Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ABUDHABI2809
2004-08-18 14:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

UAE PAPER ON DEPLOYMENT OF GCC FORCES TO IRAQ

Tags:  MARR MOPS PREL ECON EFIN UN TC 
pdf how-to read a cable
null
Diana T Fritz 02/06/2007 11:48:30 AM From DB/Inbox: Search Results

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 02809

SIPDIS
CXABU:
 ACTION: POL
 INFO: RSO AMB DCM P/M ECON

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:SISON
DRAFTED: ECON:MLUNA
CLEARED: DCM:RALBRIGHT POL:SRADDANT

VZCZCADI622
PP RUEHC RUEKJCS RUEHBS RUEKJCS RUCNDT RUCAACC
RUEHDE RUCNRAQ
DE RUEHAD #2809/01 2311411
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181411Z AUG 04
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5571
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0012
RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 4249
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 002809 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, PM/RSAT AND PM/PMAT

E.O. 12958 DECL: 8/17/2014
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL ECON EFIN UN TC
SUBJECT: UAE PAPER ON DEPLOYMENT OF GCC FORCES TO IRAQ

REF: A) ABU DHABI 2577 B) STATE 166158

(U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON FOR REASONS 1.5
(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 002809

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, PM/RSAT AND PM/PMAT

E.O. 12958 DECL: 8/17/2014
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL ECON EFIN UN TC
SUBJECT: UAE PAPER ON DEPLOYMENT OF GCC FORCES TO IRAQ

REF: A) ABU DHABI 2577 B) STATE 166158

(U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON FOR REASONS 1.5
(b) and (d)


1. (C) Special Assistant to Abu Dhabi Deputy Prime Minister and
UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayed,
Yousef al-Otaiba, in a courtesy call on the Ambassador, passed
to us a paper analyzing the pros and cons of deployment of GCC
forces to Iraq, which he said was prepared by the Emirates
Center for Strategic Studies and Research and reflected the
views of the UAEG. The paper concludes that operational
obstacles, such as questions over command and control, the risks
of growing opposition domestically and regionally, and the
likelihood of significant casualties, could make the deployment
politically and militarily impossible at this time. However,
the paper does not close the door to an eventual deployment,
noting that under the right conditions, a GCC deployment could
help develop the GCC as a regional entity, both on the political
and military levels, with the possible added benefit of
presenting a deterrent to Iran.


2. (C) Al-Otaiba explained that it is difficult for the armed
forces of the GCC countries to deploy outside of a GCC umbrella.
In regard to a potential deployment to Iraq, al-Otaiba noted
that the IIG does not want forces from neighboring countries
deployed inside Iraq. This excludes Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
The other four GCC countries do not have the manpower or
resources to deploy without support from the much larger Saudi
military.


3. (C) In response to Otaiba's explanation for why the UAE would
not send its own forces to Iraq in the near term, the DCM urged
the UAE to endorse the concept of providing financial support to
third countries that agreed to deploy forces to Iraq to support
the UN (refs. A and B). Noting that the U.S. was working with
the IIG and the UN to support their efforts to establish a
dedicated security force for the UN, the DCM told al-Otaiba that
the U.S. was not looking to be an intermediary in the financial

transactions. Rather, the UAE would provide its support
bilaterally to troop donors. Al-Otaiba told DCM he would convey
this message to MbZ and get back to him.


4. (U) Begin Text of UAE paper: THE DEPLOYMENT OF A GCC
PEACEKEEPING CONTINGENT TO IRAQ: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

Introduction
--------------

It is necessary to address the deployment of a GCC peacekeeping
contingent within a wider context of the unfolding security and
political realities within Iraq, regional concerns and
sensitivities, and developments in the international arena.
This requires serious consideration by members of the GCC whose
long-term interests will be best be served by integrating Iraq
within a post-Saddam regional security architecture. The
escalating security crisis within Iraq has the potential to have
grave regional geo-strategic implications. However, a desire to
co-opt Iraq within this regional arrangement must not be allowed
to override more pressing realities on the ground that currently
are not conducive to the deployment of a GCC peacekeeping
contingent to Iraq.

The continuation of major military operations throughout Iraq
negates the notion of a peacekeeping force. Peacekeeping has a
stabilizing role in a post-war situation, but is not applicable
in a war situation, replete with major urban warfare and large-
scale coordinated rebellion, as exists in Iraq. The reality is
that any peacekeeping force would fall under the command of the
U.S. military and, as such, would be seen as an extension of the
U.S. occupation. (1)

Advantages Associated With the Deployment of A Peacekeeping
Contingent
-------------- --------------

The positive potential of a GCC deployment includes the
following considerations: In addition to honoring the requests
of the current, UN-approved government of Iraq, GCC involvement
may help inject a greater level of legitimacy to the United
Nations process, leading to elections in January 2005.
Furthermore, a GCC taskforce would lend itself to Arab
solidarity and territorial integrity, bringing closer to the
GCC, with tangible geo-political gains. Certainly, sharing a
common language and culture will increase the effectiveness of
the operation.

Such a move may also foster a greater level of military
cooperation between GCC partners (2). It will help shed the
image of the GCC as a "talk shop," sending a new signal that the
GCC intends to play a more active role in the post-Saddam
regional security arrangement. This deployment would establish
a precedent, as it would be the first time the GCC would
collectively operate outside the borders of its members. It is
a marked departure from defensive to pro-active operations.
These two facts, operating outside member territories and
engaging in peacekeeping, present the opportunity of strategic
evolution.

