SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S VISIT TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 000630

SIPDIS

NOFORN

CENTCOM FOR POLAD AMB LITT AND CCJ2
NSC FOR THEROUX
DOD FOR OSD/ISA/NESA
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA AND PM/RSAT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MOPS GCC IZ TC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S VISIT TO
THE UAE

Ref: (A) Abu Dhabi 568 (B) State 35891, (C) Abu Dhabi
286

Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba, reasons
1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) General Abizaid: I would like to welcome you
back to the UAE. During your visit, we have requested
meetings with Abu Dhabi Deputy Crown Prince and UAE
Armed Forces Chief of Staff LTG Shaykh Muhammad bin
Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ),and Dubai Crown Prince General
Shaykh Muhammad bin Rashid Al Maktoum (MbR). Your
itinerary in the UAE will include a visit to the Al
Dhafra Air Base for a visit to the Gulf Air Warfare
Center.


2. (C) In your visit, our Emirati hosts will be
interested to hear your views on the latest
developments in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as your
perspective on the Greater Middle East initiative,
especially the security component.

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Suggested Themes
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3. (S) We propose that you touch on the following key
bilateral military issues, in addition to the more
general themes below in para four:

-- Express concern about the status of pending major
weapons acquisition programs, specifically the F-16
and E2-C (MbZ);

-- Offer congratulations for the success of the
inaugural course recently concluded at the Gulf Air
Warfare Center (MbZ);

-- Express enthusiasm for our first Joint Military
Commission on May 1-2 in Abu Dhabi as a forum for
high-level strategic dialogue on mutual bilateral
issues (MbZ);

-- Provide a look ahead on our likely military
footprint both in the UAE specifically and the region
more generally (MbZ, MbR);

-- If raised, note that the Greater Middle East
Initiative is an effort to support reforms that must
emanate from the region (MbZ, MbR).


4. (S) More broadly, you may also wish to:

-- Express thanks for the UAE's exemplary support for
U.S. and coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan,
namely access to bases and logistical support,
including the continuing UAE SOC deployment at Bagram,
as well as extensive intelligence coordination. The
UAE is on the verge of sending Emirati intel officers
to CJTF-7 in Baghdad and CJTF-180 in Afghanistan to
work with U.S. forces. Major General Fast visited the
UAE March 6 to brief military intelligence
professionals and deploying DMI officers. Reassure
MbZ that we are still intent upon deploying Seeker II
UAV's at the earliest possible opportunity;

-- Consult and provide assurances on need to maintain
Iraq's territorial integrity, minimize external
influence (Iran) and manage sectarian rivalries (MbZ,
MbR);

-- Express appreciation for UAEG's condemnation of
terror acts, as well as its financial support for Iraq
reconstruction (MbZ, MbR);

-- (If raised) Discuss our intelligence engagement,
particularly cooperation with the UAE in Iraq and
Afghanistan (MbZ).

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BILATERAL MILITARY ISSUES
--------------

Shift in Budget Priorities?
--------------


5. (S) The UAE's decision to reject the F-16 Block 60
Training FMS Case is a serious setback to this key
engagement program. Major General Khalid al Buainain,
UAE Air Force and Air Defense Commander, indicated
that the decision was largely driven by the cost of
the program. Although the USG portion of the case is
relatively modest ($85 million for two years, with an
option for five years at $178 million),the UAE
estimates that the total cost (logistics and personnel
support, including transportation, per diem, family
housing, vehicles, medical and dental, etc.) will be
closer to $1 billion. In lieu of US-based F-16 Block
60 training, the UAE has requested USAF Instructor
Pilots and a Technical Assistance Field Team to assist
them with training in the UAE. Such an option is
unlikely, since USAF has no surplus of F-16 IPs or
maintainers to dedicate to UAE. We are examining
options to support our partners in this dilemma, and
hope to impress upon UAE leadership the complexity of
the F-16 Block 60 weapons system and our ability to
help them succeed in the critical training arena. As
of this writing, MGen. Khalid was scheduled to lead a
UAE delegation to the U.S. on March 9 to explore
alternatives.


6. (S) Concurrent with the UAE decision to reject the
F-16 Block 60 Training Case, we have learned that UAE
will also delay or reject a draft request to acquire
ATACMS/HIMARS. This decision is also reportedly due
to the cost of the weapons system. Meanwhile, we have
been unable to obtain a commitment on several other
key FMS and DCS programs, including the AH-64 Apache
A-to-D Remanufacture, E-2C Hawkeye, and Harpoon. All
of these LOAs have expired without comment from UAE.
Taken in conjunction with proposals for several other
large, pending US programs (such as SIGINT aircraft,
Enhanced Sea Sparrow Missile, Combat Training Center,
and Remote Sensing),we believe UAE may be over-
extended in their defense budget. We are attempting
to obtain an understanding of UAE's current and future
year defense priorities in order to assist them with
an integrated and executable acquisition, operations,
and maintenance plan.


7. (S) We are awaiting an OSD policy decision on the
issue of the UAE's desire to procure the Predator B.
The Emiratis believe this system will provide the UAE
with the much-needed capability to survey and defend
its long, porous coasts, islands, and inland borders.
They are not interested in the Predator A.

