Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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04ABUDHABI2508 | 2004-07-28 09:03:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Abu Dhabi |
null Diana T Fritz 02/06/2007 04:41:54 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results Cable Text: SECRET SIPDIS TELEGRAM July 28, 2004 To: No Action Addressee Action: Unknown From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 2508 - UNKNOWN) TAGS: PREL, PTER Captions: None Subject: CENTCOM COMMANDER DISCUSSES IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, REGIONAL THREATS WITH SHAYKH MOHAMMED BIN ZAYED Ref: None _________________________________________________________________ S E C R E T ABU DHABI 02508 SIPDIS CXABU: ACTION: POL INFO: RSO DCM P/M ECON DAO USLO AMB DISSEMINATION: POL CHARGE: PROG APPROVED: CDA:RALBRIGHT DRAFTED: POL:SRADDANT CLEARED: USLO:RSIMM VZCZCADI844 OO RUEHC RUCAACC RHEFDIA RUEKJCS RUEASRT RHMFISS RHRMDAB RUEADWD RUEAHQA RHEFDIA RUEHC RUENAAA RUCAACC RUCAACC RUEKJCS RUEAHQA RULSSAK RUEADWD RUCNRAQ RHEHNSC RUEAIIA RUEHBUL RUEHDE DE RUEHAD #2508/01 2100903 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 280903Z JUL 04 FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5271 RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/ISA/NESA// RUEASRT/COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA RHMFISS/COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC RHRMDAB/COMUSNAVCENT RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5272 RUENAAA/CNO WASHDC RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ1/CCJ2// RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ3/CCJ4/CCJ5// RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-5// RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHDC//IA// RULSSAK/NAVY IPO WASHINGTON DC RUEADWD/HQDA WASHINGTON DC//DALO-SA// RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0174 RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 4197 |
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ABU DHABI 002508 |
Abizaid on July 24 discussed regional security issues with Abu Dhabi Deputy Crown Prince and UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ) in Abu Dhabi. Abizaid thanked MbZ for the UAE's strong support for coalition operations in Afghanistan. They discussed political developments and military operations in Iraq and counter terrorism efforts in Saudi Arabia, Syria and UAE/Oman. MbZ apologized for canceling the Seeker II deployment to Afghanistan on short notice, and reiterated his requirement for an armed Predator UAV, saying that he must make a decision on acquiring a foreign UAV system by February 2005 if the U.S. could not release an armed Predator to the UAE. Abizaid and MbZ shared security and public opinion viewpoints, including potential problems following the release of Guantanamo detainees. End Summary. 2. (U) MbZ was accompanied by his half brother, Maj. Gen. Shaykh Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Director General of Abu Dhabi Police and U/S of the Ministry of Interior, and by UAE Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Hamad Thani Al Rumaithy, and Advisor Yousuf Al Otaiba. Charge, RADM Robb (J5), Brig. Gen. Custer (J2), Executive Officer Col. Reynes, USLO, and Poloff (notetaker) joined General Abizaid. -------------------------- AFGHANISTAN -------------------------- 3. (S) Abizaid thanked MbZ for the UAE's strong support for coalition operations in Afghanistan, singling out the UAE special operations deployment for special praise. Both agreed that the drug trade, corruption, and warlords posed greater threats to Afghanistan's stability over the coming year than Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants. Good cooperation with Pakistan and Uzbekistan is putting the Al Qaeda threat to rest in Afghanistan, according to Abizaid, and several extremist leaders have faded from the picture due to the pressure. Abizaid was encouraged by the positive turnout of Afghan citizens registering to vote. Almost eight million Afghans have already registered, well exceeding the prediction of six million voters or less. Abizaid said that the remarkable success in registering voters indicated a strong desire among Afghans for a normal state. A strong turn-out at the polls would convey legitimacy to the Afghan government. MbZ asked if coalition forces were finding Arabs in Afghanistan. Abizaid said no. MbZ responded that this was both good and bad - good because Arab extremists shouldn't be there, bad because we don't know where they are going and what they are doing instead. MbZ expressed his view that the Pakistanis were starting to do a better job in controlling extremists. 4. (S) MbZ apologized for canceling the Seeker II deployment to Afghanistan on short notice, stating that border security requirements mandated deploying the Seekers at home. (NOTE: The commander of the UAE Special Operations Command briefed USLO Chief July 17 on the cancellation of plans to deploy its squadron of Seeker II UAVs to Bagram, scheduled for late summer. In a very cordial meeting, Brig. Gen. Juma Ahmed Al Bawardi expressed regret at the cancellation and also cited "operational requirements" for border security as the reason for the change. On July 19, the commander of UAE Land Forces - Artillery told USLO officers that the Seeker II was now being deployed in patrols along UAE'S western border with Saudi Arabia. END NOTE.) -------------------------- IRAQ -------------------------- 5. (C) Abizaid and MbZ discussed political changes in Iraq since their March 2004 meeting. They agreed that while the security situation remains extremely dangerous, Iraq's security forces have improved, since they are more motivated to fight for an Iraqi-led government than for the coalition. Abizaid expressed cautious optimism about the immediate future of the region's security, emphasizing that the key to stabilizing the region was to ensure that the upcoming national elections in Afghanistan and Iraq occurred as planned. Abizaid thanked MbZ for the UAEG's effective support, in particular for funding the transfer of Jordanian APCs to Iraq, in cooperation with King Abdullah of Jordan. -------------------------- SYRIA -------------------------- 6. (C) Asked by MbZ which Arab country was causing the greatest problems for Iraq, Abizaid replied Syria. Abizaid told MbZ that Syrian President Bashar had promised Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi to increase border control efforts. But terrorists, including suicide bombers, are still regularly getting through. Abizaid said that he believes Syria is aware of the problem but is not doing all it can to stop the incursions. Abizaid also told MbZ that Damascus appears to be home to a number of former regime elements who may be supporting the insurgency and that the Syrian government is aware of these activities. -------------------------- SAUDI ARABIA -------------------------- 7. (C) MbZ informed Abizaid that the UAE is watching its border with Saudi Arabia very carefully. He credited Saudi efforts to arrest terrorists, but expressed concern that the more effectively the Saudis clamp down, the greater the potential for the extremists to collect in neighboring countries. MbZ cited Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain as likely destinations. Abizaid recalled MbZ's characterization of this in an earlier conversation when MbZ compared the Saudi's moves to "squeezing water" - extremists find cracks and collect elsewhere. 