Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ABUDHABI4624
2004-12-18 12:36:00
SECRET
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:
MTAG: IMMINENT MISSILE-RELATED TRANSFER BY A UAE
how-tonull Diana T Fritz 12/19/2006 04:39:38 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results Cable Text: S E C R E T ABU DHABI 04624 SIPDIS CXABU: ACTION: ECON INFO: ICE FCS P/M DCM POL AMB DISSEMINATION: ECON CHARGE: PROG APPROVED: CDA:RALBRIGHT DRAFTED: ECON:OJOHN CLEARED: NONE VZCZCADI637 OO RUEHC DE RUEHAD #4624 3531236 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 181236Z DEC 04 FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7309
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 004624
SIPDIS
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME PRIORITY
AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY
DEPARTMENT FOR NP/CBM, NEA/ARP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2014
TAGS: PARM MTCRE ETTC PREL MNUC IR TC
SUBJECT: MTAG: IMMINENT MISSILE-RELATED TRANSFER BY A UAE
FIRM TO IRAN (C)
REF: A. DECEMBER 18 E-MAIL THORNE-ALBRIGHT
B. STATE 267982
C. ABU DHABI 3642
(U) Classified by CDA Richard Albright for reasons 1.4 (b),
(d),and (h).
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 004624
SIPDIS
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME PRIORITY
AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY
DEPARTMENT FOR NP/CBM, NEA/ARP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2014
TAGS: PARM MTCRE ETTC PREL MNUC IR TC
SUBJECT: MTAG: IMMINENT MISSILE-RELATED TRANSFER BY A UAE
FIRM TO IRAN (C)
REF: A. DECEMBER 18 E-MAIL THORNE-ALBRIGHT
B. STATE 267982
C. ABU DHABI 3642
(U) Classified by CDA Richard Albright for reasons 1.4 (b),
(d),and (h).
1. (S) Charge delivered reftel points on a missile related
transfer to MFA U/S Abdullah Rashid Al-Noaimi on December 18.
Charge stressed the concern that this equipment would be
used to support Iran's ballistic missile program. He
explained that the Embassy had already passed on the relevant
information to the Dubai State Security Organization, which
would be inspecting the container on December 18. Charge
added that, if our suspicions about the item proved accurate,
we would work with the government of the country of origin to
determine whether the export violated its export control law.
If so, we would expect that government to request return of
the item from the UAEG.
2. (S) Al-Noaimi thanked Charge for the information, saying
the UAEG was comfortable proceeding on this basis, as it had
on another case involving China. He asked whether the
Western Continent General Trading was on the list of
companies that the UAE had passed on as part of its "watch
list." (ref C) Charge replied that it was not, but noted
that the managing director of this company had a history of
diversion. (Note: Western Continent is not on the UAE's list
of companies, however, another company with the same managing
director, "Noor Al-Fath General Trading Company" is on the
list. Noor Al-Fath is under Department of Commerce
investigation for diversion of licensed police items to
Iran.)
3. (S) Al-Noaimi said that he would check to see whether
Dubai Customs would require additional authorization to hold
the shipment for longer than "a normal transshipment time."
He explained that the UAEG could hold the item for a while to
investigate the shipment based on this demarche, but would
eventually need "an official request" from the country of
origin requesting the UAEG to continue to hold or to return
the item.
ALBRIGHT
SIPDIS
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME PRIORITY
AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY
DEPARTMENT FOR NP/CBM, NEA/ARP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2014
TAGS: PARM MTCRE ETTC PREL MNUC IR TC
SUBJECT: MTAG: IMMINENT MISSILE-RELATED TRANSFER BY A UAE
FIRM TO IRAN (C)
REF: A. DECEMBER 18 E-MAIL THORNE-ALBRIGHT
B. STATE 267982
C. ABU DHABI 3642
(U) Classified by CDA Richard Albright for reasons 1.4 (b),
(d),and (h).
1. (S) Charge delivered reftel points on a missile related
transfer to MFA U/S Abdullah Rashid Al-Noaimi on December 18.
Charge stressed the concern that this equipment would be
used to support Iran's ballistic missile program. He
explained that the Embassy had already passed on the relevant
information to the Dubai State Security Organization, which
would be inspecting the container on December 18. Charge
added that, if our suspicions about the item proved accurate,
we would work with the government of the country of origin to
determine whether the export violated its export control law.
If so, we would expect that government to request return of
the item from the UAEG.
2. (S) Al-Noaimi thanked Charge for the information, saying
the UAEG was comfortable proceeding on this basis, as it had
on another case involving China. He asked whether the
Western Continent General Trading was on the list of
companies that the UAE had passed on as part of its "watch
list." (ref C) Charge replied that it was not, but noted
that the managing director of this company had a history of
diversion. (Note: Western Continent is not on the UAE's list
of companies, however, another company with the same managing
director, "Noor Al-Fath General Trading Company" is on the
list. Noor Al-Fath is under Department of Commerce
investigation for diversion of licensed police items to
Iran.)
3. (S) Al-Noaimi said that he would check to see whether
Dubai Customs would require additional authorization to hold
the shipment for longer than "a normal transshipment time."
He explained that the UAEG could hold the item for a while to
investigate the shipment based on this demarche, but would
eventually need "an official request" from the country of
origin requesting the UAEG to continue to hold or to return
the item.
ALBRIGHT