Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03THEHAGUE3087
2003-12-16 16:16:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

NETHERLANDS: 2003 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

Tags:  PTER PREL NL 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 003087 

SIPDIS


S/CT FOR REAP, EUR, EUR/UBI, D/HS, INL
JUSTICE FOR OIA - JFRIEDMAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER PREL NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: 2003 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: (A) STATE 301352; (B) THE HAGUE 1859
(C) 02 THE HAGUE 3302

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 003087

SIPDIS


S/CT FOR REAP, EUR, EUR/UBI, D/HS, INL
JUSTICE FOR OIA - JFRIEDMAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER PREL NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: 2003 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: (A) STATE 301352; (B) THE HAGUE 1859
(C) 02 THE HAGUE 3302


1. The 2003 terrorism report for the Netherlands follows.
Responses are keyed to reftel A's requirements.


A. SUPPORT TO GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST TERRORISM
-------------- --------------

2. Immediately following 9/11, the Dutch government
announced a 46-point Plan of Action for combating terrorism
and promoting security (reftels B & C). The plan is
gradually being implemented. Recently, its sixth updated
version was published. In addition to the Plan of Action,
Justice Minister Donner released a report in June 2003 on
"Terrorism and the Protection of Society," in which he
announced measures to deal more effectively with terrorist
activities. According to Donner, the terrorist threat
within the Netherlands is serious and "anything but
temporary or simple." These measures are meant to improve
the legal infrastructure for combating terrorism
domestically as well as intensify international cooperation.


3. The bill on terrorist crimes, called for in the Plan of
Action, was submitted to the Second Chamber of Parliament in
July 2002. The bill implements obligations resulting from
the EU framework decision on combating terrorism. Under the
bill, membership of a terrorist organization will be made a
separate offense. The maximum prison sentences for
offenses, such as manslaughter, gross maltreatment,
hijacking or kidnapping are to be higher if committed with
"terrorist intent." The maximum sentence will be raised to
20 years' imprisonment. The sentence for participating in a
terrorist organization will be 8 years, while the leaders
can get a 15-year sentence.


4. Following his June 2003 report, Justice Minister Donner
submitted two amendments to the bill on terrorist crimes in
August 2003 (reftel B). The first amendment makes
recruitment for the jihad punishable under Article 205 of
the Criminal Code. It reads that "the recruitment for the
armed fight will be penalized even if it is not yet clear
whether the recruited person is willing to contribute to the
armed fight in an organized context." The maximum penalty
will be raised from one to four years. Under the second
amendment, conspiracy with the object of committing
terrorist crimes will be a separate criminal offense with a

maximum sentence of 10 years. According to the Justice
Ministry, this is intended to "facilitate criminal law
action against terrorist networks and movements operating in
loose and varying collaborations." For a conspiracy
conviction, one must prove that two or more persons
(including the suspect) have agreed to commit terrorist
crimes. Such an agreement may be deduced from statements by
the persons having made the agreement, but may also be
demonstrated by statements made by witnesses or telephone
taps. The agreement itself need not be implemented yet.


5. After extensive debate, the Second Chamber of Parliament
approved the government's July 2002 bill on terrorist crimes
and August 2003 amendments on Dec. 9. The Chamber increased
the maximum sentence provisions for leaders of terrorist
organizations (from the 15 years proposed to life
imprisonment) and for participation in a terrorist
organization (from the 8 years proposed to 15 years). The
package now goes to the First Chamber. It is expected to
come into force in mid 2004.


6. The Dutch government took quick action to freeze the
assets of some important Dutch entities found to finance
terrorism. They used national sanctions authority to block
the accounts and financial transactions of Al Aqsa
Foundation (a Hamas fundraiser) and Benevolence
International Nederland (an al-Qaida linked affiliate of the
Benevolence International Foundation). The press has
reported that fundraising for Hamas, al-Qaida, and other
terrorist organizations, nevertheless, continues to take
place in the Netherlands.


7. Domestically, the Netherlands has undertaken efforts to
strengthen its laws, regulations and procedures to safeguard
its financial system against use by terrorist-affiliated
individuals and entities. It has fully implemented
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) terrorist financing
recommendations. Legislative proposals to further safeguard
the financial system (for example, by establishing
supervisory authority over firms engaged in providing
international companies with domicile, management, tax,
administrative, and legal services (so-called "trust
companies")) have been introduced.


