Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ABUDHABI1992
2004-06-16 12:36:00
SECRET
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR CENTCOM COMMANDER, GEN ABIZAID,

Tags:  PINS PREL PTER PGOV TC 
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Diana T Fritz 02/06/2007 05:36:36 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
SECRET

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM June 16, 2004


To: No Action Addressee 

Action: Unknown 

From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 1992 - ROUTINE) 

TAGS: PINS, PREL, PTER, PGOV 

Captions: None 

Subject: SCENESETTER FOR CENTCOM COMMANDER, GEN ABIZAID, JUNE 
 2004 

Ref: None 
_________________________________________________________________
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 01992

SIPDIS
CXABU:
 ACTION: USLO 
 INFO: DAO DCM POL AMB 

DISSEMINATION: USLO
CHARGE: USLO

APPROVED: AMB: WAHBA
DRAFTED: USLO: MSCHWAN
CLEARED: POL:JMAYBUR,DAO:BKERINS,DCM:RALBRIGHT,USLO:MSCHWAN

VZCZCADI317
RR RUCAACC RUEKJCS RUEASRT RHMFISS RHRMDAB RUEWMFU
RUEAHQA RUEKJCS RHEFDIA RUEHC RUEKJCS RUENAAA RUCAACC RUCAACC
RUEKJCS RUEAHQA RULSSAK RUEWMFU
DE RUEHAD #1992/01 1681236
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 161236Z JUN 04
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/ISA/NESA//
RUEASRT/COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
RHMFISS/COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC
RHRMDAB/COMUSNAVCENT
RUEWMFU/HQ DA WASH DC
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASH DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4756
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASH DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHDC
RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ1/CCJ2//
RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ3/CCJ4/CCJ5//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-5//
RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHDC//IA//
RULSSAK/NAVY IPO WASHINGTON DC
RUEWMFU/HQ DA WASH DC//DALO-SA//
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 09 ABU DHABI 001992 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/14
TAGS: PINS PREL PTER PGOV TC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CENTCOM COMMANDER, GEN ABIZAID,
JUNE 2004

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR WAHBA; REASON: 1.5 (B) AND (D)

-------
WELCOME
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 09 ABU DHABI 001992

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/14
TAGS: PINS PREL PTER PGOV TC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CENTCOM COMMANDER, GEN ABIZAID,
JUNE 2004

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR WAHBA; REASON: 1.5 (B) AND (D)

--------------
WELCOME
--------------


1. (U) GENERAL ABIZAID: WELCOME BACK TO THE UAE. WE HAVE
REQUESTED MEETINGS FOR YOU WITH ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE
SHAYKH KHALIFA BIN ZAYED AL NAHYAN, AS WELL AS WITH ABU
DHABI DEPUTY CROWN PRINCE AND UAE ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF
STAFF LT GEN SHAYKH MUHAMMAD BIN ZAYED AL NAHYAN (MBZ).
BOTH SHAYKHS WILL BE INTERESTED TO HEAR YOUR VIEWS ON THE
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN.

--------------
BACKGROUND
--------------


2. (S) UAE SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. IN THE REGION REMAINS
SOLID. THE EMIRATI LEADERSHIP HAS TRIED IN EARNEST TO
ACCOMMODATE EVERY U.S. REQUEST FOR COOPERATION AND
ASSISTANCE. THIS ENTAILS SOME POLITICAL RISK AS THE
LEADERSHIP QUIETLY ALLOWS U.S. KC-10 AND KC-135 TANKERS, U-
2 RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, GLOBAL HAWK UNMANNED AERIAL
VEHICLES, AND (UP UNTIL RECENTLY) C-130 SUPPLY AIRCRAFT TO
CONDUCT OIF/OEF/HOA SUPPORT OPERATIONS FROM BASES WITHIN
THE UAE. ADDITIONALLY, THE EMIRATIS HAVE GRANTED OVER
60,000 AIRCRAFT OVERFLIGHT AND LANDING CLEARANCES ANNUALLY
SINCE OEF BEGAN. FURTHER, THE PORTS OF JEBEL ALI AND
FUJEIRAH ARE INDISPENSABLE TO U.S. NAVY MARITIME
INTERDICTION OPERATIONS, RESUPPLY AND SUSTAINMENT, AND
COMBAT SUPPORT EFFORTS ACROSS THE REGION. UAE SPECIAL
OPERATIONS FORCES ARE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN COMBAT OPERATIONS
IN AFGHANISTAN, AND UAE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS ARE DEPLOYED
TO BAGHDAD AND BAGRAM. DESPITE SOME RECENT SETBACKS IN
MAJOR FOREIGN MILITARY SALES OFFERS (MOST NOTABLY THE
EMIRATI REJECTION OF FIVE RE-FURBISHED E-2C AIRBORNE EARLY
WARNING AIRCRAFT IN APRIL 2004),OUR MILITARY TO MILITARY
RELATIONSHIP IS VITAL AND REMAINS STRONG.

--------------
SUGGESTED THEMES
--------------


3. (C) WE ARE WORKING TO ARRANGE MEETINGS FOR YOU WITH BOTH
THE CROWN PRINCE OF ABU DHABI, SHAYKH KHALIFA BIN ZAYED,
AND THE DEPUTY CROWN PRINCE OF ABU DHABI AND CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE UAE ARMED FORCES, SHAYKH MOHAMED BIN ZAYED. IN YOUR
MEETINGS WITH THE CROWN PRINCE AND SHAYKH MOHAMED, WE
RECOMMEND THAT YOU THANK THE UAE FOR ITS STRONG AND

CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR OEF AND OIF, AND POLITICAL AND
HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS TO SUPPORT STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN
AND IRAQ. THE CROWN PRINCE WILL BE MOST INTERESTED IN
HEARING YOUR ASSESSMENT OF:

-- THE COMING TRANSITION PERIOD IN IRAQ, INCLUDING THE
ROLES OF THE COALITION FORCES AND THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT;

-- OUR TRAINING OF THE IRAQI MILITARY AND POLICE, AND YOUR
ASSESSMENT OF THEIR ABILITIES TO ASSUME GREATER
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SECURITY;

-- STRATEGIES FOR FALLUJAH AND FOR DEALING WITH MOQTADA AL-
SADR;

-- PROGRESS ON RESTORING STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN;

-- THE SITUATION IN SAUDI ARABIA.