Air Warfare Center
--------------


8. (C) The opening of the GAWC at Al Dhafra Air Base
outside Abu Dhabi illustrates the expanding nature of
our bilateral military relationship with the UAE. Our
two air forces have worked together for at least three
years to bring this project to fruition. Our
bilateral and regional interests also are served by
broadening our presence and access at Al Dhafra, an
important strategic facility in the Gulf. The
inaugural course was held January 24-February 24 (ref
C). Graduates hailed from the UAE, the UK, and the
U.S. At both the inaugural and graduation ceremonies,
MGen. Khalid emphasized that cultural interoperability
was as important as the training. We assessed this
first course to be a success and look to build upon
the lessons learned for the coming classes, the next
of which is set for May.

Joint Military Commission
--------------


9. (C) The first JMC between our two countries is
scheduled for May 1-2 in Abu Dhabi. Our agenda
priorities will be the Global War on Terrorism,
counter-proliferation, and the burgeoning regional
narcotics trade and its relationship to terrorism. We
have solicited UAE participation in developing a
mutual agenda for discussion and are awaiting their
input.

Regional Footprint
--------------


10. (S) If appropriate, I would recommend that you
outline with the leadership - MbZ - what we see in
terms of our likely regional footprint, and
specifically what we have in mind for the UAE. MbZ
and his Air Force Commander have dropped strong hints
at being open to a more robust presence, but we need
to prepare them for the direction in which we may wish
to move here, before we submit a basing plan to
Congress where the UAE will be mentioned.

"The Greater Middle East"
--------------


11. (C) There have been no official UAEG
pronouncements on the new Greater Middle East (GME)
plan. The local media have expressed frustration that
Arabs have not been consulted about this new
initiative. The press has carried the text of the
proposal that was leaked to "Al Hayat" and there have
been several op-ed articles about the issue. We have
seen only one reference to the security component of
the Greater Middle East initiative (ref B).
Essentially, it is that the USG wants to engage
governments in working together with the U.S. and
European allies (through NATO) to address common
security concerns, including proliferation, terrorism,
and border security; to improve the interoperability
of forces so we can work together more effectively in
stability and peacekeeping operations; and to offer
individual countries of the GME region these
opportunities, on an entirely voluntary basis. We
recommend that you tell MbZ and MbR that we agree that
reform should come from within the Middle East.

Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement
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12. (C) Due to the direct personal involvement of MbZ
and UAE Air Force Chief of Staff Mgen Khalid, we are
making progress on an ACSA. Talks between GHQ,
CENTCOM J4, and USLO on March 7 were very productive
and we believe we are very close to an agreement on
the language.

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BROADER ISSUES
--------------

Afghanistan and Iraq: Support for Coalition Efforts
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13. (S) The UAE Armed Forces has deployed a 35-man
Emirati Special Operations contingent to Bagram Air
Base. The Directorate for Military Intelligence has
requested to assign intelligence officers to Iraq and
Afghanistan. As you know, the UAE continues to play a
very helpful role in Afghanistan, particularly in the
provision of humanitarian and reconstruction
assistance. The UAE Armed Forces provided the Afghan
National Army with approximately $50 million in
assistance in kind in 2002. Total assistance is more
than $150 million. This includes over $50 million in
humanitarian assistance, a $30 million pledge for
development assistance, plus costs of deploying
special forces to Bagram. The UAEG also continues to
provide substantial personal financial support for
President Karzai.


14. (S) Additionally, UAE plans to deploy its squadron
of Seeker II UAVs to Bagram beginning in late summer

2004. Although this deployment was delayed from the
original plan (December 2003) due to environmental and
operational constraints at Bagram, preparations are
on-track and we are working the details to ensure a
successful deployment.

Iraq: Financial Support and Timely Public Statements
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15. (U) We understand that the UAE has disbursed the
$215 million pledge made at Madrid both in providing
humanitarian assistance and on buying Siemens
generators for power plants in Iraq. In addition, on
February 28-29, Abu Dhabi hosted a successful follow-
up Iraq donors' conference that confirmed the donors,
the UN, and the World Bank were all cooperating on
behalf of Iraq. The Emiratis continue to issue strong
public statements against terror attacks, such as the
ones that occurred on March 2 in Baghdad and Karbala
(ref A).

Iran: Worries Persist
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16. (S) All of our senior Emirati interlocutors worry
about Iran's intentions in Iraq and in the Arabian
Gulf region as a whole. Iran is one of the major
reasons the UAEG has been pursuing acquisition of
ATACMS, remote sensing technology, and is so keen to
get Predator. The Emiratis have urged us to help
prevent Iran from meddling in Iraq's domestic affairs.
They view Iran's nuclear program with deep concern and
have consistently supported a tough approach by the
IAEA.

Intelligence engagement (If raised)
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17. (S) If MbZ talks about the threat from Iran, or
from Afghans or Al Qaida, we would recommend that you
describe some of the ways we are helping the UAE.
U.S. intelligence agencies are assisting the Space and
Reconnaissance Center to consolidate its mapping
functions. The U.S. and UAE are working with the
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency to obtain air
photo interpretation training. CENTCOM is providing
technical assistance and advice to the UAE to create
an intelligence fusion center that will give threat
indications and warnings to the UAE leadership. The
UAE is also taking steps to re-energize efforts to
conclude a SIGINT agreement.
WAHBA