G/TIP DISCUSSIONS IN UAE ON CAMEL JOCKEYS: UAEG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 004660

SIPDIS

STATE FOR G/TIP, INL, DRL, NEA/RA, AND NEA/ARPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2014
TAGS: PHUM PREL TC
SUBJECT: G/TIP DISCUSSIONS IN UAE ON CAMEL JOCKEYS: UAEG
COMMITTED TO STOP TRAFFICKING; IMPLEMENTATION SLOW

REF: (A) ABU DHABI 4418 (B) ABU DHABI 3742


1. (C) Summary: G/TIP NEA/SA Reports Officer Feleke Assefa
visited the UAE December 10-13 to follow up allegations
raised in the October 19 Home Box Office (HBO) program about
the UAE,s continuing use of underage foreign boys as camel
jockeys, despite a 2002 ban on the practice. Assefa met with
officials from the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs,
and Health, and with police and prosecutors in Dubai and Abu
Dhabi. He toured Abu Dhabi,s new camel jockey shelter with
Pakistani human rights activist Ansar Burney, and discussed
child rescue proposals with the IOM. During the visit, one
source country embassy representative described how powerful
trafficking networks and some corrupt officials defeat
efforts to stop the trafficking of young boys. Assefa and
Poloff witnessed at least 100 children, some of whom appeared
to be as young as two years old, being used to train camels
for races in Dubai. On hearing this from Assefa and Poloff,
Dubai,s police chief pledged to take action. End Summary.

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UAEG MEETINGS
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2. (C) Assefa met with Lt. Col. Nasser Al Noaimi, Office
Director of the Minister of Interior, who reiterated the
ministry,s commitment to combating all forms of trafficking.
He stated that the Minister of Interior, Sheikh Saif bin
Zayed, is fully aware that a serious problem exists, and has
been working to eradicate the problem since before his
appointment as Minister in November. He said that it would be
easier for the ministry to rescue more boys after the draft
anti-trafficking legislation becomes law, thereby giving
ministry officials and police greater authority to
investigate farms and race tracks and to make arrests.


3. (C) Al Noaimi also attended a meeting that the DCM,
Assefa, and Poloff had with Sultan Al Rumaithy, Office
Director for the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs. Khadim Al Darei, Deputy Office
Director, and MFA American Affairs desk officer Rowda Al
Otaiba also joined in this meeting. Al Rumaithy confirmed
the UAEG,s long-term engagement on the camel jockey issue,
and emphasized that recent UAEG actions were not a reaction
to the HBO report, but a result of long-standing UAEG
commitment to address this problem. The UAEG was already
taking steps to combat this form of trafficking, and would
continue to do so with or without such publicity. He said
that &top leadership8 decreed that a draft law to enforce
the 2002 ban, which has been delayed in the cabinet for 1 1/2
years, would become law no later than April 2005. He also
said that overall responsibility for the human trafficking
portfolio transferred from the MFA to Interior (hence Al
Noaimi,s presence). Al Rumaithy asked for USG assistance in
applying pressure on source countries to stop child
trafficking. He said that, while the UAEG does not deflect
responsibility for the issue, official corruption in source
countries remains a key factor in the continuation of the
problem. Al Rumaithy said that Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed
has sent letters to source country foreign ministers asking
them to crack down internally on trafficking.


4. (C) The Ministry of Health meeting included Dr. Hassan Al
Alkeem (who left after a few minutes); Abdul Rahim Jaafar,
Ministry Consultant; Dr. Abdul Ghaffar Abdul Ghaffour, Asst.
U/S for Curative Medicine; and Dr. Mahmoud Fikri, Asst. U/S
for Preventative Medicine. Ministry officials asserted that
the ministry inspects all camel jockeys referred by the Camel
Racing Federation for medical testing to prove their ages and
fitness levels, a pre-condition for obtaining an
identification card displayed at races. The officials said
that there were no underage boys racing and challenged Assefa
to &go to any race and check8 for himself. They also said
that the kidnapping of children in source countries was no
longer occurring, although Jaafar later asked for USG
assistance in pressuring source countries to stop the
trafficking of boys to the UAE. The officials confirmed that
medical teams and ambulances were on standby at all races,
and police were assigned to all hospitals, with instructions
to report on any underage camel jockey who came to the
hospital with a racing injury. They also said that the
ministry,s medical committee tasked with inspecting the boys
does not follow up at the racetracks or on farms. Once
clearance is given, responsibility for enforcing the rules
lies with the Camel Racing Federation.

