UN/IRAQ: NO VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION; SUBDUED COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 USUN NEW YORK 000727

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2013
TAGS: PREL UNSC IZ
SUBJECT: UN/IRAQ: NO VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION; SUBDUED COUNCIL

REF: A. USUN 716

B. USUN 637

CLASSIFIED BY: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT; REASONS:
1.5 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: A SUBDUED SECURITY COUNCIL MET IN INFORMALS
ON MARCH 17 TO RECEIVE WORD THAT THE U.S., UK, AND SPAIN HAD
CHOSEN NOT TO BRING THEIR RESOLUTION TO A VOTE, BUT WOULD
INSTEAD "RESERVE THEIR RIGHT TO TAKE THEIR OWN STEPS TO
SECURE THE DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ." SYG ANNAN AND MOST COUNCIL
MEMBERS EXPRESSED SADNESS AND FRUSTRATION THAT A COMPROMISE
COULD NOT BE REACHED. UNMOVIC EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN BLIX
ANNOUNCED THE UNMOVIC WORK PROGRAM WITH ITS KEY REMAINING
DISARMAMENT TASKS (KRDTS) WOULD BE READY THE AFTERNOON OF
MARCH 17. ANNAN ANNOUNCED THE SUSPENSION OF ALL UN
OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL UN PERSONNEL.
RUSSIA, DRAWING FROM THE MARCH 15 RUSSIAN - FRENCH - GERMAN
DECLARATION (REF A),PUSHED FOR A COUNCIL MEETING ON
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19, TO DISCUSS APPROVAL OF THE WORK PROGRAM
AND KRDTS. MOST COUNCIL MEMBERS (EVEN THE THREE AFRICAN
STATES WHOSE FMS WILL BE IN NEW YORK ON TUESDAY, MARCH 18 FOR
AN UNRELATED MEETING) HEDGED ON MINISTERIAL ATTENDANCE. THE
RUSSIANS MAY CONTINUE TO PROBE FOR POTENTIALLY PROBLEMATIC
AREAS, BUT HAVE NOT AS YET SURFACED A RESOLUTION PUSHING FOR
THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ADOPT THE WORK PROGRAM. IN ADDITION,
RUSSIAN PERMREP LAVROV SEEMED RESIGNED TO THE REALITY OF THE
SITUATION, AND SOUGHT TO MINIMIZE DIFFERENCES, UNLIKE HIS
FRENCH AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES.


2. (C) GERMAN AND FRENCH PERMREPS BOTH PUSHED BACK ON THE
U.S. - UK - SPANISH EXPLANATION REGARDING THE DRAFT
RESOLUTION, ASSERTING THAT THE RESOLUTION WOULD NOT HAVE HAD
BACKING FROM THE MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL, AND MEXICAN PERMREP
AGUILAR-ZINSER OUTLINED (AGAIN) MEXICO'S POSITION THAT USE OF
FORCE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION WAS A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW. CHILE WAS ONLY SLIGHTLY LESS UNHELPFUL, ASSERTING THAT
INSPECTIONS WERE WORKING AND SHOULD BE CONTINUED; THE AFRICAN
STATES COLLECTIVELY WERE LESS CONTENTIOUS, FOCUSING INSTEAD
ON THE FAILURE OF THE COUNCIL TO ACHIEVE UNITY. FINALLY,
PAKISTANI PERMREP AKRAM CAREFULLY AVOIDED SAYING MUCH THAT
COULD BE INTERPRETED IN EITHER DIRECTION. COUNCIL MEMBERS ALL
STOOD BEHIND SYG ANNAN'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW UN PERSONNEL,
NOTING THAT THE DECISION WAS MADE IN THE INTEREST OF THEIR
SAFETY. LAVROV LAID A MARKER THAT THE COUNCIL DID NOT
"SUPPORT" THE SYG'S DECISION BUT RATHER "NOTED" IT, AS THE
PHRASEOLOGY TO BE USED IN ANY STATEMENT TO THE PRESS TO BE
MADE BY THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT (GUINEA). END SUMMARY.


