Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ZAGREB2453
2003-11-20 12:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Zagreb
Cable title:  

CROATIA'S ELECTIONS: ANOTHER IMPORTANT STEP

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL HR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 002453 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2013
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL HR
SUBJECT: CROATIA'S ELECTIONS: ANOTHER IMPORTANT STEP

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph Frank, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 002453

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2013
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL HR
SUBJECT: CROATIA'S ELECTIONS: ANOTHER IMPORTANT STEP

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph Frank, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Voters head to the polls this Sunday, November 23, in
what will probably be the closest general election in
Croatia's short history. The only result we're ready to
predict is that the overwhelming majority of voters will cast
ballots for candidates who back integration into
Euro-Atlantic institutions and favor continued economic
reform. But regardless of whether the right or left wins,
the next government will be a coalition which will include
parties which do not fully share that consensus. That means
that Croatia's next government -- no matter how positive its
intentions -- could have many of the characteristics we found
most exasperating in its predecessor. All expectations are
that the poll will be carried out properly and that
preliminary, unofficial results should be available by the
end of election day. End summary.


2. (C) In Croatia's last general election nearly four years
ago, voters were faced with clear choices: isolation or
Europe, stagnation or reform. When they return to the polls
this Sunday, their options -- as they have been presented --
are far less distinct. Both PM Racan's SDP and Ivo Sanader's
HDZ have pledged to continue to lead Croatia toward
integration in the EU and NATO, even if it means making
unpopular choices, like cooperation with ICTY and
accommodating the return of Serb refugees. Both claim that
they will continue to move forward with economic reforms,
although both will probably have to step back from a few
populist campaign promises.


3. (C) Perhaps the most important achievement of the past
three years is the emergence of this solid consensus among
the majority of voters as to where Croatia should be going.
No matter what the outcome, our initial post-election
response should be to welcome voters' affirmation of
Croatia's European vocation -- and all the reforms that
entails -- and to encourage the next government to make
faster progress toward this goal.


4. (C) Observers here continue to predict that this election
will be the closest in Croatia's short history. But it is
clear that neither the HDZ nor the SDP will win enough seats

to form a government on its own. That means they will have
to reach out to parties which do not fully share this
mainstream, pro-Europe, pro-reform consensus. There are also
serious questions about whether the HDZ's commitment to this
consensus is anything more than a respectable facade
concealing the nationalist, corrupt elements still strong in
Sanader's HDZ. Certainly, the HDZ leadership has significant
reservations about full cooperation with the ICTY.


5. (C) All polls indicate that the HDZ will be the single
largest party in the next parliament. To assemble the
additional votes needed for a center-right government to come
to power, Sanader will look first to the HSLS/DC as a
coalition partner. While the leaders of this coalition have
made pro-Europe noises, HSLS leaders have made it clear that
unconditional cooperation with The Hague War Crimes Tribunal
is a price they are not willing to pay to get to Europe. If
Sanader needs to reach beyond the HSLS/DC, he will have to
engage with the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP),an extreme
right-wing party which still carries historical baggage from
Croatia's WWII-era fascist state.


6. (C) For a center-left government to return to power,
Racan's SDP can rely on the progressive Croatian People's
Party (HNS) as a solid partner which shares the mainstream
consensus. They should also be able to count on the support
of most of the eight parliamentary seats which by law are
allotted to Croatia's many ethnic minorities. But even in
their most optimistic election scenarios, this grouping will
need help from the Croatian Peasants' Party (HSS). While the
HSS shares the goal of membership in the EU, its leadership
claims it will oppose some economic reforms (like
privatization) and are arguing for a stronger state role in
directing the economy.


7. (C) In January of 2000, the coalition led by Racan's SDP
came to power with only a single shared goal: get rid of
Tudjman's HDZ. Lack of consensus within that coalition often
meant the Government was paralyzed and conflicted every time
it faced a tough decision. Unfortunately, the likely lack of
consensus within either of the lineups expected to succeed
after Sunday's poll will produce either an unstable
government or -- more likely -- one that, like its
predecessor, seems indecisive and misses key opportunities.
The only formula that seemed to work for the previous
Government was to move slowly, blame tough choices on
external factors and logroll coalition partners which would
otherwise block progress. We should expect to see some of
this behavior in the next government as well. In practical

terms, that means major policy changes will be difficult to
achieve. Issues that would require a two-thirds majority --
like deploying troops to Iraq -- will be a tough sell for any
government.


8. (C) We expect at least preliminary results to be
available late on election day, November 23. Final results
may not be published for a few days, but because the process
of tabulating results in Croatia has in the past been so
transparent, reliable results of parallel vote counts
conducted by NGO's and party observers will likely be
available by November 25.


9. (C) The next step after elections is up to President
Mesic. The leader of the party which gets the most votes is
not automatically given first chance to form a coalition
government. Croatia's constitution grants the president a
high degree of flexibility in identifying who should make the
first attempt at forming a government. Mesic will grant this
mandate to the leader of whichever grouping convinces him
that they have the votes in the new parliament to form a
government. That individual will then have thirty days to
form a government and receive a vote of confidence in the new
Sabor.
FRANK


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