UAE OFFICIALS QUERY DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001344

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/RA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/09
TAGS: OVIP PGOV PREL ECON TC
SUBJECT: UAE OFFICIALS QUERY DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE ON
ARAB MEDIA, IRAQ, AND ISRAEL



1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba for
reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


2. (C) Summary: During his visit to Abu Dhabi April 20-21,
Deputy Secretary Armitage held wide-ranging discussions in
separate meetings with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Khalifa bin
Zayed Al-Nahyan, Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al-
Nahyan (MbZ),and UAE Foreign Minister Rashid Abdullah Al-
Nuami. The Dep Sec briefed his UAE interlocutors on events
in Iraq and asked them for their support in bringing Iraqi
Sunnis into the process. While supportive of the overall
U.S. objectives in Iraq, MbZ was critical of Washington's
handling of Arab media coverage of events in Iraq and the
recent U.S. statements on the Palestinian/Israeli issue.
The Emirati officials offered some suggestions on dealing
with the current ethnic and religious factions in Iraq, but
Rashid Abdullah warned that intervention by neighboring
countries (i.e. Iran) would be very dangerous. CP Khalifa
and MbZ made very clear that Israel's targeted killing of
Al Rantissi just days after Sharon met with President Bush
led many in the Arab world to believe that Tel Aviv had
received the "green light" from Washington to eliminate
Palestinian leadership. CP Khalifa said that the
President's statement on settlements and right of return
had put the UAE and other U.S. allies "in a very difficult
position." End summary.

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Media Not Playing A Helpful Role
--------------


3. (C) Foreign Minister Rashid Abdullah noted to Dep Sec
that the Arab media have been particularly unhelpful to the
situation in Iraq. MbZ also said that he disagreed with
the way Washington had handled media coverage of its
broader initiatives in the region, and noted that Al
Jazeera and Al Arabiyya were very dangerous media outlets,
in particular.


4. (C) MbZ admitted that his 16-year old son was
influenced by the misinformation on Al Jazeera. He said
that his son is intelligent -- a "straight A student" --
but recently had voiced some anti-Western opinions, which
MbZ believed were a result of watching too much Al Jazeera.
"If [Al Jazeera] can affect the grandson of a moderate
leader like Shaykh Zayed this way, imagine what it can do
to the uneducated or the lower classes."


5. (C) MbZ believes that Al Jazeera is the mouthpiece of
Al Qaida and that Al Arabiyya reflects the views of the
Muslim Brotherhood. He noted that the local security
service recently had discovered an armed wing of the
Brotherhood in the UAE (to be reported septel). He made
particular mention of the fact that an Al Jazeera crew was
allowed to film the ongoing battle in Fallujah and
resultant civilian casualties, and distorted events on the
ground.

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Suggestions For Iraq
--------------


6. (C) Foreign Minister Rashid Abdullah said that Iraq
always has been a problem for its neighbors -- Iraqi people
are fiercely nationalistic and often resort to violence as
a force for change. He said that the Gulf states are
reluctant to get involved in the forming of an Iraqi
Government because of the Iraqi people's resistance to
outside influence, including the Arab League. Rashid
Abdullah suggested that the USG try to harness the Iraqi
national pride -- find a strong Iraqi personality to lead
the country -- to surmount current religious and ethnic
factiousness.


7. (C) The Foreign Minister also expressed concern about
Iran's reported attempts to negotiate an agreement between
U.S. forces and Al Sadr supporters in Fallujah, and said
that the UAEG did not/not want Iran to play such a pivotal
role. He reiterated the UAEG's distrust toward Tehran, and
labeled any Iranian involvement in Iraq as "unhelpful and
very antagonistic."


8. (C) Referring specifically to the current U.S.
offensive in Fallujah, CP Khalifa noted that the people of
that town would resolve the stalemate on their own terms.
He suggested that U.S. negotiators seek out the tribal
leaders in Fallujah and reason with them to avoid more
civilian casualties. He was sure that the tribal leaders,
especially the educated elite, could be convinced that the
USG has good intentions in Iraq. CP Khalifa also expressed
his hope that the Iraqi people would listen to the wise
leaders already among them, and mentioned long-time adviser
to the Abu Dhabi ruling family, Adnan Pachachi, in
particular.

--------------
Support For Iraq's Sunnis
--------------


9. (C) Dep Sec asked his Emirati interlocutors if they
would encourage publicly the participation of all Iraqis --
particularly the Sunni -- in the future political process
of Iraq. Foreign Minister Rashid Abdullah noted that the
UAEG could make a public statement to that affect, but the
United States would have to make sure that Sunnis really do
play a larger role in the governing of Iraq. CP Khalifa
demurred and explained that the UAEG heretofore had been
very careful not to be viewed as supporting the Sunni at
the expense of the Shia in Iraq. While he privately
encouraged the appointment of more Sunni to key
governmental positions, he said that they would consider
carefully how to word a statement that could help without
offending any of the parties. (Note: The following day, a
statement from CP Khalifa appeared in all the Arabic and
English language dailies; quote, "All the people of Iraq
should be viewed as a single integrated entity for the
stake of stability and security, and to allow Iraqis to
pool their resources toward the development of their
country." End note.)

--------------
Al Rantissi Assassination An "Embarrassment"
--------------


10. (C) CP Khalifa and MbZ privately told the Dep Sec of
their dismay about the recent assassination of Dr. Abdul
Aziz Al Rantissi. MbZ said that UAEG considers the United
States a friend and an ally, but the assassination on the
heels of Sharon's visit to the White House "could not have
been a worse scenario" for the United States and its
allies. CP Khalifa said, "it looked as though President
Bush gave Sharon the green light." Dep Sec told them that
the USG did not and does not give "green lights." CP
Khalifa added that the President's statement on settlements
and right of return just two days after President Mubarak's
meetings in Texas was very damaging to Mubarak and put him
and other moderate Arab leaders "in a very difficult
position" domestically. Such statements, according to CP
Khalifa, "take us back, instead of moving us forward."


11. (U) This cable was coordinated with D's staff.


12. (U) CPA minimize considered.

Wahba