4. (S) WITH SHAYKH MOHAMED, WE RECOMMEND THAT YOU EXPLORE
IN GREATER DETAIL THE ISSUES MENTIONED ABOVE, AS WELL AS
RAISE THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

-- ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING
THE EXPECTED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NEW U.S. EMBASSY AND
THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT, AND COALITION FORCES;

-- ARRANGEMENTS FOR BROADER PARTICIPATION IN THE
MULTINATIONAL FORCE;

-- ASK MBZ FOR HIS VIEWS ON IRAQI RECEPTIVENESS TO ARAB
TROOPS (NOTE: SHAYKH MOHAMED TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT ARAB
TROOPS WOULD ONLY GO TO IRAQ IF BLESSED BY THE ARAB LEAGUE.
END NOTE.)

-- ASSURE MBZ OF U.S. COMMITMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA. (MBZ AND
OTHER SENIOR EMIRATIS HAVE CAUTIONED THAT OUR SUPPORT AT
THIS TIME IS CRUCIAL FOR THE SAUDIS BUT NEEDS TO BE SUBTLE
AND BALANCED.)
--------------
TERRORISM FINANCING
--------------

5. (C) THE UAEG HAS CRACKED DOWN ON POTENTIAL
VULNERABILITIES IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS SINCE 9/11, AND
IMPLEMENTED LEGISLATION IN JANUARY 2002 CRIMINALIZING MONEY
LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING. IT IS IN THE PROCESS
OF CONSIDERING A SEPARATE TERRORIST FINANCE LAW TO ADDRESS
SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THE CENTRAL BANK HAS HAD WITH
INVESTIGATING TERRORIST FINANCING AND FREEZING THE ACCOUNTS
OF TERRORISTS. AS OF THE END OF 2003, THE UAEG HAS FROZEN
MORE THAN 3.13 MILLION DOLLARS IN 18 BANK ACCOUNTS IN THE
UAE, AND HAS WORKED WITH US TO BLOCK FINANCING A NUMBER OF
NAMED TERRORIST ENTITIES. THE CENTRAL BANK ALSO HOSTED A
CONFERENCE ON THE HAWALA INFORMAL MONEY TRANSFER SYSTEM IN
APRIL. THE UAE RECOGNIZES THE NEED TO PROTECT ITS
FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM USE BY TERRORISTS. A TERRORIST
ATTACK HERE WOULD NEGATE THE LEADERSHIP'S EFFORTS TO
PROMOTE THE UAE, AND DUBAI IN PARTICULAR, AS A TOURIST
DESTINATION AND HAVEN FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT.

--------------
MEDIA CONCERNS
--------------


6. (U) AL ARABIYYA, THE DUBAI-BASED ARABIC SATELLITE NEWS
STATION COMPETING WITH AL JAZEERA FOR VIEWERS, STIRRED UP
CONTROVERSY WITH SENSATIONALISTIC BROADCASTS OF COALITION
OPERATIONS.


A. (U) WE HAVE EXPRESSED STRONG OBJECTIONS TO BOTH THE
UAE GOVERNMENT AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE DUBAI MEDIA CITY,
REGARDING AL ARABIYYA'S LACK OF OBJECTIVITY. AL ARABIYYA
AND NUMEROUS MEDIA GIANTS, SUCH AS CNN AND REUTERS, OPERATE
FROM DUBAI MEDIA CITY BECAUSE THE UAEG AND DUBAI ALLOW THEM
TO BROADCAST WITHOUT CENSORSHIP. AL ARABIYYA IS OWNED BY
WEALTHY SAUDI BUSINESSMAN WALEED BIN IBRAHIM AL IBRAHIM, A
BROTHER-IN-LAW OF KING FAHD, AND A PRINCIPAL SHAREHOLDER OF
MIDDLE EAST BROADCASTING CORPORATION (MBC),AL ARABIYYA'S
PARENT COMPANY. OTHER AL ARABIYYA INVESTORS REPORTEDLY
INCLUDE KUWAITI BUSINESSMEN AND A KUWAITI ROYAL FAMILY
MEMBER, AHMED AL FAHED AL SABAH.


B. (C) THE UAE LEADERSHIP TELLS US THEY ARE NOT IN A
POSITION TO SHUT DOWN THE STATION OR CANCEL RESIDENCY VISA
PERMITS WITHOUT DESTROYING DUBAI'S FREE-ZONE REPUTATION.
BUT SHAYKH MOHAMMED AND OTHER UAE LEADERS HAVE REPEATEDLY
STRESSED THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF BOTH AL
ARABIYYA AND AL-JAZIRA. THE EMIRATIS HAVE WORKED BEHIND
THE SCENES TO ENSURE THAT AL ARABIYYA STATION'S NEW
MANAGEMENT IMPROVES REPORTING STANDARDS AND OBJECTIVITY.
UAE LEADERS ARE OPTIMISTIC THAT THE STATION WILL SOON
EXERCISE MORE PROFESSIONAL AND OBJECTIVE STANDARDS.

--------------
DUBAI AND COUNTER-PROLIFERATION
--------------


7. (S) DURING A MARCH VISIT TO THE UAE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE JOHN WOLF URGED UAE LEADERS TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST
COMPANIES AND INDIVIDUALS SUPPORTING A.Q. KHAN'S
PROLIFERATION NETWORK IN DUBAI. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND
MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS SHAYKH HAMDAN BIN
ZAYED AL NAHYAN PLEDGED COMPLETE COOPERATION TO SHUTDOWN
THE KHAN NETWORK, AND DUBAI CROWN PRINCE AND UAE MINISTER
OF DEFENSE SHAYKH MOHAMMED BIN RASHID AL MAKTOUM (MBR)
UNDERTOOK TO FULFILL A NUMBER OF OUR OUTSTANDING REQUESTS
IMMEDIATELY, NAMELY APPREHENDING B.S.A. TAHIR'S BROTHER WHO
WAS RESIDENT IN DUBAI, AND MAKING HIM AVAILABLE TO U.S.
INVESTIGATORS FOR QUESTIONING; AS WELL AS CLOSING DOWN SMB
COMPUTERS AND TURNING OVER COMPUTER EQUIPMENT AND OTHER
ASSETS (E.G., FILES) TO USG AUTHORITIES FOR INVESTIGATION.
UAE AUTHORITIES CONTINUE TO WORK WITH U.S. INVESTIGATORS TO
DISCERN THE FULL SCOPE OF KHAN'S ACTIVITIES IN THE UAE.
A/S WOLF'S TRIP FOLLOWED THE SUCCESSFUL LAUNCH OF THE
STATE/NP-LED EXPORT CONTROLS AND RELATED BORDER SECURITY
ASSISTANCE (EXBS) PROGRAM IN THE UAE. THE USG AND THE UAEG
HAVE AGREED ON A ROBUST EXPORT CONTROL TRAINING PLAN, WHICH
WE BEGAN TO IMPLEMENT IN DECEMBER 2003. SINCE THAT TIME,
THE USG HAS PROVIDED FOUR COURSES TO THE UAEG ON BOTH LEGAL
ASPECTS OF AN EXPORT CONTROL PROGRAM AND ON HOW TO DETECT
AND INTERDICT THE COMPONENTS OF WMD. THE UAE IS IN THE
PROCESS OF DRAFTING ITS OWN EXPORT CONTROL LAW.