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UNDERAGE CAMEL JOCKEYS IN PLAIN SIGHT
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5. (C) On December 12, Assefa and Poloff met Ansar Burney, a
Pakistani human rights activist and chairman of the NGO Ansar
Burney Welfare Trust International, and his wife Shaheen, at
the Nad Al Sheba Camel Racetrack located just outside of
Dubai. (Note: This is the racetrack prominently featured in
the HBO special. End note.) Assefa and Poloff witnessed at
least 100 young boys, ages estimated as young as two years
old, in racing gear, on camels, and clearly training to race.
Many of the boys claimed to be from Pakistan or Bangladesh.
However, some of the smallest said they were from Sudan,
Ethiopia, and Somalia, confirming rumors of an emerging trend
in East African countries supplying camel jockeys.

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THE POLICE PERSPECTIVE
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6. (C) Assefa also toured the new camel jockey shelter and
rehabilitation center in Shahama, opened on the Zayed
Military City Army base 1 1/2 weeks prior (ref. A). Col.
Fahdal, Director of the Abu Dhabi Police Department,s
Anti-Infiltration Unit and supervisor of the center, said an
anti-trafficking law would put the police on firmer legal
ground when rescuing these kids. Fahdal said that police
have already been forced to return five rescued boys to their
parents, even though the parents were living in the UAE and
were likely complicit in the trafficking and abuse, since
they had no legal grounds to retain custody of the children
or prosecute the parents. Fahdal complained that source
countries were corrupt and not doing enough to stop the
exploitation of their own citizens. He also accused some
source country missions in the UAE of being complicit in the
trafficking. He showed Assefa and Poloff numerous copies of
passports with clear discrepancies between the photographs
and ages claimed. He said he sees the names of the same
officials, some abroad and some in the UAE, in many of the
passports. (Note: See ref. B and paragraph 12 for
confirmation of this allegation. End note.)


7. (U) After the meeting, Fahdal took Assefa on a tour of the
shelter, along with Ansar and Shaheen Burney. Assefa was
impressed with the facility, and had an opportunity to
interact with the 19 former camel jockeys living there.
(Note: Since Assefa,s visit, eight more boys have been
rescued and placed in the shelter. End note.)


8. (C) Police in Dubai did not appear to be aware of the
magnitude of the camel jockey problem there, but showed
readiness to take action when informed that large numbers of
underage jockeys had been seen at the Nad Al Sheba Race Track
the previous day. The Director of the Human Rights Care
Department, Lt. Col. Mohammed Abdullah Al Murr, and the
Director of the Human Rights Care and Social Services Section
of the Bur Dubai Police Station, Capt. Fahad Abdullah Al
Awadhi, said a few young boys may still be occasionally used
to train camels, but it was no longer possible to use
underage camel jockeys during races. Neither had seen the
HBO special. After Assefa relayed our experience at Nad Al
Sheba racetrack the previous day, both men appeared genuinely
shocked. They assured Assefa that they would immediately
investigate the problem.


9. (C) Lt. Gen. Dhahi Khalfan Tamim, Commandant General of
the Dubai Police Force, also said at first that the use of
underage boys as camel jockeys was no longer a pervasive
problem in Dubai. Like Fahdal, Tamim said police were having
a difficult time charging traffickers and camel farm owners
with crimes, since they were given very little enforcement
authority under the 2002 ban.


10. (C) When told about Assefa,s Nad Al Sheba experience the
previous day, Tamim jumped into action. First, he put an
incoming call from the director of Dubai Immigration on the
speaker and asked how this could have happened. The director
explained that the order from Dubai Crown Prince and UAE
Minister of Defense Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum (MbR) was
to stop all incoming camel jockeys first, followed by
rescuing underage jockeys already here. He stated that,
since last year, no new visas had been given to camel jockeys
in Dubai. After that call concluded, an agitated Tamim,
after complaining that the Camel Racing Federation was not
doing its job, called its director to ask him point blank
(again, on speaker phone) how this could have happened. The
stunned director explained that, to his understanding, the
ban was only against racing, not against training. After
hanging up, Tamim rejected this excuse, saying that the real
problem was that the Bedouins responsible for continuing the
camel racing tradition were not obeying MbR,s order to stop
using children as camel jockeys. He said that, four weeks
ago, he personally heard MbR tell several Bedouin camel
owners that he would stop all camel racing in the emirate if
they did not cease using children as jockeys. (Note: Abu
Dhabi Crown Prince and UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff
Mohammed bin Zayed has reportedly made the same threat to Abu
Dhabi emirate camel owners. End note.) Tamim promised that,
within the next few days, MbR would take action on this
situation. (Note: Two days after this meeting, CG Dubai noted
that, in a marked change from the situation a week earlier,
there were no underage camel jockeys in evidence in the Nad
Al Sheba area. End note.) He also guaranteed that the
problem would be completely resolved by the end of 2005.


