Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03THEHAGUE3175
2003-12-24 10:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR

Tags:  PARM PREL CWC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 003175 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR CHUPA
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/24/2013
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR
WEEK ENDING DECEMBER 24

REF: THE HAGUE 2944 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Pete Ito, U.S. Delegation to the OPCW. Reasons: 1.5 (B,
D)

This is CWC-138-03.

--------------------------------------------- ------
TOUR D'HORIZON WITH CHINESE AND KOREAN COUNTERPARTS
--------------------------------------------- ------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 003175

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR CHUPA
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/24/2013
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR
WEEK ENDING DECEMBER 24

REF: THE HAGUE 2944 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Pete Ito, U.S. Delegation to the OPCW. Reasons: 1.5 (B,
D)

This is CWC-138-03.

-------------- --------------
TOUR D'HORIZON WITH CHINESE AND KOREAN COUNTERPARTS
-------------- --------------


1. (U) Deloffs exchanged views with Chinese counterparts Yu
Dunhai and Dai Huaicheng on OPCW activities, nonproliferation
issues, and CW destruction over lunch on December 23.
Separate conversations with Korean First Secretary Lee Sang
Soo and others covered much of the same ground.


2. (U) The Chinese said they share the Western Group's desire
to increase the efficiency of Executive Council activities.
Yu voiced support for reducing the number of EC sessions,
working the agenda in advance to decide which issues are ripe
for decision, and considering ways to encourage
consensus-building -- such as pressuring States Parties to
explain their objections clearly and early when they do not
join consensus, to allow those objections to be addressed and
overcome. We agreed that there was widespread support for
those ideas, but pointed out that ECs were useful not only
for the decisions and recommendations they produced, but also
for prompting the Secretariat and States Parties to focus
attention on the OPCW agenda and maintain momentum that might
otherwise be lost. Deloffs also summarized for the Chinese
some of the other proposals that had emerged from the WEOG's
discussions with Secretariat officials (see paras 9-12).


3. (U) Yu, a member of the Advisory Board on Administrative
and Financial issues (ABAF),voiced support for expansion of
the Working Capital Fund to improve cash flow problems
associated with Article IV and V inspections. He commented
that in informal consultations on the subject some
delegations had called for stronger incentives for possessor
states to make timely repayment for Article IV and V
inspection expenses. We assured Yu that the USG also wanted
to find a structural solution to Article IV/V payments and
was studying the ABAF proposal, but wanted to ensure that a

higher cap on the WCF was justified and that this solution
would not violate the principle that surplus funds should be
returned to States Parties. The ROK's Lee, another ABAF
participant, also expressed support for the WCF proposal.


4. (U) Asked for views on how best to move forward on Article
XI, Yu said the U.S. should work with Iran to address its
determination to introduce an International Cooperation
Committee and to circumvent the AG process, but agreed that
these issues should not be allowed to block progress on the
broader goals of Article XI. Noting that the facilitator
might soon step down, Yu said that he and his Chinese
colleagues were reluctant to serve as facilitators due to
language difficulties, commenting that good facilitators
often have mastery of the language (noting Matthews on
Article VII as an example).


5. (U) On Universality, Lee told us that the ROK would
consult with Japanese and Chinese counterparts about their
views on Regional or Sub-Regional Points of Contact, but no
meeting has yet been set up. So far, neither Beijing nor
Seoul has responded to their delegations or the TS on serving
as POC. From our soundings, it appears that both want to go
slow on the DPRK but are interested in playing a helpful, but
informal role in Southeast Asia. So far, only the Japanese
seem likely to take on the formal role of POC. Meanwhile, on
December 19, the TS notified SPs that an informal meeting on
the Universality Action Plan will be held on January 13 (not
January 8, as earlier proposed) to discuss activities the
POCs may undertake. (The note was faxed to AC/CB.)