--------------
PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI)
--------------


8. (U) SENIOR UAE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED
INTEREST IN HOW THE UAE COULD PLAY A ROLE IN PSI. MBZ TOLD
THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE UAE IS INTERESTED (IN PRINCIPLE) IN
A SHIP BOARDING AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. UAE ARMED FORCES
GHQ IS CURRENTLY REVIEWING A DRAFT AGREEMENT AND WE EXPECT
TO OPEN DISCUSSIONS ON PSI WITH THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF'S
OFFICE SOON.

--------------
NARCOTICS IN THE UAE
--------------


9. (U) ALTHOUGH NOT A NARCOTICS PRODUCING NATION, THE UAE
IS A TRANSSHIPMENT POINT FOR TRAFFICKERS MOVING ILLEGAL
DRUGS WESTWARD FROM THE MAJOR DRUG-PRODUCING COUNTRIES,
INCLUDING AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, PAKISTAN, AND INDIA. FREQUENT
REPORTS OF SEIZURES OF ILLEGAL DRUGS IN THE UAE DURING THE
PAST YEAR UNDERSCORE THIS CONCLUSION, ALTHOUGH MOST
SEIZURES HAVE BEEN OF "SOFT" DRUGS LIKE HASHISH, NOT "HARD"
DRUGS LIKE HEROIN. NEWS STORIES ABOUT DRUG SMUGGLING,
DEALING, AND USAGE WERE REPORTED IN THE LOCAL PRESS IN

2003. IN ADDITION TO THE COUNTRY'S GENERALLY LAISSEZ-FAIRE
ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMERCIAL TRADE--THOUGH CERTAINLY NOT
DRUGS--THERE ARE SEVERAL FACTORS THAT PROMOTE UAE'S ROLE AS
A WAY-STATION, INCLUDING ITS PROXIMITY TO MAJOR DRUG
CULTIVATION REGIONS IN SOUTH ASIA; 700 KILOMETERS OF OPEN
COASTLINE; AND RELATIVE AFFLUENCE AMONG THE LOCAL
POPULATION. PUBLISHED STATISTICS ON NARCOTICS SEIZURES AND
DOMESTIC ADDICTION REVEAL A GROWING DRUG PROBLEM AMONG UAE
AND THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS WHICH, WHILE NOT SIGNIFICANT BY
AMERICAN STANDARDS, IS NOTABLE GIVEN THE COUNTRY'S HARSH
DRUG LAWS. A MINISTRY OF HEALTH REPORT IN LATE 1998
ASSERTS THAT THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 12,500 DRUG ADDICTS
IN THE COUNTRY OF 3.1 MILLION PEOPLE.

--------------
REGIONAL AID AND SUPPORT
--------------


10. (U) IRAQ: SENIOR UAEG OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY
SUPPORTIVE OF OUR BROADER REGIONAL OBJECTIVES IN IRAQ AND
AFGHANISTAN. UAE ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ, BOTH PLEDGED AND
DELIVERED, HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT. AS A FOUNDING MEMBER OF
THE CORE GROUP ON IRAQ'S RECONSTRUCTION, THE UAEG PROVIDED
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR IRAQ'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND HOSTED
A FOLLOW-ON DONORS CONFERENCE IN FEBRUARY 2004. DURING
FORMER SECRETARY BAKER'S VISIT TO THE UAEG IN JANUARY 2004,
ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE SHAYKH KHALIFA AGREED TO FORGIVE THE
BULK OF IRAQ'S $4 BILLION DEBT TO THE UAE.


11. (U) AFGHANISTAN: THE UAE HAS PROVIDED MILLIONS OF
DOLLARS IN FINANCIAL AID AND ASSISTANCE-IN-KIND TO THE
AFGHAN INTERIM AUTHORITY, AND REMAINS ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN
RECONSTRUCTION AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. THE UAEG
PLEDGED $30 MILLION IN ECONOMIC AID AND A FURTHER $6
MILLION IN HUMANITARIAN AID AT THE JANUARY 2002 TOKYO
CONFERENCE, AND WE EXPECT THE UAE AID PACKAGE TO EXCEED THE
$150 MILLION UAE HAS ALREADY SPENT.

--------------
IRAN: TENSION PERSISTS
--------------

12. (S) RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UAE AND IRAN REMAIN STRAINED.
THE EFFORT TO REACH SOME COMPROMISE ON THE ABU MUSA ISLAND
ISSUE CAME TO A NEAR HALT IN LATE SPRING/EARLY SUMMER OF

2003. THE EMIRATIS HAVE MADE CLEAR TO US THAT THEY ARE
DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF IRAN'S TERRITORIAL/MILITARY AMBITIONS
IN THE GULF, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO TEHRAN'S NUCLEAR
AND WMD ACQUISITION POLICY AND HAVE CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED
A TOUGH APPROACH BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND IAEA.
TO ADD TO THE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE UAE AND IRAN, IT HAS
BEEN REPORTED TO US THAT OVER TWO MONTHS AGO, TWO UAE COAST
GUARD PATROL SHIPS AND CREW WERE BEING DETAINED IN BANDER
ABBAS. THE REASONS FOR THIS ARE UNCLEAR AND THE EMIRATIES
HAVE REMAINED QUIET ABOUT IT. LIKEWISE, EARLY JUNE HAS
WITNESSED AN UPSURGE IN DETENTION OF FISHING VESSELS FOR
OPERATING TOO CLOSE TO OIL WELLS IN THE GREATER ABU MUSA
AREA WHICH BOTH SIDES CLAIM. THE EMIRATIS ARE WORRIED ABOUT
IRANIAN DESIGNS IN IRAQ AND HAVE URGED US TO HELP PREVENT
IRAN FROM MEDDLING IN IRAQ'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS. THE
EMIRATIS BELIEVE THAT THE IRANIANS ARE ACTIVELY SEEKING A
FOOTHOLD IN THE SUNNI IRAQ COMMUNITY AS WELL AS WITH THE
SHI'A.