UK: ACTION ON UNSCR IS OFF; IRAQ CAN STILL ACT
-------------- -


3. (C) AFTER ANNOUNCING TO THE PRESS THE CO-SPONSORS'
DECISION NOT TO CALL FOR A VOTE ON THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION
(REF B),UK PERMREP GREENSTOCK CONVEYED THE SAME MESSAGE IN
SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS. HE SPECIFIED THAT THE
CO-SPONSORS HAD NOT ACTUALLY WITHDRAWN IT AS HAD BEEN
MISREPORTED IN THE PRESS. HE REITERATED THAT THE RESOLUTION
REMAINS ON THE TABLE. GREENSTOCK SAID THE UK HAD HELD
INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS AND HAD CONCLUDED THAT COUNCIL
CONSENSUS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IN LINE WITH RESOLUTION 1441.
HE EXPLAINED THAT "ONE COUNTRY IN PARTICULAR HAS UNDERLINED
ITS INTENTION TO VETO ANY ULTIMATUM 'NO MATTER WHAT THE
CIRCUMSTANCES.'" GREENSTOCK CONTINUED THAT THAT COUNTRY
(NOTE: FRANCE. END NOTE.) "REJECTED OUR COMPROMISE PROPOSAL
BEFORE EVEN THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT ITSELF AND HAS PUT FORWARD
SUGGESTIONS THAT WOULD ROW BACK ON THE UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT OF
THE COUNCIL IN 1441 - THOSE SUGGESTIONS WOULD AMOUNT TO NO
ULTIMATUM, NO PRESSURE, AND NO DISARMAMENT." HE SAID THAT
"THE CO-SPONSORS RESERVE THEIR RIGHT TO TAKE THEIR OWN STEPS
TO SECURE THE DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ."


4. (C) GREENSTOCK SAID, IN THE VIEW OF HMG, IT WAS STILL
POSSIBLE FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN TO DEMONSTRATE HE HAD MADE THE
STRATEGIC DECISION TO DISARM AND CALLED FOR IRAQ TO TAKE THE
APPROPRIATE STEPS. HE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN UNMOVIC
PRESENTING ITS WORK PROGRAM AND KRDTS TO THE COUNCIL, SAYING
THAT THE UK WAS OPEN TO DISCUSSIONS ON ITS PROVISIONS.
GREENSTOCK WARNED THAT ANY PROGRESS ON THE WORK PROGRAM OR
THE KRDTS WAS PREDICATED ON OVERALL IRAQI COOPERATION. HE
SAID THAT THE UK ATTORNEY GENERAL HAD JUST RELEASED A RULING
ON THE LEGALITY OF ACTION AGAINST IRAQ AND THAT THE UK
MISSION WOULD DISTRIBUTE THAT RULING TO COUNCIL MEMBERS.
GREENSTOCK RESERVED THE UK'S POSITION ON ATTENDING THE
PROPOSED MINISTERIAL BUT, IN THE EVENT FS STRAW DID COME, HE
WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ARRIVE UNTIL WEDNESDAY.


U.S.: RESOLUTION IS OFF; UNMOVIC AND IAEA OUT
--------------


5. (C) AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE SUPPORTED GREENSTOCK'S
EXPLANATION OF ACTION ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. HE REGRETTED
THAT, IN THE FACE OF A CERTAIN VETO THREAT, THAT THERE WAS NO
PURPOSE IN PURSUING THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ANY FURTHER.


6. (C) AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE THEN EXPLAINED CALLS HE AND
OTHER USG OFFICIALS HAD MADE TO UNMOVIC AND THE IAEA ON MARCH
16, SAYING THAT THE U.S. HAD PROMISED THE UN THAT IT WOULD
PROVIDE ADVANCE WARNING WHEN IT WAS TIME TO WITHDRAW
INSPECTORS FROM IRAQ. HE SAID THE U.S. HAD ASKED THE WEAPONS
INSPECTORS TO TAKE "EXPEDITIOUS ACTION" TO SUSPEND THEIR
OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND TO REMOVE ALL PERSONNEL FROM THE
COUNTRY. AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE SAID THAT THE WARNING DID NOT
NECESSARILY MEAN THAT WAR WAS IMMINENT, BUT THAT THE U.S.
WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE FURTHER WARNINGS.


BLIX: WORK PROGRAM READY; DETAILS ON WORK
--------------


7. (C) UNMOVIC EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN BLIX EXPLAINED THAT COPIES
OF THE DRAFT WORK PROGRAM WOULD BE AVAILABLE IN THE AFTERNOON
OF MARCH 17. BLIX REVIEWED THE REQUIREMENTS BEHIND THE WORK
PROGRAM AND KRDTS, AND SAID THE "CLUSTER" DOCUMENT DELIVERED
ON MARCH 7 HAD OUTLINED THE RANGE OF DISARMAMENT ISSUES. THE
WORK PROGRAM WOULD CONTAIN 12 KEY REMAINING DISARMAMENT
TASKS, ALONG WITH DETAILS OF HOW UNMOVIC INTENDED TO GO ABOUT
ITS WORK.