As was the case with NATO, which played a primarily defensive
role for much of its history until the conflict in Kosovo (3),
the GCC's involvement in Iraq presents a similar opportunity.
Finally, like NATO, the GCC would further demonstrate its
commitment to multilateralism. This commitment has the effect
of putting pressure on proponents of unilateralism. Yet, it
will not serve long-term security requirements for the Gulf
region to alienate their security guarantors within the United
States, with whom they have forged a mutually accommodating
security arrangement.

The role of Iran is also a matter of geo-strategic concern. GCC
collective action in creating a stable Iraq would be a new
strategic factor for Iran, which currently holds a very strong
position. This Iranian strength is in part due to its ability
to influence internal actors, such as the Supreme Council for
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). That being said, Iran could
very well perceive GCC participation as a threat, and respond
with direct or covert aggression (e.g., against GCC peacekeeping
units or against member states, etc.).

Disadvantages Associated With the Deployment of A Peacekeeping
Contingent
-------------- --------------

This raises discussion of the more difficult aspects of such a
mission. In the current climate the GCC would enter a stage
with regional powers like the United States, Turkey, Israel (4),
and Iran. The GCC forces would face the risk of becoming
entangled in Iraq's religious and ethnic conflicts. How then
will the role of the GCC be received by the Iraqi people? Will
this lead to confrontations with Iraqi civilians? Would the GCC
units become marked targets for terror attacks? Militant
leaders in Iraq have already made it clear that they would
consider an Arab force as a legitimate target. Abd al-Hadi al-
Darraji, from Al-Sadr's bureau stated that any Arab force would
be treated as "occupying forces and forces that are helping the
occupation complicate the situation in Iraq."(5) If this
scenario emerges and deaths mount, what of the domestic
political consequences to GCC members?

The GCC currently enjoys good relations with the Iraqi people.
A peacekeeping contingent, operating under the command structure
of U.S. occupying forces, could find itself participating in
offensive operations. This would be a violation of the very
heart of the peacekeeping mission, and would result in both
substantial casualties and severe damage to the reputation of
the GCC among the Iraqi people.

On another level the GCC faces the possibility of problems of
cooperation. Militarily the GCC is essentially a defensive
organization and may well face operational challenges, at least
initially, were it to expand its role. The political consensus
may also be hard to reach, and could be shattered should one of
the countries decide to withdraw its troops in response to
domestic or military pressures. Such a move could have far-
reaching implications for GCC relations.

An important issue concerning GCC participation is the question
of US willingness to have regional forces intervene. Colin
Powell's initial reaction to the Saudi proposal for Muslim
troops from non-neighboring countries was luke-warm at best.
Even if a GCC contingent was deployed to Iraq, it would risk
being used as a shield for US troops, and more importantly being
perceived that way. Even if GCC peacekeepers were in Iraq under
the auspices of a UN resolution, or that of another multilateral
body, in practical terms there can be little doubt that the
tactical operations of the GCC contingent would fall under the
direct influence of the U.S. military. This further increases
the danger of this mission being perceived as endorsing US
occupation, which itself does not accept that its military
operations in Iraq should come under the control of any other
organization. The peacekeepers of the GCC would then face
greater danger as a result of the uncertainty over the chain of
command in Iraq peacekeeping operations.

Conclusion
--------------

On a strategic and abstract level there are clear benefits to
sending a GCC contingent of peacekeepers to help regain
stability in Iraq, but certainly the practical obstacles would
be too great to advocate such a move. The deployment would help
in the continuing development of the GCC as a regional entity,
both on a political and military level, possibly with the added
benefit of presenting a deterrent to Iran. It would also help
in the process of encouraging a broadening of multilateral
ideals in regional international affairs. However, the
operational obstacles, such as questions over command and
control, the risks of growing opposition domestically and
regionally, and the likelihood of significant casualties could
make the deployment politically and militarily (sic).

Finally, if the decision were taken to deploy a peacekeeping
contingent, the mandate of such a mission would have to
explicitly prevent GCC troops from being stationed in areas of
heightened ethnic and sectarian sensitivities.

Footnotes
--------------

(1) In an interview on 17 July, Iraq Prime Minister Iyad Allawi
clearly stated, "The multinational forces are under the command
of the United Nations and since the United States has the
largest force, then it is natural that they are under its
command," in "Iraq PM says UN Arab contingent will be under US
command," Global News Wire - Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, 18
July 2004.

(2) The establishment of the peninsula shield force in 1982
provided a clearly defined military dimension to the
organization. A peacekeeping contingent in Iraq may help the
GCC make the leap from a defensive entity into a more pro-active
body.

(3) The performance of UAE peacekeepers in Kosovo was widely
hailed as a success by the international community. Combined
with the mine clearing operation in south Lebanon, the UAE could
lend its experience in post conflicts situations to a GCC
peacekeeping contingent.

(4) See Seymour Hersh, "PLAN B: as June 30th approaches, Israel
looks to the Kurds," New Yorker 28 June 2004.

(5) "Al-Jazeera talk show on Saudi plan to send Muslim troops to
Iraq," BBC Monitoring Middle East, 5 August 2004.

End Text

SISON