--------------
LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, AND PSI
--------------


6. (C) Lee praised the U.S. role in obtaining Libya's
commitment to rid itself of WMD. He has been instructed to
seek further details from us and from OPCW about what is
known of the Libyan CW program, and specifically any
connection it may have with North Korea. He added that his
Ministry has been briefed by AmEmbassy Seoul on the issue
(State 345870) and was seeking further details. The Chinese,
for their part, reiterated support for Libya's accession to
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).


7. (C) Asked what approaches the PRC had made to North Korea
on proliferation, Yu said that that China had raised
accession to the CWC with the DPRK two years previously, but
since the nuclear issue was again looming larger on the
regional and bilateral agenda, the PRC did not consider it a
propitious time to raise the CW issue. Asked whether the PRC
supported the Proliferation Security Initiative, Dai
confessed that the Chinese still had "some concerns" about
PSI. We responded to specific questions about the countries
involved and the nature of the initiative, drawing on
standing guidance. The following day, we provided them with
a non-paper (drawn from State 333924) and a subsequent Press
Release from the Department on PSI developments.


8. (U) On nonproliferation and export controls, Dunhai
explained that the PRC's recently-released nonproliferation
paper was the result of years of work by a new generation of
administrative staff at the Foreign Ministry, who were more
"forward-leaning and progressive" than longer-serving members
of the Chinese bureaucracy. Dai acknowledged that although
export controls had been administratively put in place,
End-User Certificates and border and port verifications were
proving difficult to implement. He insisted that China is
committed to staying in step with Australia Group (AG)
material and technology transfer controls.

--------------
MORE EFFICIENT EC MEETINGS
--------------


9. (U) On Dec. 16, Director for Policy Making Organs Sylwin
Gizowski hosted a gathering of some 15 delegations to discuss
improvements to the work of the Executive Council, a topic he
had addressed earlier with the WEOG (REF). Gizowski
emphasized that he wanted input on broader issues regarding
how the EC should organize its work for the year, as well as
concrete measures to improve efficiency at EC sessions. On
the latter issue, Gizowski readily admitted that the work of
the Technical Secretariat in providing documents in a timely
manner was not acceptable, and pledged that it would work to
do better.


10. (U) With regard to broader ideas, the Swiss delegate
said there should be consideration of whether more EC
meetings necessarily would lead to more efficiency or
productivity. The U.S. Del representative emphasized that EC
sessions were key events that drove decisions. However,
there was general agreement on the need to better structure
work for EC meetings. For instance, there seemed to be
general agreement that it would be beneficial to have the EC
(at the beginning of the year or the beginning of an EC
Presidency) lay out the specific issues that would be
targeted for decision at specific EC sessions. While the
German delegate questioned whether such deadlines would be
realistic, the consensus seemed to be that it would focus
attention and energy. Even if the deadlines slipped due to a
lack of consensus, at least the effort would have been
optimized. The current process of simply rolling all
unresolved topics over to the next EC only ensured that there
was no prioritization of work.


11. (U) In an interesting exchange, the U.S. and Russian
delegation members acknowledged that it would be beneficial
to coordinate closely with the Chairman to avoid the
time-consuming ritual of publicly deferring items for later
in the EC session on which there was disagreement. Gizowski
and others noted that this would certainly be a good idea and
would be appreciated by other delegations. He added,
however, that delegates had told him that the discussion at
EC-35 on U.S. (Aberdeen) and Russian facilities was one of
the most interesting and useful exchanges at recent EC
sessions. Gizowski and others thought that selection of
appropriate topics for such full briefing and discussion
might be worthwhile for future EC sessions.


12. (U) Finally, there was also discussion, but no clear
consensus, on the idea of changing the term of the EC
Chairmanship so that it is in sync with the Conference
Chairmanship. Gizowski concluded by commenting that the
effort to make EC sessions more productive would remain a
continuing work in progress, and said the TS would welcome
comments and suggestions from delegations on measures to
improve efficiency.


13. (U) Ito sends.
RUSSEL