--------------
THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP
--------------


13. (U) OUR MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH UAE IS
ACTIVE AND STRONG. UNTIL RECENTLY, OUR KEY INTERLOCUTOR
WITH THE UAE MILITARY HAD BEEN UAE ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF
STAFF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SHAYKH MOHAMMED BIN ZAYED AL
NAHYAN (MBZ). FOLLOWING HIS APPOINTMENT TO THE ROLE OF ABU
DHABI DEPUTY CROWN PRINCE, MBZ HAS BEEN LESS INVOLVED IN
DAILY MILITARY ISSUES, AS HIS NEW DUTIES HAVE DEMANDED MORE
AND MORE OF HIS ATTENTION. INSTEAD, MBZ HAS DEFERRED MOST
MILITARY MATTERS TO HIS CAPABLE AND INTELLIGENT DEPUTY,
MAJOR GENERAL HAMAD MOHAMMED THANI AL RUMAITHY. THIS IS A
POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT, IN THAT THE US-UAE MILITARY-TO-
MILITARY RELATIONSHIP HAS NOW BEEN INSTITUTIONALIZED WITH
GHQ, AND IS NO LONGER RELIANT UPON THE PERSONAL
AVAILABILITY AND DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF MBZ. MAJOR GENERAL
HAMAD THANI IS A KEEN ORGANIZER AND HAS EFFECTIVELY
ENERGIZED HIS STAFF TO BEGIN COORDINATING THE MYRIAD ISSUES
OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.


14. (U) UNFORTUNATELY, THE INAUGURAL JOINT MILITARY
COMMISSION (JMC),SCHEDULED FOR MAY 2004, WAS POSTPONED AT
OSD REQUEST DUE TO A SCHEDULING CONFLICT WITH THE QATAR
MILITARY COOPERATION COMMISSION (MCC). IN A SHORT-NOTICE
ATTEMPT TO DECONFLICT THE TWO HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS FROM AN
ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS HOLIDAY, WE WERE FORCED TO POSTPONE THE
UAE JMC IN FAVOR OF THE PREVIOUSLY-CONFIRMED DATES FOR THE
QATAR MCC. DESPITE OBVIOUS DISAPPOINTMENT AT UAE GHQ
(FOLLOWING EARNEST PREPARATIONS FOR THE EVENT),DEPUTY
CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GENERAL HAMAD THANI GRACIOUSLY
ACCEPTED OUR REQUEST TO POSTPONE THE JMC, AND SUGGESTED 11
- 12 OCT 2004 AS THE NEXT OPPORTUNITY FOR THE FORUM. WE
ARE AWAITING OSD CONFIRMATION OF THOSE DATES.


15. (U) THE SUCCESS OF THE RECENT INAUGURAL CLASS OF THE
GULF AIR WARFARE CENTER (GAWC) IS ONE OF THE HIGHLIGHTS OF
THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. USAF AND UAE AIR FORCE HAVE
BEEN WORKING THE CONCEPT SINCE MAY 2000. UAE IS PROVIDING
STATE-OF-THE-ART FACILITIES AND THE U.S. (ALONG WITH THE
U.K.) IS PROVIDING COURSEWARE AND DEDICATED INSTRUCTORS, AS
WELL AS ROUTINE PARTICIPANTS. THE INAUGURAL CLASS
CONCLUDED IN FEBRUARY 2004 AND SUCCESSFULLY VALIDATED THE
INITIAL CONCEPT. THE SECOND CLASS GRADUATED ON 26 MAY 2004
AND IMPLEMENTED A SYLLABUS REFINED BY THE LESSONS OF THE
INAUGURAL COURSE. FUTURE CLASSES WILL EXPAND GAWC
PARTICIPATION TO OTHER GCC COUNTRIES AND FRANCE, AND THE
UAE AIR FORCE COMMANDER IS CONSIDERING FURTHER EXPANSION TO
POSSIBLY INCLUDE JORDAN AND EGYPT. MEANWHILE, CENTAF AND
UAEAF ARE COORDINATING A DRAFT US-UAE MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT DETAILING FUTURE GAWC COOPERATION.


16. (S) AL DHAFRA AIR BASE REMAINS A KEY COMPONENT OF OUR
RELATIONSHIP WITH UAE AND IS VITAL TO THE ABILITY OF
CENTCOM AND CENTAF TO PROJECT COMBAT POWER IN THE AOR. AL
DHAFRA IS CURRENTLY THE HOME TO THE 380TH AIR EXPEDITIONARY
WING, WITH MORE THAN 1100 CENTAF PERSONNEL, OPERATING
TWELVE KC-135 AND FOUR KC-10 AIR REFUELING TANKERS, AS WELL
AS SIX U-2 SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT AND ONE GLOBAL HAWK
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE. UAEAF HAS ACCOMMODATED VIRTUALLY
EVERY REQUEST FOR PERIODIC INCREASES IN FORCES AT AL
DHAFRA, AS MANDATED BY OUR FLUCTUATING OPERATIONS TEMPO.
WE ARE PRESENTLY COORDINATING THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
SEPARATE, DEDICATED U.S. AIRCRAFT PARKING RAMP AND
REFUELING HYDRANT SYSTEM. CONGRESS AUTHORIZED THIS MILCON
PROJECT IN THE 2003 GWOT SUPPLEMENTAL. WE EXPECT TO
OBLIGATE FUNDS AND BEGIN CONSTRUCTION THIS MONTH.
ADDITIONALLY, UAEAF IS FUNDING THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW
U.S. CANTONEMENT AREA WITH STATE OF THE ART DORMITORY
FACILITIES. THE NEW CANTONEMENT AREA WAS DESIGNED TO U.S.
SPECIFICATIONS AND WILL ALLAY NUMEROUS FORCE PROTECTION
CONCERNS, AND WILL ALSO MOVE CENTAF PERSONNEL FROM THE
EXISTING TENTS, INHABITED SINCE 1991.


