutionalizing our
bilateral relationship through our Strategic
Partnership, and by holding the first JMC in Abu Dhabi
on May 1-2;

-- Express thanks for UAEG cooperation on achieving a
bilateral ICC Article 98 agreement and a Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement, and on agreeing to
host a hawala conference in April.

-- Thank the Emiratis for their tremendous
humanitarian assistance throughout the Middle East,
and for successfully hosting the Iraq donors' follow-
up conference Feb. 28-29;

-- With Shaykh Mohammed Bin Zayed (MBZ),congratulate
him on his promotion last November to Deputy Crown
Prince of Abu Dhabi, which we view as a sound decision
that has resolved leadership succession questions for
the foreseeable future;

Iraq: Contributor to stabilization and reconstruction
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Iraq remains high on the Emiratis' agenda. A
member of the Iraq Core Donors Group, the UAE has
pledged $215 million in financial assistance toward
Iraq's reconstruction. In February, Abu Dhabi hosted
a follow-up meeting for the October 2 and 3 Madrid
Donors' Conference on Iraq, focusing on the operation
and funding of the International Reconstruction Fund
Facility for Iraq. The UAE also committed to forgive
most of Iraq's $7 billion bilateral debt.

Middle East peace: Support for our engagement
--------------


5. (C) The Arab-Israeli conflict is the other high-
priority agenda item for the Emiratis (see ref A).
The Emiratis want us to stay engaged, but they
perceive that we are occupied by other crises. There
is concern over the continuing construction of the
wall and deterioration of the situation in the West
Bank and Gaza.

UAE one of the largest donors to Palestinians
--------------


6. (C) The UAEG has maintained a robust assistance
package to the Palestinians. With $87 million in
project and humanitarian assistance to Palestinians in
the West Bank and Gaza since September 2000, the UAE
has been a major Arab donor to the Palestinians. The
efforts are carefully monitored and very much support
our strategy to ensure that funds do not fall into the
wrong hands. In addition to the government aid,
private donations of ruling family members to the
Palestinians certainly total tens of millions of
dollars. At the request of his father, HBZ recently
directed the RCA to help finance repairs of the Dome
of the Rock mosque.

Iran: Tension persists, but Bam quake aid appreciated
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Relations between the UAE and Iran remain
strained after the effort to reach some compromise on
the Abu Musa island issue came to a near halt in late
spring/early summer of 2003. The Emiratis have made
clear to us that they are deeply suspicious of Iran's
territorial/military ambitions in the Gulf,
particularly with respect to Tehran's nuclear and WMD
acquisition policy. The Emiratis also remain worried
about Iranian designs in Iraq. In the immediate
aftermath of the Bam earthquake it was Shaykh Zayed
who ordered planes be sent to Iran to deliver 30 tons
of relief supplies, making the UAE the first in the
Arab region to arrive in Iran. Iran appreciated the
UAE's swift response, which was overseen by HBZ, the
UAE Red Crescent Authority chairman.

Afghanistan: UAE aid exceeds $150 million
--------------


8. (S) The UAE continues to play a very helpful role
in Afghanistan, particularly in the provision of
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. The UAE
Armed Forces has deployed an Emirati Special
Operations contingent to Bagram Air Base to work side-
by-side with U.S. forces. UAE humanitarian and
military programs in Afghanistan are ongoing, and we
expect the final price tag to far exceed the $150
million already spent.

Successes: Article 98, TIFA, MEPI, Export Controls
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Our Strategic Partnership deliverable is the
March 15 TIFA signing in Washington. Minister of
State for Financial and Industrial Affairs Mohammed
Khalfan Bin Kharbash is leading the UAE side,
accompanied by MFA Assistant U/S for Political Affairs
Abdullah Rashid. They have a robust schedule of
meetings in Washington, including Ambassador Zoellick,
OPIC Executive VP Ross Connelly, U/S of Defense Dov
Zakheim, EB A/S Wayne, and members of Congress. The
UAE deliverable was the Article 98 Agreement. The
Article 98 agreement went into force on February 15,
and is our 82nd such agreement. Other recent
accomplishments to be highlighted are the
implementation of our Export Controls Action Plan, and
solid UAE participation at a number of MEPI regional
programs, including the Judicial Forum in Bahrain, the
Women and the Law seminar in Amman, and the Campaign
School in Doha. The MLAT text is with the UAE side
and there is still work to be done.