8. (C) BLIX CONTRASTED THE KRDTS WITH VARIOUS COUNCIL
"BENCHMARK" PROPOSALS, SAYING THAT UNMOVIC DID NOT USE THE
TERM BENCHMARKS. BLIX THOUGHT THE VALUE OF BENCHMARKS, SUCH
AS THOSE PROPOSED LAST WEEK BY THE UK, RESIDED IN THEIR
ABILITY TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AMONG THOSE CONCERNED ABOUT
IRAQ'S WMD PROGRAMS. BLIX SAID UNMOVIC'S ROLE IN A
BENCHMARK-BASED EXERCISE WOULD BE TO REPORT BACK
ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN A GIVEN PERIOD OF TIME. HE ALSO CLARIFIED
THAT DISCUSSION OF A 120-DAY TIME PERIOD FOR UNMOVIC REFERRED
TO UNSCR 1284-BASED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, AND WAS NOT
NECESSARILY LINKED TO THE TIME IT WOULD TAKE TO DISARM IRAQ,
WHICH HE REPEATED WOULD TAKE "NOT DAYS, NOT YEARS, BUT
MONTHS."


9. (C) BLIX TOUCHED ON CHALLENGES IN ASSESSING PROGRESS IN
VARIOUS AREAS. MISSILES COULD BE VERIFIED AS THEY WERE
DESTROYED - HE NOTED THAT 70 OF THE AL-SAMOUD MISSILES HAD
BEEN DESTROYED SO FAR - AND THE REQUESTED DOCUMENTATION ON
UAVS SHOULD BE RELATIVELY EASY TO DELIVER. HOWEVER, IN THOSE
CASES WHERE THERE WAS A QUESTION OF WHETHER THE IRAQIS
ACTUALLY HAD A SYSTEM - E.G., ANTHRAX OR MOBILE CW OR BW LABS
- THE SITUATION WOULD BE MORE COMPLICATED. IF THE IRAQIS
ACTUALLY HAD THE SYSTEM, THEN IT SHOULD BE A RELATIVELY
STRAIGHTFORWARD TASK TO TURN THE ITEMS OVER. HOWEVER, IF THEY
DID NOT HAVE THE SYSTEMS, THEY WOULD FACE A FAR MORE
CHALLENGING TASK IN ASSEMBLING THE DOCUMENTATION PROVING THAT
THEY DID NOT HAVE, OR NEVER HAD, A PARTICULAR SYSTEM. BLIX
SAID THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN "PRO-ACTIVE" IN PROVIDING DOCUMENTS
RECENTLY ON VX AND ANTHRAX, BUT THAT HE AWAITED UNMOVIC'S
ANALYSIS BEFORE PRONOUNCING ON THE PAPERS THEMSELVES.


10. (C) BLIX NOTED THE CALLS FROM AMERICAN OFFICIALS URGING
UNMOVIC WITHDRAWAL, AND SAID HE WOULD WAIT FOR THE SYG'S
JUDGMENT.


SYG: UN OPERATIONS SUSPENDED; PERSONNEL OUT
--------------


11. (C) SYG ANNAN ANNOUNCED THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS:

-- ALL UN HUMANITARIAN PERSONNEL WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM
IRAQ. (NOTE: WHILE THE SYG DID NOT PROVIDE A TIMELINE, A
PARTICIPANT IN THE MEETING WHERE THE SYG MADE THE DECISION
SAID THE UN WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF 24 TO 48 HOURS. END
NOTE.)

-- WITHDRAWAL OF UN PERSONNEL FROM IRAQ WOULD INCLUDE
CONTRACTORS FROM COTECNA AND SAYBOLT (NOTE: AUTHENTICATORS
OF OFF DELIVERIES AND OVERSEERS OF OIL LOADINGS,
RESPECTIVELY. END NOTE.). IN ALL, THE NUMBER OF HUMANITARIAN
WORKERS WITHDRAWING WOULD TOTAL 195.

-- ANNAN SAID THE WITHDRAWAL OF UN STAFF WOULD LEAD TO THE
SUSPENSION OF OIL-FOR-FOOD, WHICH COULD NO LONGER OPERATE
WITHOUT PERSONNEL TO VERIFY OIL LIFTINGS OR OFF DELIVERIES
AND DISTRIBUTION.

-- THE SYG STRESSED THAT UN ACTION ON OFF WAS A SUSPENSION,
NOT A CANCELLATION, AS THE LATTER WOULD REQUIRE A UNSC
DECISION.

-- WEAPONS INSPECTIONS WOULD ALSO BE SUSPENDED, WITH 130
UNMOVIC AND 5 IAEA INSPECTORS BEING WITHDRAWN.

-- UNIKOM MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WOULD ALSO BE
INSTRUCTED TO WITHDRAW (MORE DETAILS SEPTEL).