17. (S) THE EMIRATI PORTS AT JEBEL ALI (ON THE ARABIAN
GULF) AND FUJEIRAH (ON THE GULF OF OMAN) ARE ALSO CRUCIAL
TO CENTCOM ACCESS AND FORCE PROJECTION IN THE REGION. OVER
620 U.S. NAVY SHIPS VISITED UAE PORTS LAST YEAR. U.S. NAVY
SEALS RECENTLY COMPLETED TRAINING DUBAI POLICE AND JEBEL
ALI PORT POLICE ON SPECIAL TACTICS AND SHIPBOARDING
PROCEDURES, IN ORDER TO BETTER PROTECT US NAVAL SHIPS IN
UAE PORTS.


18. (S) UAE DEPLOYED A 35-MAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS CONTINGENT
TO BAGRAM AIR BASE IN MID-2003. THESE TROOPS ARE ENGAGED
IN ACTIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS AND SUFFERED THEIR FIRST
CASUALTIES (WIA, RETURNED TO DUTY) ON 24 APRIL 2004. UAE
ALSO PLANS TO DEPLOY ITS SQUADRON OF SEEKER II UAVS TO
BAGRAM BEGINNING IN LATE SUMMER 2004. ALTHOUGH THIS
DEPLOYMENT WAS DELAYED FROM THE ORIGINAL PLAN (DECEMBER
2003),DUE TO ENVIRONMENTAL AND OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS AT
BAGRAM, PREPARATIONS ARE ON-TRACK AND WE ARE WORKING THE
DETAILS TO ENSURE SUCCESS.


19. (S) WE HAVE RECENTLY ENGAGED IN SEVERAL INTELLIGENCE
SHARING INITIATIVES WITH UAE. MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, THE UAE
DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SENT OFFICERS TO
COALITION HEADQUARTERS IN BOTH BAGHDAD AND BAGRAM IN APRIL
2004 TO PERFORM DUTIES AS JOINT OPERATIONS AND JOINT
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES ARE
ASSISTING THE UAE SPACE AND RECONNAISSANCE CENTER (SRC) TO
CONSOLIDATE ITS MAPPING FUNCTIONS, AND THE NATIONAL
GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IS DEVELOPING AIR PHOTO
INTERPRETATION FAMILIARIZATION TRAINING FOR THE UAE SRC.
FURTHER, CENTCOM HAS OFFERED TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE AND ADVICE TO THE UAE TO CREATE AN INTELLIGENCE
FUSION CENTER THAT WILL GIVE THREAT INDICATIONS AND
WARNINGS TO THE UAE LEADERSHIP. THE UAE IS EVALUATING
WHETHER TO TAKE THE NEEDED STEPS TO CONCLUDE A BILATERAL
SIGINT AGREEMENT.


20. (U) UAE CONCERN WITH LOGISTICS, SUPPLY, AND SUPPORT OF
THEIR FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN HAVE LED TO RENEWED INTEREST IN
AN ACQUISITION AND CROSS SERVICING AGREEMENT. THE DIRECT
PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT OF BOTH MBZ AND UAE AIR FORCE
COMMANDER STAFF PILOT MAJOR GENERAL KHALID ABDULLA MOBARAK
AL BUAINAIN HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT, AND WE ARE MAKING
PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETING AN AGREEMENT IN TALKS BETWEEN
UAE GHQ, CENTCOM J4, AND USLO STAFF OFFICERS.


21. (U) EXERCISE EAGLE RESOLVE 04 (ER 04) WAS CONDUCTED 15
- 25 MAY 2004. THE EMIRATIS HOSTED CENTCOM'S ANNUAL
COOPERATIVE DEFENSE INITIATIVE EVENT FOR THE FIRST TIME,
FOLLOWING THE HIATUS LAST YEAR DUE TO OIF. THE THEME FOR
ER 04 WAS THEATER AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE. CENTCOM J3 AND
SUPPORTING U.S. ORGANIZATIONS WERE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN
DEVELOPING THE SCENARIO AND PROCEDURES FOR THE EXERCISE,
AND PROVIDED THE PREPONDERANCE OF PARTICIPANTS AND
EXPERTISE. UAE PREPARATIONS WERE ENTHUSIASTIC,
PROFESSIONAL, AND THOROUGH, AND UAE OFFICERS PERFORMED
ADMIRABLY, ESPECIALLY IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS FOR THE AIR
OPERATIONS CENTER AND REGIONAL OPERATIONS CENTR. KUWAIT,
BAHRAIN, AND QATAR WERE WELL-REPRESENTED AND PARTICIPATED
CAPABLY. OMAN PROVIDED TWO MID-LEVEL OFFICERS WHO
STRUGGLED WITH THE BASIC CONCEPTS. SAUDI ARABIA DID NOT
SHOW UP FOR THE COORDINATION EXERCISE PORTION OF ER 04, BUT
ARRIVED FOR THE EXECUTIVE SEMINAR AND DEBRIEFS. EGYPT AND
JORDAN BOTH PROVIDED OBSERVERS. THE EXERCISE WAS A SUCCESS
AND PRODUCED SEVERAL VALUABLE LESSONS REGARDING
OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INTEROPERABILITY AND COORDINATION. THERE
ARE, AS OF YET, NO VOLUNTEERS TO HOST NEXT YEAR'S EXERCISE
AND THE ISSUE WAS TABLED FOR FUTURE DISCUSSIONS.

--------------
CHALLENGES AND SETBACKS
--------------


22. (U) WE HAVE EXPERIENCED A NUMBER OF RECENT SETBACKS IN
OUR MIL-TO-MIL RELATIONSHIP, MOST NOTABLY IN THE ARENA OF
MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEM SALES.


23. (U) UAE ALLOWED THE OFFER EXPIRATION DATE (OED) ON THE
LETTER OF OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE (LOA) FOR FIVE E-2C ADVANCED
HAWKEYE AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AIRCRAFT TO EXPIRE WITHOUT
FORMAL NOTIFICATION ON 31 MARCH 2004. A SUBSEQUENT 15-DAY
GRACE PERIOD ALSO LAPSED WITHOUT FORMAL UAE COMMENT. THIS
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) CASE HAD BEEN UNDER
CONSIDERATION FOR SEVERAL YEARS, AND THE OED WAS REPEATEDLY
EXTENDED OVER THE COURSE OF CHALLENGING NEGOTIATIONS.
FOLLOWING OED, THE FIVE AIRCRAFT THAT HAD BEEN RESERVED FOR
THE UAE WERE RETURNED TO THE USN FLEET, WHERE THEY ARE
BEING DISMANTLED FOR SPARE PARTS.