8. (S) Abizaid contrasted his latest trip to Saudi Arabia with a visit several months ago. In July, Saudi officials appeared much more confident about their ability to combat terrorism. The amnesty was proving effective, and raids have unraveled several cells. -------------------------- OMAN/UAE ARRESTS -------------------------- 9. (S) MbZ briefed Abizaid on the recent joint UAE/Oman operation, based on U.S. information, that resulted in the arrest of 13 members of an Omani terrorist cell. Those arrested included several Afghans and one Emirati woman. MbZ claimed that the cell was planning an "event," and expressed his satisfaction at the cooperation between the Omani and UAE services. -------------------------- SECURITY CONCERNS -------------------------- 10. (S) Abizaid told MbZ that he sees intelligence patterns emerging that indicate one of three very serious incidents potentially occurring before the November U.S. elections: --A strike against one or more European allies to force their retreat from Iraq, similar to the pullouts of Spain and the Philippines. Abizaid listed Italy, Japan, Bulgaria and the U.K. as potential targets. --Another major strike on U.S. soil, as damaging as 9/11 or more so. However, rather than retreating, Abizaid predicted that this would cause an "extreme" U.S. retaliatory reaction. --A major hit against the oil manufacturing infrastructure in one or more moderate countries in the region. The economic impact could be global, and, like any of the above incidents, the effects could be intended to influence U.S. elections. 11. (C) MbZ agreed with Abizaid's concerns, particularly related to the oil industry. MbZ sharply criticized the decision by the Philippines to withdraw its contingent in Iraq to gain the release of a kidnapped citizen. This would embolden the terrorists to kidnap others. He said that the UAE had received chatter about potential terrorist activity, noting that much of it originates in the U.S. He shared the concern about the potential for an al Qaeda attack on regional oil infrastructure, noting that it would be relatively easy to destroy a refinery. -------------------------- MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION -------------------------- 12. (C) On several occasions, Abizaid stated frustration that the U.S. is losing the "perception war" in Iraq and Afghanistan, due in large part to bad media coverage. He stressed that the coalition has suffered no military losses in Iraq, even at the platoon level, yet the media, particularly Arab media, focuses on perceived U.S. failures. MbZ agreed that the Arab media will discredit anything favorable to the U.S. He said that the U.S. needs to present its side of the story more effectively. Citing the recent Fallujah bombings, MbZ said that Al Jazeera aired an old woman in front of a bombed house saying that she and her family were innocent civilians and that the US had killed her sheep, goats and cows. This is very hard to counter to an Arab audience. The only way to do so was to present the evidence and explain why U.S. forces attacked and what they achieved. Let the people see that terrorists have been killed. He also urged the U.S. to better publicize the positive changes the U.S. is bringing about. Abizaid said that Iraqi services and facilities, including schools, are better now than they have been for 30 years. However, these success stories are not getting out. MbZ agreed that this is the story that the U.S. must tell to change the world's perception of the U.S. role in Iraq. MbZ's special assistant recommended that CENTCOM let the Iraqis talk as much as possible. They will have more credibility to an Arab audience. -------------------------- GUANTANAMO -------------------------- 13. (C) MbZ commented that the release of the Guantanamo detainees had the potential to cause problems. Citing the appearances of a released Jordanian detainee named Rami on Arab talk shows, he said that these people are becoming heroes. In the future, some of them could be running mosques with thousands of followers, plaguing the region for years to come. Saying that this person, who was arrested by U.S. forces in Tora Bora, had certainly not been there as a tourist, MbZ stated that it would have been preferable for these people to have been killed in action. -------------------------- PREDATOR -------------------------- 14. (S) Referring to General Yagi's visit, Abizaid asked MbZ for his views on Predator. MbZ said that he is seeking an armed Predator from the U.S. and expressed disappointment that the U.S. appeared ready to offer only an unarmed version. MbZ confirmed that, while he strongly preferred the Predator, he was looking at co-developing in the UAE alternative UAV systems available from other countries. He said that the UAE required armed UAVs to control its long land and maritime borders and pointed out that they have been using UAVs since the first Gulf War. He stressed the benefits of sharing information through a common security system with the U.S. and other allies. Abizaid said that he wanted to work with MbZ, and asked for some time to explore options and get back to him. MbZ said that he could wait for a few months to hear from Abizaid before committing to another system. But he said that he planned to make a decision by the International Defense Exhibition (IDEX) to be held in Abu Dhabi in mid-February 2005. Both agreed that the Predator issue would not damage the strong U.S./UAE relationship. 15. (C) In closing, MbZ reaffirmed the strategic value of the relationship and expressed his commitment not to let disagreements on some issues detract from close and effective bilateral cooperation. General Abizaid agreed. 16. (U) General Abizaid cleared this cable. ALBRIGHT |