-- THE SYG SAID A LETTER WOULD BE FORTHCOMING TO THE SECURITY
COUNCIL PRESIDENT, LISTING THESE STEPS AND EXPRESSING THE
NEED TO CONTINUE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.


RUSSIA: MOVE FORWARD PROGRAM OF WORK,
BUT NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE OFFERED
--------------


12. (C) RUSSIAN PERMREP LAVROV EXPLAINED THE PROPOSAL
CONTAINED IN THE MARCH 15 JOINT RUSSIAN - GERMAN - FRENCH
DECLARATION. HE STRESSED THAT THE DOCUMENT COULD "SPEAK FOR
ITSELF" SINCE INSPECTIONS WERE UNDERWAY AND YIELDING RESULTS.
IN CONTRAST TO THE AZORES STATEMENTS, RUSSIA "TAKES A
DIFFERENT APPROACH BASED ON CONCRETE FACTS, THAT INSPECTIONS
ARE WORKING;" IRAQ HAD TAKEN POSITIVE STEPS ON THE SUBSTANCE
OF THE REMAINING DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS. IN THAT CONTEXT,
LAVROV LOOKED FORWARD TO RECEIVING THE DRAFT WORK PROGRAM
LATER TODAY PER BLIX'S EARLIER PROMISE TO HAVE IT COMPLETED.
FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND GERMANY ALL BELIEVED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO
HOLD A MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL TO APPROVE THE WORK
PROGRAM, AND HE REQUESTED THAT THE COUNCIL SET A DATE SOON SO
THAT THE MINISTERIAL COULD TAKE PLACE, PREFERABLY EITHER
TUESDAY AFTERNOON ON WEDNESDAY MORNING, SINCE IT WAS "CLEAR
WE CAN'T DELAY."


FRANCE: MORE OF THE SAME, BUT YOU CAN'T BLAME FRANCE
-------------- --------------


13. (C) PERMREP DE LA SABLIERE SAID THAT HE HAD A "STRANGE
FEELING THIS MORNING, WHICH PERHAPS OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS
SHARED." HE HAD THOUGHT THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD BE DISCUSSING
THE POSSIBILITY OF PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT, "TO WHICH ALL ARE
DEDICATED," BUT "MUCH TO MY SURPRISE," HE HAD LEARNED
PUBLICLY THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION HAD BEEN "WITHDRAWN." OF
COURSE, THE CO-SPONSORS COULD DO AS THEY SEE FIT, BUT THE
COUNCIL SHOULD NOT HAVE LEARNED THAT THE RESOLUTION HAD BEEN
"WITHDRAWN" OUTSIDE A COUNCIL SETTING. UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES, WHEREBY THE INSPECTIONS WERE MAKING PROGRESS
TOWARDS ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT IN A "LIMITED
TIMEFRAME," FRANCE COULD NOT SUPPORT A PROPOSAL THAT
AUTHORIZED USE OF FORCE. WHILE THE CO-SPONSORS HAD "PUT
FORTH" THAT A PARTICULAR DELEGATION -- "I BELIEVE MINE" --
HAD MADE CLEAR IT WOULD OPPOSE A DRAFT AUTHORIZING THE USE OF
FORCE, THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WOULD NOT HAVE ACHIEVED A
MAJORITY VOTE; WITHOUT A MAJORITY, A "NO" VOTE DID NOT
CONSTITUTE A "VETO" UNDER THE CHARTER, HE STATED. THE
DISCUSSIONS HELD DURING THE LAST WEEK HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE
MAJORITY OF COUNCIL MEMBERS COULD NOT SUPPORT A RESOLUTION
AUTHORIZING THE USE OF FORCE, FOR THEY REMAINED COMMITTED TO
PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT.


14. (C) LA SABLIERE SAID THAT THE COUNCIL WAS COLLECTIVELY
RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS "BINDING" RESOLUTIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO
THE PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ. THE INSPECTORS WERE
TELLING THE COUNCIL THAT DISARMAMENT COULD BE ACHIEVED
PEACEFULLY, HE STRESSED. HE WAS THUS INTERESTED IN THE DRAFT
WORK PROGRAM AND KRDTS, WHICH HE BELIEVED SHOULD BE APPROVED
ON MARCH 19 AT A MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL AS
A FINAL COUNCIL DISCUSSION. THERE WAS CONVICTION IN THE
COUNCIL THAT BENCHMARKS, KRDTS, AND AN INSPECTOR-PROPOSED
TIMEFRAME OF ONE OR TWO MONTHS COULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR
EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION, WITHOUT THE AUTOMATICITY
"CONTEMPLATED BY SOME, BUT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT FOR THE
MAJORITY OF DELEGATIONS." THE USE OF FORCE WITHOUT COUNCIL
APPROVAL WAS NOT JUSTIFIED, GIVEN PROGRESS MADE IN
INSPECTIONS, HE REPEATED. THE COUNCIL COULD CONTINUE TO WORK
ON THE BASIS "DESIRED BY THE MAJORITY OF THE UN AND THE
PEOPLES OF THE WORLD." IN A SEPARATE INTERVENTION, LA
SABLIERE POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS NOT FOR THE COUNCIL TO
DECIDE THE WITHDRAWAL OF UN STAFF. HE PLACED FULL TRUST IN
THE SYG TO MAKE THE DECISION ON "TEMPORARY" WITHDRAWAL, BUT
NOTED THAT FRANCE WAS IN FAVOR CONTINUING INSPECTIONS.