A. (C) THE UAE REJECTED THE E-2C LOA DUE (OSTENSIBLY)
TO TWO CONCERNS: THE DIFFICULTY AND EXPENSE OF INTEGRATING
A FRENCH DATA LINK SYSTEM (STRICTLY A COMMERCIAL VENTURE
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND FRENCH MANUFACTURERS, AND THE UAE);
AND UAE INSISTENCE UPON BLANKET APPROVAL FOR THE U.S. LINK-
16 DATA LINK SYSTEM. THIS LATTER ISSUE IS SIGNIFICANT, IN
THAT UAE INTENDS TO INTEGRATE LINK-16 IN A NATIONAL COMMAND
AND CONTROL ARCHITECTURE (STILL TO BE DEFINED),WHICH
INCLUDES NUMEROUS FOREIGN-MANUFACTURED WEAPONS SYSTEMS. IN
TWO SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS WITH MBZ PRIOR TO THE OED,
AMBASSADOR WAHBA STRESSED THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:
LINK-16 HAD BEEN APPROVED FOR THE UAE E-2C AND APPROVAL IS
PENDING/LIKELY FOR THE F-16; THE U.S. RELEASE PROCESS DOES
NOT PERMIT ANY BLANKET APPROVAL PROVISIONS, EVEN FOR OUR
CLOSEST ALLIES (UK, NATO); AND THAT THIS ISSUE REMAINS THE
PROPER PURVIEW OF THE COMMAND AND CONTROL INTEROPERABILITY
BOARD (CCIB),WHICH WE HAVE REPEATEDLY ATTEMPTED TO
SCHEDULE AND WHICH UAE CANCELLED ON SHORT NOTICE AT LEAST
TWICE. FURTHER, AMBASSADOR WAHBA STRESSED THAT THE
AIRCRAFT WOULD NO LONGER BE AVAILABLE AFTER THE OED, AND
THAT THE COST TO ACQUIRE THE SAME OR A COMPLIMENTARY SYSTEM
IN THE FUTURE WOULD CERTAINLY BE MUCH HIGHER. MBZ
ACKNOWLEDGED THE AMBASSADOR'S POINTS AND INFORMED HER THAT,
WITHOUT ASSURANCE FOR BLANKET RELEASE, THE DECISION HAD
BEEN MADE TO REJECT THE OFFER.


B. (C) IN THE MEANTIME, THE AEW CAPABILITY OFFERED IN
THE E-2C LOA REMAINS A PRESSING REQUIREMENT FOR THE UAE,
AND ONE THEY WILL HAVE TO ADDRESS AT SOME POINT IN THE
FUTURE. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR F-16 FLEET WILL
CERTAINLY BE DIMINISHED BY THE LOSS OF THE COMPLEMENTING E-
2C CAPABILITY, AND EVEN IF THEY BEGIN NEGOTIATION ON
ANOTHER AEW PLATFORM TOMORROW--EVEN ANOTHER E-2C PURCHASE--
IT WILL PROBABLY BE 3 - 5 YEARS BEFORE THEY CAN OBTAIN THE
CAPABILITY THEY REQUIRE. FINALLY, IN TERMS OF THEIR
EXPRESSED LINK-16 ISSUE, THE UAE F-16 FLEET IS NOW ISOLATED
AS THE ONLY PLATFORM IN THEIR INVENTORY CURRENTLY APPROVED
FOR LINK-16 (RELEASE IN PRINCIPLE).


24. (C) LINK-16 IS ONLY ONE OF SEVERAL VITAL
INTEROPERABILITY ISSUES THAT CHALLENGE OUR FUTURE MILITARY
INTERACTION WITH UAE. OTHERS INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED
TO: COMSEC ACCOUNTS, FACILITIES, AND CUSTODIANS; LINK-11;
AND DEVELOPMENT OF A VISION FOR A UAE NATIONAL COMMAND AND
CONTROL ARCHITECTURE. THESE ISSUES ARE IN THE ARENA OF THE
CENTCOM-SPONSORED COMMAND AND CONTROL INTEROPERABILITY
BOARD. UNFORTUNATELY, UAE CANCELLED A PREVIOUSLY-SCHEDULED
CCIB ON VERY SHORT NOTICE IN OCTOBER 2003, AND HAS FAILED
TO RESPOND TO REPEATED CENTCOM AND COUNTRY TEAM OFFERS TO
RE-SCHEDULE, MOST RECENTLY IN APRIL 2004. THE CCIB IS ONE
OF OUR MOST PRESSING ISSUES AND SHOULD BE STRESSED AT EVERY
OPPORTUNITY DURING THE CDR'S VISIT.


25. (C) IN FEBRUARY 2004 UAE ANNOUNCED A SURPRISE DECISION
TO REJECT THE LOA FOR U.S.-BASED (TUCSON) F-16 TRAINING FOR
THEIR SOON-TO-BE-ACQUIRED F-16 BLOCK-60 FLEET. THE UAE AIR
FORCE COMMANDER CITED NEW FISCAL CONSTRAINTS AS THE
RATIONALE FOR THE DECISION. IN RESPONSE, SAF/IA, LOCKHEED
MARTIN, AND GENERAL ELECTRIC RAPIDLY ENGINEERED A REVISED
OFFER IN MARCH 2004 THAT LOWERED THE COST OF THE PROGRAM
SIGNIFICANTLY, BY REDUCING THE SCOPE AND SCALE (THOUGH NOT
THE CALIBER) OF THE TRAINING. UAE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION
AND APPRECIATION FOR THE NEW OFFER. SAF/IA PROVIDED THE
REVISED LETTER OF OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE (LOA) IN MAY 2004,
WHICH WILL EXPIRE ON 30 JUNE 2004. WE HAVE JUST LEARNED
THAT UAE IS REQUESTING A TWO MONTH EXTENSION ON THE LOA,
WHILE THEY CONCLUDE THEIR DELIBERATIONS ON THE OFFER. IT
APPEARS THAT SAF/IA WILL APPROVE THE EXTENSION TO THE OFFER
EXPIRATION DATE AS REQUESTED, BUT WILL ALSO REITERATE THE
IMPLICATIONS THAT CONTINUED DELAYS IN SIGNING THE CASE WILL
ONLY EXACERBATE AN ALREADY CRITICAL SITUATION. IT IS A DAY
FOR DAY SLIP IN THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE TRAINING SCHEDULE
FOR EVERY DAY OF DELAY BEYOND 30 JUNE IN SIGNING THE CASE.
THIS IS A REAL CONCERN, AS SEVERAL KEY PROGRAM MILESTONES
ARE IMMINENT OR HAVE ELAPSED.