8. The Dutch showed leadership in securing European Union
designation of Hamas. The Netherlands also led notable
efforts in the FATF to launch and complete a project with
the United States in developing best practices for the
implementation of financial blocking orders and to initiate
discussions on the proper treatment of non-profit
organizations. The Dutch have supported multilateralization
of almost all U.S. designations. We have urged them to
support EU designation of Hizballah.


9. The government appropriates about 90 million Euros a
year to fund the Dutch counter-terrorism package and about 5
million Euros a year to finance intensified CT cooperation
with the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.


10. The Dutch government has provided military assistance
to the fight against international terrorism in both
Afghanistan and Iraq. The Netherlands contributed a
frigate, fighter aircraft and reconnaissance planes to
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. This
contribution was discontinued on October 1, 2003. Since
July, the Netherlands contributes 1,100 troops to the
Stabilization Force in Iraq. Further, the Netherlands
continues to participate with two frigates and one Maritime
Patrol Aircraft in Operation Active Endeavor in the
Mediterranean.


B. JUDICIAL SYSTEM - PROSECUTIONS
--------------

11. The acquittals in December 2002 of four men allegedly
involved in a plot to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Paris, and of
12 alleged Muslim extremists suspected of recruiting Jihad
combatants in May 2003 revealed inadequacies in Dutch law.
In particular, courts have been reluctant to allow the use
of intelligence information as evidence. The prosecutor
appealed against the Rotterdam court's decision in December
to limit the use of intelligence evidence. In October 2003,
the appellate court in The Hague suspended the case because
of serious delays in the preparations for the trial. A new
"pro forma" session is now scheduled for January 14, and the
actual court sessions are planned for March 17 and 24. In
October 2003, the Justice Ministry released another four men
(an additional man had been released earlier) suspected of
preparing a terrorist attack. According to the National
Prosecutor's Office, there was insufficient evidence
independent of intelligence sources to detain them any
longer. The prosecutors emphasized, however, that a planned
attack had been prevented. The five were allegedly working
for a Moroccan (Abdelalim A.) living in Spain, who is
suspected of having played a role in the Casablanca suicide
attacks. The investigation against the five continues.


12. There have been no international terrorist attacks in
the Netherlands in 2003.


C. EXTRADITIONS
--------------

13. In July, the Netherlands extradited to Spain alleged
ETA activist Juanra Rodriguez.


14. On January 13, the Netherlands deported to Norway
Najumuddin Faraj Ahmad, better known as Mullah Krekar,
leader of the militant Kurdish Ansar al-Islam organization,
when it appeared that Jordan would not supply essential
information required to enable his extradition to the latter
country. In order to avoid Krekar being set free, Justice
Minister Donner decided to deport him to Norway, where
Krekar had residency status, because he believed Norway had
more legal possibilities to deal with the case. According
to press reports, the minister thought he had assurances
from Norway that Krekar would be taken into custody upon
arrival, which turned out to be incorrect.


15. In December 2002, the Amsterdam District Court refused
to extradite to Turkey Nuriye Kesbir, a senior PKK official,
who had previously applied for but was denied asylum in the
Netherlands. Extradition was considered "inadmissible" in
the absence of guarantees that Turkey would not execute a
possible death sentence. The Supreme Court is still to rule
on the appeal against this court decision. In February, the
Council of State ordered the Immigration Service to
reconsider his request for asylum.


D. IMPEDIMENTS TO PROSECUTION/EXTRADITION
--------------

16. A major impediment to Dutch prosecution of terrorist
suspects is the fact that intelligence gathered by the
intelligence/security agency, AIVD, cannot be checked or
verified in criminal procedures, or only to a limited extent
(see para 11 on prosecution). According to the Justice
Minister's June 2003 report, AIVD must observe secrecy for
state security or to protect its sources in spite of courts'
desire for verification. Justice Minister Donner, however,
wants to investigate to what extent and under what
circumstances confidential information by intelligence
agencies may be used as evidence in criminal investigations.
He also wants to examine what procedures are used in other
EU countries. According to Donner, the need for legislation
cannot be ruled out.