CHINA: STILL NEED MAXIMUM EFFORT
--------------


15. (C) CHINESE PERMREP WANG STATED CHINA BELIEVED THAT AS
LONG AS THERE WAS ONE PERCENT HOPE, THE COUNCIL SHOULD MAKE
THE EFFORT TO CONTINUE INSPECTIONS. WANG SUPPORTED THE
FRENCH, RUSSIAN, AND GERMAN MARCH 15 JOINT STATEMENT AND
EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE MARCH 19 MINISTERIAL-LEVEL MEETING
TO DISCUSS THE INSPECTORS' WORK PROGRAM. HE NOTED THE
"WITHDRAWAL" OF THE CO-SPONSORS DRAFT RESOLUTION, AND
EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS GOOD IF THE DECISION INDICATED THAT
THERE WAS HOPE FOR CONSENSUS ON A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. IF
THIS DECISION SIGNIFIED A PATH TO WAR, THEN IT WAS "VERY
REGRETTABLE" BECAUSE CHINA BELIEVED THAT THE REALIZATION OF
PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT WAS STILL POSSIBLE. IT WAS IN THE
INTEREST OF ALL SIDES TO CONTINUE INSPECTIONS AND AVOID WAR.
ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF UN PERSONNEL FROM IRAQ, CHINA WAS ALSO
CONCERNED ABOUT THE SAFETY OF PERSONNEL, AND RESPECTED THE
SYG'S DECISION IN THAT REGARD.


GERMANY: ON TO 1284, CONSENSUS NOT EQUAL TO UNANIMITY
-------------- --------------


16. (C) GERMAN PERMREP PLEUGER AGREED WITH RUSSIAN PERMREP
LAVROV'S STATEMENTS REGARDING THE MARCH 15 JOINT DECLARATION.
HE STRESSED THAT GERMANY STILL BELIEVED THAT THE COUNCIL
COULD ACHIEVE THE GOAL OF PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT, AND THAT THE
"VAST MAJORITY OF SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS WANTED ANOTHER TRY
AT ACHIEVING PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT." CONSENSUS DOES NOT MEAN
UNANIMITY, HE STATED. PLEUGER EMPHASIZED THAT HE "COULD NOT
ACCEPT THAT THE COUNCIL CONSENSUS WAS NOT IN LINE WITH UNSCR
1441" AS POSITED BY THE CO-SPONSORS. ALL THOSE THAT WERE
OPPOSED TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION "WERE NOT OUTSIDE 1441." ON
THE CONTRARY, THESE MEMBERS WANTED PEACE BASED ON UNSCRS 1441
AND 1284. AT THIS POINT, IT WOULD NOT MAKE SENSE TO SUSPEND
INSPECTIONS, HE STRESSED. BLIX HAD PREPARED THE DRAFT WORK
PROGRAM AND THE KRDTS. MINISTERS COULD ACHIEVE CONSENSUS BY
MEETING TO APPROVE THESE PROPOSALS, WHICH WERE "NOT THAT
DIFFERENT" FROM THE UK BENCHMARKS. THE SYG WAS RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE SECURITY OF UN STAFF; THEREFORE, GERMANY WOULD
SUPPORT ANY DECISION HE MADE ON UN WITHDRAWAL.