26. (S) CONCURRENT WITH THE INITIAL UAE DECISION TO REJECT
THE F-16 TRAINING CASE, WE LEARNED THAT UAE HAD TABLED
THEIR DRAFT REQUEST TO ACQUIRE ATACMS/HIMARS. THIS
DECISION IS ALSO REPORTEDLY DUE TO THE COST OF THE WEAPON
SYSTEM AND WAS CONFIRMED IN A CONVERSATION BETWEEN DEPUTY
SECRETARY ARMITAGE AND MBZ ON 20 APRIL 2004. MEANWHILE, WE

SIPDIS
HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN A COMMITMENT ON SEVERAL OTHER
KEY FMS AND DCS PROGRAMS, INCLUDING THE AH-64 APACHE A-TO-D
REMANUFACTURE AND HARPOON. BOTH OF THESE LOAS EXPIRED
WITHOUT COMMENT FROM UAE. TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH UAE
PROPOSALS FOR SEVERAL OTHER LARGE, PENDING U.S.
ACQUISITIONS (SUCH AS SIGINT AIRCRAFT, ENHANCED SEA SPARROW
MISSILE, A LAND FORCES COMBAT TRAINING CENTER, AND REMOTE
SENSING),WE BELIEVE UAE MAY BE EITHER OVER-EXTENDED IN
THEIR DEFENSE BUDGET, OR THEY MAY HAVE REASSESED THEIR
DEFENSE PRIORITIES ENTIRELY. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO
UNDERSTAND UAE'S CURRENT AND FUTURE YEAR DEFENSE PRIORITIES
IN ORDER TO ASSIST THEM WITH AN INTEGRATED AND EXECUTABLE
ACQUISITION, OPERATIONS, AND MAINTENANCE PLAN. OBTAINING
SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING SHOULD BE A KEY CONSIDERATION FOR THE
UPCOMING JMC, TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER 2004.


27. (C) DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON, 10 - 12 MAY
2004, MBZ RAISED SEVERAL ISSUES THAT WE ARE WORKING TO
ADDRESS. DURING A MEETING WITH SECAF DR. ROCHE AND CSAF
GENERAL JUMPER, MBZ ASKED FOR AN UPDATE ON THE STATUS OF
LINK-16 RELEASE; EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN POSSIBLY
OBTAINING USAF A-10 ATTACK AIRCRAFT; AND REQUESTED AN
INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF USAF F-16 INSTRUCTOR PILOTS (IPS)
AND SENIOR MAINTENANCE NCOS OFFERED IN THE F-16 TRAINING
LOA (FROM TWO TO EIGHT IPS, AND FROM THREE TO THIRTY FIVE
NCOS). IN A SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH SECDEF, MBZ ALSO ASKED
FOR AN UPDATE ON THE STATUS OF THE UAE REQUEST TO OBTAIN
PREDATOR UAVS, AND REQUESTED AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF
UAE SLOTS AT NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, FROM ONE TO TWO.
SAF/IA WILL LEAD A TEAM TO ABU DHABI TO BRIEF MBZ ON LINK-
16, A-10S, F-16 SUPPORT PERSONNEL, AND PREDATOR, ON 26 JUNE

2004. OSD (P) IS STAFFING A RESPONSE TO INCREASE THE NDU
AUTHORIZATIONS, AND WE ANTICIPATE AN ANSWER ON THAT ISSUE
AT ANY TIME.


28. (S) UAE STRONGLY DESIRES U.S. SUPPORT FOR REMOTE
SENSING DATA, SYSTEMS, AND PRODUCTS. THEY HAVE REQUESTED A
DEDICATED TURNKEY COMMERCIAL REMOTE SENSING SATELLITE
SYSTEM, WITH AN OPTION TO LEASE. WITH THE PURCHASE OF F-16
BLOCK-60S, UAE PARTICULARLY WANTS TO ENSURE COMPATIBILITY
FOR MISSION PLANNING AND INTELLIGENCE INFRASTRUCTURE
SUPPORT. SPECIFICALLY, THEY HAVE REQUESTED A SYSTEM WITH
PANCHROMATIC, MULTISPECTRAL, AND SYNTHETIC APERTURE RADAR
CAPABILITIES. PANCHROMATIC AND MULTISPECTRAL OPTIONS ARE
INCLUDED IN THE CURRENT INTERAGENCY-APPROVED NEGOTIATING
FRAMEWORK; SAR IS NOT. STATE/NON-PROLIFERATION LED
INTERAGENCY DISCUSSIONS WITH UAE IN SEPTEMBER 2003 TO
DISCUSS THE ISSUE. THE INTERAGENCY TEAM IS NOW CONSIDERING
OPTIONS THAT MAY BE OFFERED IN SUPPORT OF THE UAE REQUEST,
INCLUDING COMPETITIVE COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS, AND WE ARE
AWAITING GUIDANCE.


29. (S) UAE DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (DMI)
SUBMITTED A FORMAL LETTER OF REQUEST (1 MAY 2003) TO
PURCHASE TWO ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) AIRCRAFT (PROGRAM
ENTITLED CANDY APPLE). TO DATE, THE UAE REQUEST REMAINS IN
THE INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND RELEASE PROCESSES, AND OUR
INDICATIONS ARE THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT UAE WILL RECEIVE
APPROVAL FOR THE SYSTEM THEY REQUESTED. UAE IS ANXIOUS TO
PURSUE OFFERED FOREIGN ALTERNATIVES SHOULD AN EVENTUAL U.S.
RESPONSE BE UNFAVORABLE. WE RECENTLY LEARNED THAT THEY
HAVE TRANSFERRED ONE OF THEIR BOEING 737 AIRCRAFT FROM
EMIRI FLIGHT (DV SUPPORT) TO DMI, AND MAY BE IN
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FRENCH FIRM THALES TO CONVERT THE
AIRCRAFT TO A SIGINT PLATFORM.