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PUBLIC PROSECUTION ECHOES POLICE
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11. (SBU) Hassan Khamees, a senior official at Dubai Public
Prosecution, also acknowledged the need to adopt an
anti-trafficking law. Khamees said that he was instructed to
begin taking cases affected by the ban in October 2003. In
cases of death and injury, prosecution against the
responsible party was compulsory. The problem was that the
charges brought had to fall under broader existing laws, such
as murder, assault, sexual assault, kidnapping, etc. He
cited one case in 2002 in which a mother was prosecuted for
selling her son to a camel farm owner, and two other cases
against Sudanese nationals in 2003. But due to the nature of
the crimes and the difficulty in collecting evidence against
the perpetrators, Khamees said it was extremely difficult to
prove cases in court without legislation better tailored to
these types of crimes.

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CORRUPTION IN SOURCE COUNTRY MISSIONS
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12. (C) Assefa met with Embassy of Pakistan Second Secretary
Imran Haider (please protect),who is responsible for the
camel jockey portfolio. Haider had spoken to Post in the
past (ref. B) about internal pressures at the highest levels,
both in his mission and in Pakistan, to continue the flow of
young boys to the UAE to work as camel jockeys. He said
that, although he knows he is ruining his career and perhaps
endangering his safety because of the consular assistance he
gives his young compatriots, he will not stop. Haider and
Burney have worked together to rescue and repatriate over 160
children in 2004. They also agree that roughly 5,000 to
6,000 children may still be working in the UAE as camel
jockeys. Haider alleges that, although his own county
contributes to the continuing camel jockey problem, the
UAEG,s talk of changes is just that ) all talk. He
explained the problem in terms of tribal affiliation, both
here and in Pakistan. Those who profit from racing generally
are from politically established families positioned in
influential government jobs. When a problem arises, one
phone call to a family member at the appropriate ministry or
police department takes care of it. Haider said he has 78
trafficking cases he is trying to pursue, and each time he
asks for assistance he is refused by UAEG officials at
different ministries. During the meeting, Haider introduced
Assefa to two young boys, aged about five and eight, whom he
had just rescued.

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IOM TRYING TO HELP
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13. (C) Assefa met on December 11 with Mohammed Al Nassery,
Chief of Mission of the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) office in Kuwait. Also attending the meeting
were Michael Burke, Director of the Iraqi Out-of-Country
Voting office in the UAE, and Khalid Qadir (please protect),
who is working in Dubai without UAEG knowledge on IOM-related
issues. (Note: Qadir and Al Nassery have been lobbying the
UAEG hard for more than a year to open an IOM branch in
Dubai. In the meantime, Qadir is familiarizing himself with
Dubai and quietly working some IOM issues, pending
anticipated approval. End note.) They discussed a proposed
IOM-funded program to assist the return and reintegration of
about 70 Bangladeshi children working here as camel jockeys.
The USD 1.7 million project, if approved, would be
implemented over five years. Assefa expressed his support of
the project, but recommended that the IOM shift its focus
from a one-time rescue of a limited number of boys to
capacity building both in Bangladesh and the UAE, and to
improving ties between political and law enforcement
officials in both countries.

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COMMENT
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14. (C) Overall, the G/TIP visit was useful. The UAEG said
all the right things and showed evidence that it is starting
to do the right things, while Assefa was able to see
first-hand the magnitude of the existing problem. While it
is clear that enforcement is uneven across the country, the
process to eliminate this form of trafficking is well
underway. However, the process will take time and closer
coordination between police, immigration, and health
officials, and increased cooperation with source country
governments. Despite statements from the MFA, we believe
that the HBO program has indeed jolted the UAE leadership
into addressing the problem more forcefully and rapidly. We
will continue to raise the issue with UAEG interlocutors to
encourage effective action.

MINIMIZED CONSIDERED.

ALBRIGHT