SPAIN: 1441 IN ENTIRETY, CAN'T BE SELECTIVE
--------------


16. (C) SPANISH PERMREP ARIAS CONCURRED WITH AMBASSADOR
GREENSTOCK THAT THE CO-SPONSORS WOULD NOT PROCEED WITH THE
VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION. BASED ON UNSCR 1441, READ AS A
WHOLE, SPAIN HAD NOTED THAT IRAQ WAS IN MATERIAL BREACH.
SOME MEMBERS HAD NOT READ UNSCR 1441 AS A WHOLE, BUT HAD A
TENDENCY TO OMIT CERTAIN POINTS, FOR EXAMPLE, "ANY OMISSION
OR FALSEHOOD" OR "NOT FULL COOPERATION" WOULD RESULT IN A
MATERIAL BREACH. COUNCIL MEMBERS WERE PURSUING A DIFFICULT
PHILOSOPHY BECAUSE WITHOUT MILITARY PRESSURE, THE INSPECTORS
WOULD NOT BE IN IRAQ. MERE LANGUAGE WOULD NOT FUNCTION
WITHOUT AN ULTIMATUM. LA SABLIERE SUGGESTED THAT THE
CO-SPONSORS DID NOT HAVE THE MAJORITY OF VOTES. BUT WHETHER
OR NOT THIS WAS THE CASE, THE FRENCH DELEGATION SAID IT WOULD
VETO, AND THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE.


BULGARIA: SAD DAY FOR THE COUNCIL
--------------


17. (C) BULGARIAN PERMREP TAFROV STATED THAT IT WAS A "SAD
DAY FOR THE UN AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL, SAD THAT IT WAS
CLEARER THAN EVER THAT SECURITY COUNCIL DIVISIONS OVER THE
IRAQ CRISIS WERE INSURMOUNTABLE." BULGARIA HAD ADVOCATED
COUNCIL UNITY AND WAS CONCERNED OVER THE TREND IN THE COUNCIL
TOWARD TWO RIGID POSITIONS ON IRAQ. THIS SPLIT SHOULD NOT
HAVE DIVIDED THE COUNCIL ON ITS COMMON GOAL OF DISARMAMENT.
BULGARIA SUPPORTED THE UK PROPOSAL, BELIEVING THAT IT
PROVIDED THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF COMPROMISE FOR COUNCIL
UNITY. CERTAIN DELEGATIONS REJECTED THE PROPOSAL. THE
DIVISIONS IN THE COUNCIL LIKELY WOULD REMAIN FOR DAYS AND
EVEN WEEKS, BUT COUNCIL MEMBERS SHOULD NOT RESORT TO "MUTUAL
RECRIMINATION." DIFFERENCES IN THE COUNCIL WERE NOT
"INSURMOUNTABLE," AS LONG AS COUNCIL MEMBERS HAD THE
POLITICAL DETERMINATION TO TAKE "ONE LAST STEP." IN THE
FINAL ANALYSIS, BULGARIA WAS OPEN TO ANY PROPOSAL THAT COULD
RESTORE COUNCIL UNITY.


18. (C) FOR THE MOMENT, THE COUNCIL SHOULD FOCUS ON THE MAIN
ISSUE OF THE FUTURE OF THE UN AS AN "ESSENTIAL INSTITUTION
FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE VERY INCARNATION OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF MULTILATERALISM IN WORLD AFFAIRS." IT WAS
CRITICAL FOR THE COUNCIL TO RESTORE ITS CENTRAL ROLE ON THE
ISSUE OF IRAQ, AND CONTINUE DIALOGUE. THE COUNCIL, HOWEVER,
NEEDED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND
WITH REGARD TO THE SAFETY OF UN PERSONNEL. BULGARIA WOULD
HEED ADVICE ON UN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SYG AND THE CHIEF
INSPECTOR.


PAKISTAN: THE ART OF SAYING LITTLE
--------------


19. (C) IN WHAT HAS BECOME TYPICAL OF HIS INTERVENTIONS IN
THE COUNCIL ON THE SUBJECT OF IRAQ, PAKISTANI PERMREP AKRAM
CAUTIOUSLY AVOIDED MAKING CHOOSING SIDES IN THE DEBATE,
SAYING IT WAS CLEAR THE COUNCIL WAS AT AN IMPASSE. PAKISTAN
HAD SOUGHT "FULL AND FAITHFUL" IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCRS AS
THE SOLUTION TO IRAQ'S WMD, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO.
DISARMAMENT BY PEACEFUL MEANS HAD ALWAYS BEEN A STRONG
PREFERENCE. PAKISTAN HAVE ALSO BELIEVED IN THE UNITY OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL IN ACHIEVING THESE OBJECTIVES, BUT
UNFORTUNATELY THE COUNCIL HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIND
CONVERGENCE IN ANY OF THE PROPOSALS WHICH HAD BEEN TABLED BY
MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. THAT SAID, PAKISTAN BELIEVED THAT
TIME AND SPACE FOR DIPLOMACY DID NOT END, AND DIPLOMATIC
OPTIONS MUST CONTINUE TO BE EXPLORED IN ORDER TO FIND A
UNITED STAND. THE COUNCIL SHOULD RECEIVE THE PROGRAM OF WORK
WHILE CONTINUING TO URGE A RESPONSE FROM THE IRAQI
AUTHORITIES EVEN AT THIS LATE DATE.