Domestic considerations: Shaykh Zayed and succession
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Since your last visit to the UAE in October,
the domestic political situation has stayed about the
same. President Zayed's role in the day-to-day
affairs of the state continues to diminish, although
we continue to see photographs of him meeting with
heads of state (Hosni Mubarak was here on February 18)
and leaders of the other emirates. We believe his
sons shield him from situations where he may be
embarrassed by a failure of memory or loss of train of
thought. His sons have taken over the substantive
day-to-day operation of all the major portfolios of
the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and key ministries. That
said, we continue to hear evidence that he is
"consulted" on major issues that are likely to come to
his attention or require his approval to gain support
from other quarters.

Democracy, human rights and TIP
--------------


11. (C) You will want to explain the concept of a
Greater Middle East (GME). The UAEG has refrained
from public comment on GME, although the media has
stated that the US should not seek to impose reform
from the outside.


12. (C) On TIP, the UAE has made great strides on
controlling the problem of underage camel jockeys.
The next challenge for the UAE will be the problem of
trafficking in women. There are some differences in
the way our two countries define the problem and
discussions G/TIP Coordinator Mark Taylor had in mid-
February with law enforcement officials provided the
opportunity for our side to clarify some of these
issues. We hope to see more active involvement from
the UAE law enforcement agencies in investigating and
prosecuting the traffickers. HBZ took this on board
and said that combating trafficking in women was the
UAEG's priority as well because it is detrimental to
UAE society and its reputation. We have discussed a
short-term action plan with the UAEG that would enable
them to take concrete steps against this traffic, and
we believe a drop to Tier 2 in the next TIP report
before they have sufficient time to make some
significant progress would hurt HBZ's standing, given
the political capital he spent on the camel jockey
issue.

New Embassy Compound
--------------


13. (U) We opened for business in our new Embassy in
Abu Dhabi's Diplomatic Quarter on February 7. Shaykh
Hamdan was our guest of honor at the March 2
dedication ceremony, along with a substantial
delegation of shaykhs, ministers and business leaders
(see ref B). We look forward to showing you the new
compound. Our immediate neighbors include the KSA,
India, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Yemen, and Pakistan.

Dubai Crown Prince
--------------


14. (S) Your schedule prohibits a meeting with UAE
Minister of Defense and Dubai Crown Prince Mohammed
bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (MbR). Like most of our senior
UAE interlocutors, MbR was caught off-guard by the
President's NDU speech implicating Dubai in AQ Khan's
vast proliferation network. The Emiratis would have
appreciated prior consultation on this issue and
public acknowledgment of the UAE's excellent
cooperation with the United States on counter-
terrorism and non-proliferation matters. During a
March 13-14 visit to the UAE, Assistant Secretary Wolf
provided senior UAEG officials with additional
information on companies and residents in Dubai that
support the Khan network. MbR in particular noted
that these individuals have taken advantage of the
openness and hospitality of Dubai, and undertook to
commit significant resources to investigating and
shutting down elements of AQ Khan's network here.
In December, we launched the first two in a series of
export control and related border security programs
(EXBS) designed to help the UAEG develop an effect
export controls and trade monitoring regime. The
December EXBS programs already have resulted in a
draft export controls law that we hope the UAEG will
promulgate by mid-2004; this law will become the basis
for the next EXBS course (scheduled for late-April) to
develop specific control lists of goods that will
require declaration and registration to transit the
UAE.


15. (U) This cable was coordinated with AmConsul
Dubai.

Minimize considered.

WAHBA