Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ABUDHABI3210
2004-09-16 06:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

LOCAL VIEWS ON PROSPECTS FOR UAE

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM SOCI KWMN KDEM KMPI TC SA 
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Diana T Fritz 02/05/2007 05:36:00 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 03210

SIPDIS
CXABU:
 ACTION: POL
 INFO: MEPI RSO AMB DCM P/M ECON

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MSISON
DRAFTED: POL:SRADDANT CG:JDAV
CLEARED: A/DCM:HOWINDECKER POL:JMAYBURY MEPI:HWECHSEL

VZCZCADI692
PP RUEHC RUEHZM RUEHRH RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #3210/01 2600604
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 160604Z SEP 04
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5947
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1379
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 4341
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 003210 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/RA and DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/14
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SOCI KWMN KDEM KMPI TC SA
SUBJECT: LOCAL VIEWS ON PROSPECTS FOR UAE
DEMOCRATIZATION

REF: A) ABU DHABI 1589 B) 03 DUBAI 1318 C) 03
DUBAI 3529 D) 03 ABU DHABI 1813 E) 03 DUBAI 2103

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 003210

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/RA and DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/14
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SOCI KWMN KDEM KMPI TC SA
SUBJECT: LOCAL VIEWS ON PROSPECTS FOR UAE
DEMOCRATIZATION

REF: A) ABU DHABI 1589 B) 03 DUBAI 1318 C) 03
DUBAI 3529 D) 03 ABU DHABI 1813 E) 03 DUBAI 2103


1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison
for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).


2. (U) This message was jointly drafted by Embassy
Abu Dhabi and ConGen Dubai.


3. (C) SUMMARY: The slow but steady regional trend
toward democratization has triggered some, albeit
limited, discussion in Emirati circles about the
prospects of taking similar steps here in the UAE.
The local media has been reporting regularly on the
progress of Saudi Arabia's moves toward its first
municipal election, and people often compare and
contrast Saudi Arabia's democratization steps to
those made in Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman. Our
contacts were generally supportive of
democratization in the region, although they
maintain that UAE rulers should adopt changes
slowly. A proposal in Dubai to hold popular
elections for a District Council was dropped this
month in lieu of an appointed council. END
SUMMARY.

--------------
EMIRATI THOUGHTS ON DEMOCRATIZATION
--------------


4. (C) Dr. Muhammed Abdullah Al Roken, an attorney
who is seeking government permission to operate an
independent human rights NGO (Ref. A),told Poloff
that UAE nationals are ready for increased
political participation, and are watching and
quietly discussing the shift toward democracy in
other Gulf countries. However, Al Roken, an avowed
Islamist who was removed from a professorship at
UAE University in Al Ain post-9/11 as part of a
government sweep of potential extremists from
positions of influence, believes that change will
have to flow from the government to the masses, not
vice versa. He believes that most Emiratis would
not try to pressure the UAEG into political changes
for fear of social and political blowback. He
opined that the wealthy are too self-centered to
risk political and social disfavor. On the other

hand, poorer and less educated Emiratis are too
intimidated to speak out, he believes, and count
their blessings that they are able to approach
their rulers occasionally for handouts.


5. (C) At the other end of the spectrum, some Dubai
contacts have argued that Dubai and the other
emirates already have functioning "bedouocracies" -
- their term for the existing political system of
rule by hereditary tribal chiefs who hold daily
"open courts" or majlises, during which all male
citizens can have direct access to their leaders,
should they desire it. (Note: Rulers' majlises are
all-male events. End note.) This system amounts
to a type of direct representation that, they feel,
serves the UAE's small population quite well and
obviates the immediate need to import western-style
democracy. Many others, particularly in Dubai,
believe that it is very important if only for PR
purposes for the UAE to start moving cautiously in
the direction of popular elections. (Note: The need
for caution is mentioned frequently by even the
strongest backers of increased political
participation in the UAE, mainly due to concerns
about the "destabilizing" effects of direct
elections, which some observers here believe have
been evident in Kuwait and Bahrain. End note.)

--------------
UAEG VIEWS OF DEMOCRATIZATION
--------------


6. (C) Government views on holding elections vary
from emirate to emirate. Dubai announced with much
fanfare in April 2003 that it would hold district
elections within the next three months (Ref. B).
Dubai notables told us later in the year that a
"Supreme Council" had been formed to come up with a
detailed election plan, which would likely include
some form of direct local elections, ideally prior
to Summer 2004 (Ref. C). That deadline also passed
without comment.


7. (C) During a recent meeting with Mohammed Gergawi,
Chairman of Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid's Executive Office,
CG asked for an update on planning for the proposed
elections. Gergawi admitted somewhat sheepishly that the
Supreme Council tasked with planning the elections had
largely completed its work, and that the final plan does
not envision any role for direct elections, even for
Dubai's Emirati national population. Instead, committees
of up to a hundred prominent citizens from each
neighborhood would be appointed by the Ruler's office, and
they would elect from among themselves a representative (or
possibly several, depending on the population of the
neighborhood) to send to a new District Council.


8. (C) CG asked whether the decision to move away from
direct elections had been entirely local, or whether the
views of others from neighboring emirates had been taken
into account. Gergawi said he could not address that
point, but that it was important to emphasize that the
decision was taken mainly to ensure that "extremists" and
other disruptive elements were not given a platform. He
added that, in his opinion, UAE society was not mature
enough to deal with the inherent instability of an
electoral free-for-all, even at the local/district level.
(Comment: This is disappointing news given that Dubai's
proposed District Council elections were the first, and so
far only, tangible hint that moves toward greater political
participation might be in the cards for the UAE. End
Comment.


9. (C) UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
and Deputy Prime Minister Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed
has said in the past that he favors an early move
to democratization in the UAE (Ref. D). He thought
this would be a fitting legacy for his father,
President Sheikh Zayed, and the President's support
of the political change would make it more widely
accepted, especially among conservatives. Sheikh
Hamdan said that the fact that a number of other
states in the region, including the Saudis, are
opening up politically, adds a sense of urgency to
the matter.


10. (C) However, other Emirati officials are more
leery of moves toward democratization both here and
regionally, and even if they support the concept of
democracy, they believe governments must move
carefully. The ruler of Sharjah, Sheikh Sultan bin
Mohammed Al Qassimi, recommended last year that the
USG should not push too hard for democratization in
the Arab world, since holding elections now could
result in the election of members of radical
Islamist organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood
(Ref. E). Instead of moving directly towards
popular elections, Al Qassimi recommended that the
USG encourage other long-term steps that foster a
culture of democracy, such as improving the
education system.

--------------
COMMENT ON U.S. ROLE
--------------


11. (U) While it is important that moves toward
democratization are UAE-initiated, there are a
number of steps the USG can take to expedite the
trend and assist the government and potential
electorate to make the transition to democracy as
smooth as possible. MEPI is well positioned to
continue offering reform programs that emphasize
increased civil society participation and explain
democratic processes. The MEPI-sponsored Media
Strategy Assistance Workshop, to be held in Abu
Dhabi next month and attended by 30 participants
from the region, is an excellent example of how the
U.S. can support reform in the UAE. Mission will
continue to nominate key UAE leaders for IV
programs, such as the one currently supporting a
trip of Federal National Council appointees to
Washington, D.C. Finally, Mission will continue to
encourage the UAEG to participate in G8/BMENA
events that promote democratic reform via economic
and civil society dialogue, such as the September
24 BMENA/Foreign Ministers' meeting on the margins
of UNGA, and the October 1 BMENA/Finance Ministers'
meeting on the margins of the IMF/World Bank annual
meeting in Washington.

SISON