CHILE, MEXICO: (TYPICALLY OF LATE) UNHELPFUL
--------------


20. (C) CHILEAN PERMREP VALDES AGREED THAT IT WAS A SAD DAY
FOR THE UNITED NATIONS, "GIVEN THAT THE INSPECTIONS ARE
STRENGTHENED AND MORE EFFECTIVE DAILY... THEY COULD HAVE
ACHIEVED THE DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ, AND CHANGED THE DYNAMIC
THERE," WHICH HE ASSERTED WOULD HAVE LED TO GREATER DEMOCRACY
IN IRAQ. CHILE REGRETTED THAT ITS PROPOSAL TO BRIDGE
DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE P-5 HAD BEEN REJECTED BEFORE IT WAS
FULLY CIRCULATED FOR CONSIDERATION. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE
NEED TO "MAINTAIN A CONSTRUCTIVE CLIMATE" IN THE COUNCIL, HE
WARNED MEMBERS AGAINST RECRIMINATIONS. CHILE SUPPORTED THE
PRESENTATION OF THE PROGRAM OF WORK, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS "NO
REASON" TO IGNORE THE SERIOUS SITUATION ON THE SECURITY OF
IRAQ AND THE SYG'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW UN PERSONNEL.


21. (C) MEXICAN PERMREP AGUILAR-ZINSER MADE A
CHARACTERISTICALLY LONG INTERVENTION, ECHOING PREVIOUS POINTS
MADE IN THE COUNCIL, OUTLINING MEXICO'S INTERPRETATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UN CHARTER. HE REGRETTED THAT
THERE HAD BEEN NO UNANIMOUS DECISION WHICH WOULD HAVE ALLOWED
THE COUNCIL TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ, AND,
RECALLING 1441, REGRETTED THAT THE CONCLUSION HAD NOT BEEN TO
SEEK A UNANIMOUS DECISION ON PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT. MEXICO
HAD CAREFULLY EXAMINED THE ARGUMENTS PUT FORTH BY THE U.S.,
UK AND SPAIN AS CO-SPONSORS OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION.
FURTHER, MEXICO SHARED BILATERAL COMMITMENTS THAT RELATED TO
COMMON SECURITY "WITH ONE CO-SPONSOR WITH WHOM WE SHARE
GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY AND POLICY GOALS;" MEXICO WOULD
DEFEND THE IMMEDIATE SPHERE OF SECURITY TOGETHER WITH THAT
PARTNER.


22. (C) WITH RESPECT TO THE DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ, HOWEVER,
MEXICO BASED ITS POSITION ON THE CONVICTION THAT ACTION
SHOULD BE TAKEN WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK WITH FULL
AUTONOMY AND INDEPENDENCE. WHILE MEXICO HAD NEITHER
"ARSENALS NOR STRATEGIC PROJECTS NOR FINANCIAL INTERESTS
GLOBALLY," ITS EXTERNAL POLICIES WERE FOUNDED ON THEIR
CONSTITUTION WHICH REGULATED ITS BEHAVIOR. PRESIDENT FOX HAD
SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCTED HIS FOREIGN MINISTER AND PERMREP TO
ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE MEXICAN
CONSTITUTION: ONE REQUIRED PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WITH FORCE
ONLY BROUGHT AT THE FINAL MOMENT, AND ANOTHER REQUIRED THAT
THE THREAT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED AS SUCH BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL
"AS THE SOLE BODY AUTHORIZED TO DECLARE THE USE OF SUCH
FORCE." HOPE WAS NOT YET EXHAUSTED, AND THUS "THERE WAS NO
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE USE OF FORCE IN DISARMING IRAQ." THE
PRECEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UN CHARTER SET FORTH
THE CONDITIONS FOR USE OF FORCE; MEXICO DID NOT SEE THAT
THOSE CONDITIONS HAD BEEN MET. THE SECURITY COUNCIL CANNOT
RELINQUISH AUTHORITY HERE, FOR MAJORITIES -- WHETHER OR NOT
UNANIMOUS -- ALSO HAVE THE AUTHORITY OF COLLECTIVE WILL.
SADDAM HUSSEIN MUST DISARM, MUST ABIDE BY THE RELEVANT
UNSCRS, AND CANNOT THREATEN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.
IN THAT CONTEXT, MEXICO SUPPORTED THE DRAFT PROGRAM OF WORK,
WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A STANDARD TO DISARMAMENT EFFORTS, HE
CONCLUDED.