30. (C) ON 20 APRIL 2004 DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE ASKED
MBZ IF UAE WAS STILL INTERESTED IN ATACMS. MBZ REPLIED
"YES, BUT WE ARE CONCERNED WITH THE COST," AND THAT ENDED
THE DISCUSSION. WE ARE AWARE THAT THE UAE RECENTLY TABLED
A DRAFT LETTER OF REQUEST TO PURCHASE ATACMS, DUE TO THE
COST OF THE WEAPON SYSTEM. MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, UAE HAS NOT
SIGNED THE ATACMS MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU),BUT
HAS FORMALLY OFFERED SEVERAL "SUGGESTIONS" FOR CHANGES.
MOST OF THESE SUGGESTIONS WOULD PROPERLY BE RESOLVED IN ANY
EVENTUAL LOA AND ARE IRRELEVANT TO THE MOU. HOWEVER, ON
THE ISSUES OF MISSILE ACCOUNTABILITY AND PHYSICAL
INVENTORY, THE UAE IS FIRMLY OPPOSED TO U.S. REQUIRMENTS
FOR END USE MONITORING AND HAS REJECTED THE PRINCIPLE
OUTRIGHT. THIS POSITION WOULD REQUIRE THE RENEGOTIATION OF
THE MOU TO REMOVE THE END USE MONITORING PROVISIONS, AND
THIS IS NOT LIKELY. WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO EXPLAIN THE U.S.
POLICY IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS: THIS WEAPON SYSTEM IS AMONG
OUR MOST SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND WE ARE ASKING THAT THE
UAE PROVIDE ASSURANCE THEY WILL PROTECT THE INHERENT
TECHNOLOGY JUST AS WE DO; THE ACCOUNTABILITY PROVISIONS OF
THE POLICY ARE NO DIFFERENT THAN THOSE WE APPLY TO OUR OWN
FORCES; THE UAE HAS NOT BEEN SINGLED-OUT FOR ANY UNIQUE
PROVISIONS AND THE POLICY APPLIES TO ALL OF OUR PARTNERS
WHO PURCHASE SUCH TECHNOLOGY; AND, THE INVENTORY
REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT AS OBTRUSIVE AS THE UAE MIGHT FEAR.
UNFORTUNATELY, WE REMAIN AT AN IMPASSE.


31. (C) WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED A NEAR IDENTICAL PROBLEM OF
ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONTROL ASSURANCES FOR A PROPOSED DIRECT
COMMERCIAL SALE OF NIGHT VISION DEVICES (NVDS),DUE TO A
RECENT CHANGE IN U.S. EXPORT POLICY. THE EMIRATIS,
ESPECIALLY LAND FORCES COMMANDER MAJ GEN SAEED MOHAMMED AL
RUMAITHY, HAVE VEHEMENTLY REJECTED ANY PROVISIONS THAT
WOULD PERMIT US TO INVENTORY THEIR NVDS AFTER THE SALE. HE
CITES THE FACT THAT UAE ALREADY POSSESSES THE EXACT SAME
NVDS UNDER A PREVIOUS SALE, WITH NO REQUIREMENT FOR
INVENTORY AND ACCOUNTABILITY.

32. (U) THE EMIRATIS REMAIN VERY CONCERNED BY CHANGES IN
U.S. VISA POLICIES SINCE 2001 AND HAVE FREQUENTLY VOICED
THEIR CONCERNS IN SENIOR-LEVEL MILITARY FORUMS. INCREASED
U.S. SECURITY MEASURES AND BACKGROUND CHECKS ARE
INTIMIDATING AND CONFUSING TO THE EMIRATIS. DESPITE OUR
BEST EFFORTS, THEY CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN
DENIED BONA FIDE MILITARY TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES, AND THEN
ASSESSED HUGE FMS MISSED-TRAINING PENALTY FEES, WHILE VISA
APPLICATIONS WERE EITHER DENIED OUTRIGHT OR HELD UP IN OUR
SEEMINGLY INSCRUTABLE PROCESS. THIS IS NOT THE CASE. IN
FACT, IN THE PAST TWO YEARS, THE EMIRATIS HAVE ONLY BEEN
PENALIZED FOR MISSED TRAINING ON TWO OCCASIONS. IN ONE
CASE THEY DID NOT PROVIDE A CANDIDATE FOR A RESERVED
MILITARY TRAINING COURSE AND THEN FAILED TO CANCEL THE
COURSE; AND IN THE SECOND CASE THEIR CANDIDATE APPLIED FOR
HIS VISA LESS THAN A WEEK PRIOR TO THE TRAINING, AND DID
NOT RECEIVE THE VISA IN TIME TO ATTEND THE COURSE. TOTAL
PENALTY FEES FOR BOTH CASES WERE LESS THAN $40K. WE HAVE
WORKED HARD TO ADDRESS EMIRATI CONCERNS REGARDING THE
LENGTH OF TIME AND THE UNCERTAINTY OF OBTAINING A U.S.
VISA. WE HAVE REASSURED THEM OF BOTH THE LEGITIMATE U.S.
HOMELAND SECURITY ISSUES AND THE VALUE OF THEIR TRAVEL TO
THE U.S. TO ATTEND MILITARY TRAINING AND CONFERENCES. WE
HAVE IMPLEMENTED A SYSTEM TO IDENTIFY THEIR TRAVEL
CANDIDATES EARLY, SCREEN THEIR APPLICATIONS AND WALK THEM
THROUGH THE CONSULAR PROCESS, AND WILL UNILATERALLY CANCEL
SCHEDULED TRAINING AT OR PRIOR TO THE PENALTY DATE IF THERE
IS NO QUALIFIED, READY-TO-TRAVEL CANDIDATE. WE HAVE BEEN
LARGELY SUCCESSFUL IN THIS EFFORT. OUR GREATEST CHALLENGE
NOW IS THE LINGERING "URBAN LEGEND" THAT A HIGH PERCENTAGE
OF VISA APPLICATIONS ARE REFUSED AND AN APPARENT CULTURAL
STIGMA THAT FAILURE TO OBTAIN A U.S. VISA DISHONORS THE
INTEGRITY OF THE APPLICANT.


33. (C) IN SUMMARY, WHILE WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED SOME SETBACKS
IN MANY MAJOR WEAPONS SALES, OUR MIL-TO-MIL RELATIONSHIP
REMAINS STRONG. A FULL DISCUSSION OF UAE SECURITY CONCERNS
AND PRIORITIES WILL PROVIDE US WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO
REFINE AND BETTER UNDERSTAND THE FUTURE OF OUR IMPORTANT,
STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP.

WAHBA