Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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03ZAGREB1887 | 2003-08-29 15:26:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Zagreb |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. |
C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 001887 |
1. (C): With the political class returning from the Dalmatian coast, the Ambassador had separate tour d'horizon meetings this week with Foreign Minister Picula, Deputy Foreign Minister Simonovic, and Croatian Ambassador to the U.S. Grdesic to re-energize work on some key issues that have lain largely dormant over the summer vacation season. FM Picula said he has given his staff a two week deadline to develop a serious proposal on an Article 98 agreement, as he understands a meeting at the Department around his UN UNGA visit will depend on real progress in this key area. The Ambassador stressed that we needed to see concrete, positive steps on this issue to help steer the bilateral relationship back on track. 2. (C) FM Picula said that the GoC wants to use the planned visit of a U.S. Navy ship to the BiH port of Neum in September to show that Croatia can work with the U.S. The Ambassador stated bluntly that the real measure of Croatian cooperation with the ICTY will be General Ante Gotovina's transfer to The Hague. On refugee returns, the GoC must work to harmonize its statistics with its neighbors' and the international community's so that we can have a clear understanding of what kind of progress has been achieved. Picula said that Croatia was trying to build more cooperative relations with BiH and Slovenia, but the GOC's initiatives were being spun the wrong way in the Slovenian and BiH press. END SUMMARY. ARTICLE 98 -------------------------- 3. (C) The Ambassador met with Deputy Foreign Minister Simonovic on August 26 and with Foreign Minister Picula and Croatian Ambassador to the U.S. Grdesic (separately) on August 27. The Ambassador's calls were simultaneous to a flurry of press reporting suggesting that Croatia had made a new offer to the U.S. on Article 98. DFM Simonovic clarified that the GoC's approach was still the same. Croatia could accept an agreement where the U.S. agrees to start some form of U.S. investigative or judicial proceeding against an accused person which would allow Croatia to halt extradition of that individual to the ICC. Simonovic said further expert level discussions could work out what phase or what kind of U.S. process would be needed to satisfy Croatian legal concerns. Subsequently, FM Picula told the Ambassador that he had charged his experts with coming up with a new, creative proposal in the next two weeks. 4. (C) The Ambassador commented to Picula that Croatia's position on the Article 98 issue and the Iraq war remained prominent in Washington's thinking about the U.S.-Croatia relationship. The GoC would need to take a series of steps to change this thinking and get the bilateral relationship moving forward. He cautioned Picula that U.S. views on Article 98 were clear and had not changed, and it would be important for the GoC to present to the U.S. a meaningful proposal. 5. (C) Picula asked where discussions on Article 98 stood with the EU, as their position was key. The GoC is under the impression that the UK and Italy are pushing the EU to bring forward a position that would permit members to conclude Article 98 agreements with the U.S. Such a move would facilitate Croatia,s efforts to conclude an Article 98 agreement. The Ambassador commented that Croatia would have to come to its own decision on an Article 98 agreement in the context of its relationship with the EU, but noted that it was hard to believe that this single issue could decide Croatia's membership prospects, particularly when other countries seeking EU membership had signed Article 98 agreements with the U.S. NEUM SHIP VISIT -------------------------- 6. (C) The Ambassador stressed in all his meetings that by clearly demonstrating its support for the U.S. Navy ship visit to the BiH port of Neum, Croatia can help steer the U.S.-Croatia relationship back on track. FM Picula said the GoC was ready to support the ship visit, and and asked that the U.S. request for specific GoC assistance to support the ship visit be conveyed in writing. DFM Simonovic told the Ambassador that the GoC was satisfied with the BiH dipnote (generated by the GoBiH subsequent to reftel) requesting assistance for the U.S. ship visit. (COMMENT: Given the lack of BiH maritime infrastructure or support services at Neum, Croatian support will be critical to the success of the ship visit. END COMMENT). IRAQ TROOP CONTRIBUTION -------------------------- 7. (C) Picula said that the MFA was working with the MoD to prepare the appropriate documentation for the Sabor to begin consideration of a Croatian contribution to coalition forces in Iraq. He said the decision document would be submitted to the Sabor for approval in the regular session beginning September 15. He predicted approval prior to parliamentary elections expected on November 23. Picula asked the Ambassador's assistance in lobbying for support of key Sabor deputies. Picula observed that a new UNSC resolution thought to be under consideration that would go beyond UNSCR 1500 would make the GoC political position easier. EU ACCESSION -------------------------- 8. (C) Simonovic noted that political conditionalities on EU membership will drive much of the next government's post-election actions, including cooperation with ICTY, refugee returns, and justice system improvements. He noted that the UK was being very tough on Croatia, making its approval of the EU SAA contingent on the surrender of General Ante Gotovina to the ICTY. Simonovic hoped that Prime Minister Racan's upcoming visit to London in September would help smooth out this problem and facilitate UK approval of the SAA. ICTY -------------------------- 9. (C) DFM Simonovic commented that the timing of the next ICTY indictments could affect the political situation in Croatia, but observed that the GoC would be able to handle it even if the announcement came before the elections. He asked if the international community's impression of GoC cooperation had changed. The ambassador warned bluntly that the international community's perception is that the GoC is not doing enough to capture Gotovina and transfer him to The Hague. That Gotovina could grant an interview with a leading Croatian weekly magazine and pose for photos for the cover made it hard for the international community to believe that Gotovina simply could not be found. The message to Gotovina must be clear that his only choice is to appear in The Hague. Anything else will hold up EU accession and just about everything else Croatia wants with the international community. Simonovic responded that the international community's perception of Croatia on this issue was "worse than I thought." REFUGEE RETURNS -------------------------- 10. (C) When asked about the international community's perception on refugee returns, the Ambassador observed that because of poor record keeping and a lack of agreement on definitions for categories of returnees made it imperative that the GoC get the basic issue of how to count returnees resolved with its neighbors and the international community. Until that happens, we would never be able to agree on what the remaining tasks are. Simonovic hoped that President Mesic's upcoming trip to Belgrade will help Croatia's image on this issue. The Ambassador responded that the international community is looking for measurable progress, and the consensus is that we are not there yet. RELATIONS WITH SLOVENIA -------------------------- 11. (C) Simonovic complained that relations with Slovenia are burdened by Slovenia's emotional approach to key issues like the GoC plan to declare an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). He noted that the Italians have the rational approach of wanting to preserve a sustainable fishery for their own fleet and are ready to talk about options, including an EEZ, to prevent non-European vessels from devastating the Adriatic fishery. Working with Slovenia was much more difficult as the GoS will not say directly what it wants and keeps linking an EEZ with the issue of access to the high seas. He admitted that poor GoC diplomacy had led to the initialed (but unratifiable) agreement on Piran Bay which, despite having no legal standing, had created political expectations in Slovenia and Croatia that were hard to overcome. Simonovic believes that arbitration may be the only long-run way to depoliticize and resolve the EEZ issue, as well as border delimitation and the Ljubljanska Banka issue. RELATIONS WITH BOSNIA -------------------------- 12. (C) Simonovic observed that the GoC was finally finding the right level of engagement with BiH and now believes it can play a positive role in Bosnia. However, he was unhappy how the corridor 5C roadway issue was developing. Simonovic commented that some in BiH are using this issue to claim the GoC is back to its old ways of meddling in BiH internal affairs. He feared the GoC response will be to become once again too "hands-off." Croatia was on the "side of the angels" on the 5C corridor; the real issue is that BiH authorities are letting the whole tendering process smell of corruption. FRANK NNNN |