ANGOLA, CAMEROON, GUINEA: REGRETFUL,
BUT STILL TINGED WITH HOPE
--------------


23. (C) ANGOLAN PERMREP GASPAR-MARTINS SAID THAT THE BLIX AND
EL-BARADEI REPORTS TO THE COUNCIL HAD MADE CLEAR THAT
INSPECTIONS WERE PRODUCING SOME RESULTS IN THE ATTEMPT TO
DISARM IRAQ, BUT THOSE RESULTS WERE NOT SATISFACTORY TO EVERY
MEMBER. ALTHOUGH ALL PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS HAD TO BE EXHAUSTED
BEFORE MOVING TO WAR, THAT SEEMED TO BE THE SITUATION FACING
THE COUNCIL. IN THAT CONTEXT, HE PAID TRIBUTE TO THE MOST
RECENT UK EFFORT, BUT "EVEN THAT" DID NOT WORK. WAR CAUSED
UNTOLD SUFFERING, AND IF THE COUNCIL COULD AVOID A DECISION
HAVING TO UPHOLD WAR, IT SHOULD DO SO. ON A PRACTICAL NOTE,
GASPAR-MARTINS SUGGESTED THAT SOME TIME SHOULD ELAPSE BEFORE
HOLDING ANOTHER MINISTERIAL MEETING, "TO LET THINGS CALM
DOWN." IF GOVERNMENTS MIGHT BE CONVINCED OF MOVING FORWARD
ON THE DRAFT PROGRAM OF WORK WITH THE FULL COMMITMENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL, HOWEVER, THEN THE ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO
DO SO.


24. (C) CAMEROONIAN PERMREP BELINGA-EBOUTOU AGREED THAT THE
COUNCIL WAS FORCED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE LIMITS OF DIPLOMACY IN
MANAGING THE IRAQI CRISIS. DESPITE THE DRAMATIC EVENTS OF
THE PREVIOUS 48 HOURS IN THE CAR, THE COUNCIL HAD NOT
REGISTERED THAT CRISIS; THIS SIMPLE FACT SUPPORTED HIS
ASSERTION. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE COUNCIL'S DISUNITY WAS A
"DISSERVICE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND MULTILATERALISM," AND
APPEALED FOR THE P-5 TO CAUCUS AND SORT OUT THEIR
DIFFERENCES. THE SIX HAD PROPOSED ELEMENTS FOR A
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT THAT HAD BEEN REJECTED, BUT WHICH
REMAINED ON THE TABLE. HE CONCLUDED THAT "A MIRACLE" COULD
NOT YET BE RULED OUT.


25. (C) GUINEAN PERMREP TRAORE, COUNCIL PRESIDENT FOR MARCH,
SAID THAT GUINEA HAD SPARED NO EFFORT TO FIND A COMPROMISE
THAT WOULD BE HEAL THE DEADLOCK IN THE COUNCIL. HOWEVER, THE
FRENCH - GERMAN - RUSSIAN DECLARATION OF MARCH 15 AND THE
AZORES SUMMIT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE COUNCIL WAS "MORE DIVIDED
THAN EVER." ALL WILL LOSE WITHOUT SOME COMPROMISE, HE
WARNED; HE HOPED SOME COMPROMISE SOLUTION COULD STILL BE
FOUND.


SYRIA: DEADLOCK
--------------


26. (C) SYRIAN PERMREP WEHBE SAID THAT THE COUNCIL HAD "TRULY
REACHED A STATE OF COMPLETE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN
IRAQ," WITH THE U.S. INFORMING UNMOVIC AND THE IAEA TO
EVACUATE, THE INSPECTORS' WITHDRAWAL, AND THE STATEMENTS MADE
IN THE AZORES. THE COUNCIL HAD REACHED DEADLOCK, BUT THERE
WAS STILL ANOTHER COURSE: THE PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ.
THE COUNCIL AGREED UNDER UNSCR 1441 THAT THE AIMS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD BE TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL
DISARMAMENT. UNSCRS 1284 AND 1441 ESTABLISHED UNMOVIC AND
REINFORCED THE INSPECTIONS SYSTEM. IRAQ WAS COOPERATING ON
PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANCE; IT MADE POSITIVE EFFORTS TO DESTROY
WEAPONS, AND HAD PRODUCED REPORTS ON ANTHRAX AND VX. NOW THE
COUNCIL HAD "GREATER DETERMINATION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR WORK
UNDER 1441" AND CONTINUED COUNCIL UNITY BECAUSE THE
INSPECTORS WERE READY TO PRESENT A WORK PROGRAM AND KRDTS.
WEHBE SUPPORTED LAVROV'S PROPOSAL TO HEAR THE WORK PROGRAM ON
MARCH 19 TO "LEAD TOWARDS ADDITIONAL PEACEFUL ACTION."


NEGROPONTE