Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ABUDHABI2177
2004-06-30 11:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

UAE OPEN TO HELPING IRAQI MINISTRIES, BUT

Tags:  PREL ECON IZ TC 
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Cable 
Text: 
 
 
CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM June 30, 2004


To: No Action Addressee 

Action: Unknown 

From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 2177 - PRIORITY) 

TAGS: PREL, ECON 

Captions: None 

Subject: UAE OPEN TO HELPING IRAQI MINISTRIES, BUT SECURITY 
 CONCERNS PERSIST 

Ref: None 
_________________________________________________________________
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 02177

SIPDIS
CXABU:
 ACTION: POL 
 INFO: DCM P/M ECON RSO AMB 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: CDA:RAALBRIGHT
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: ECON:CMARTIN-CRUMPLER

VZCZCADI815
PP RUEHC RUCNRAQ RUEHGB
DE RUEHAD #2177 1821150
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301150Z JUN 04
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4940
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 002177 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/NGA, NEA/RA, AND NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2005
TAGS: PREL ECON IZ TC
SUBJECT: UAE OPEN TO HELPING IRAQI MINISTRIES, BUT
SECURITY CONCERNS PERSIST

Ref: (A) State 134750, (B) Abu Dhabi 1826

Classified by Richard A. Albright, Charge d'Affaires,
a.i., reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 002177

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/NGA, NEA/RA, AND NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2005
TAGS: PREL ECON IZ TC
SUBJECT: UAE OPEN TO HELPING IRAQI MINISTRIES, BUT
SECURITY CONCERNS PERSIST

Ref: (A) State 134750, (B) Abu Dhabi 1826

Classified by Richard A. Albright, Charge d'Affaires,
a.i., reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Post briefed Ministry of Foreign
Affairs officials on details of USG plans to offer
Iraq's ministries development assistance (see ref A),
and asked whether the UAEG was contemplating similar
assistance to Iraq's ministries. The response was
generally positive, although our interlocutors doubted
that the UAE would consider sending government
technical experts to Iraq until the security climate
improves. They also admitted that many of their own
ministries are short-staffed and would be hard-pressed
to loan personnel to an Iraqi ministry. End Summary.


2. (C) Polchief discussed the possibility of
development assistance for Iraq's new ministries with
a number of MFA contacts and received a relatively
positive response. "We will do whatever we can to
contribute to Iraq's ministries and the country's
reconstruction," Yacub Al-Hosani, Director of
International Organizations, said on June 30. "What
we need to know are Iraq's priorities so that we can
identify which experts to send. We need a roadmap for
Iraq."

Security concerns paramount
--------------


3. (C) Al-Hosani said concerns about the security of
Emirati personnel in Iraq remain paramount for his
government. The uncertain security climate is the
major reason the UAE has offered to host training for
Iraqis rather than sending UAE government experts to
Baghdad, he added. The UAE (Abu Dhabi police training
institute in Al Ain) hosted more than 200 Iraqi
criminal police in March and in April this year (ref
B).


4. (C) The UAE Central Bank has provided substantial
assistance to the Iraqi Central Bank, including
training for a group of approximately 30 Iraqis on
banking supervision and examination techniques in
November 2003. The training took place in Abu Dhabi,
and the UAE Central Bank Governor has declined
previous USG requests to send staff to Iraq because of
security concerns. He has noted to Embassy officials
that he supports staff exchanges, but none of his
staff so far have volunteered to travel to Iraq. The
UAE Central Bank continues to advise the Iraqi Central
Bank on an ad hoc basis, and working-level bank staff
maintain informal contact with their Iraqi
counterparts.

Short-staffed UAE ministries
--------------


5. (C) The UAE would have difficulty sparing their
existing staff, which in some ministries is very thin
and at times short on experience. Khalid Al-Ghaith, a
deputy director in the MFA's GCC Department, said the
Foreign Ministry is not even sure yet how it will beef
up its own embassy in Baghdad. Al-Hosani acknowledged
that this was a problem, particularly during the
summer season when many in the ministry take their
vacations. Al-Hosani said that it was more likely
that the UAEG would consider assistance to Iraq's
ministries after the summer, and perhaps even after
Ramadan (October/November),which will allow it to
assess whether the security situation has improved.
"We also want to understand how the Iraqis, the people
on the street, perceive other Arabs who come to help
with their government. Will they accept us? Our
experience so far is that they are welcoming us, but
after a few months, there could be new frustrations,"
he said.


6. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
ALBRIGHT