17. In April 2003, the Second Chamber of Parliament gave
Donner the go-ahead to use "criminal civilian infiltrants"
in exceptional situations in terrorist cases only, if there
are no other options and their use is essential in an
investigation. In each individual case, the use of criminal
infiltrants will require the approval of both the Justice
Minister and the College of Attorneys General.


F. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS BY THE NETHERLANDS
-------------- --

18. In addition to the legislative measures mentioned
above, the government announced the following counter-
terrorism efforts in 2003:

- an expansion in the AIVD intelligence capacity;
- better coordination of activities and information sharing
between intelligence services and the police;
- the development of an interrelated package of surveillance
and security measures to protect the vital infrastructure
and persons requiring special protection;
- more emphasis on integration programs of ethnic minority
groups in the Dutch society aimed at preventing radicalism
and extremism;
- more intensive use of mechanisms that provide for
transparency of and effective control on non-profit
organizations as well as houses of worship, denominational
schools and Koran schools financed by foreign countries;
- an amendment to the Civil Code and Sanctions Act to ban
terrorist organizations, networks and movements or to
frustrate their activities;
- the establishment of a Joint Counter-Terrorism Committee,
which is to assist the Justice Minister in his capacity as
Coordinating Minister for Counter-Terrorism in carrying out
his task.
- in response to a report on immigration policy and
terrorism, the government agreed in October 2003 to
investigate the feasibility of introducing a national
security check in the aliens system. A systemized file
comparison between information from the immigration
department and the security agencies will contribute to
fighting terrorism, according to the government.


19. The Dutch government continues to monitor supporters of
radical Islamic organizations in the large Turkish and
Moroccan communities in the Netherlands, as well as other
major Muslim groups. Dutch officials worry about
polarization between Muslims and non-Muslims, fueled by
extremists who take advantage of the migrants'
"disadvantaged" position and their sense of unease. In some
conservative Muslim circles, activities by these extremists
have had a polarizing effect, leading to growing radicalism
and extreme standpoints among a small minority. Muslim
authorities indicate there appears to be a willingness among
young Muslims to take part in the jihad.


20. There have been increasing press reports about radical
Muslims using the Netherlands as a base for their
operations. Questions have been raised about the
controversial es-Salaam mosque in Rotterdam, which allegedly
is financed by UAE Finance Minister Hamdan bin Rashid al-
Maktoum, who is suspected of terrorist connections, and the
fundamental Al Fourkhan mosque in Eindhoven, which has
allegedly tried to recruit young Muslims for the jihad.
This prompted the liberal VVD party to request the
government to close down mosques threatening the legal
order. Other reports mentioned attempts by alleged
terrorists to get flying and diving lessons in the
Netherlands. In October, AIVD warned Dutch universities and
business to be alert for students or researchers from "risk"
countries trying to gain high-tech know-how and products
with which weapons of mass destruction can be manufactured.
The AIVD compiled a checklist, which should make it easier
for Dutch companies and institutes to assess possible risks.
In November 2003, the fiscal police (FIOD) raided several
Somali money-exchange offices, allegedly as part of an
investigation against the Al-Barakaat group. Dutch
authorities have also investigated local phone shops as a
possible source of funds for terrorist organizations.


G. SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM
--------------

21. The Dutch government does not support any terrorist
groups, neither financially nor politically. A number of
foreign political groups, including Kurdish (PKK/KADEK),
Filipino (New People's Army),Sri Lankan (LTTE/Tamil Tigers)
and Sikh organizations, have established offices in the
Netherlands, but they are monitored by the police and
intelligence services and tolerated as long as they do not
commit terrorist acts or other crimes in the Netherlands.


H. PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM
--------------

22. The Dutch government has issued no public statements in
support of a terrorist-supporting country on terrorism
issues.


I. GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE
--------------

23. The Dutch government realizes that "the security of the
Netherlands is seriously threatened" and has taken action in
Parliament to address the terrorist threat. The pending
bill on terrorist crimes that penalizes recruitment for the
jihad and conspiracy with the object of committing
terrorist attacks, as well as the Parliament's approval of
the government's request to use criminal infiltrants in
counter-terrorism investigations, demonstrate that the
government has recognized deficiencies in its CT laws (see
discussion in paras 2-4). At the same time, the government
has been criticized for being too tolerant and nave fearing
that strict internal security measures against Muslim
fundamentalist groups would irritate the large Muslim
population in the country, make them more radical and drive
them underground.


J. SUPPORT FOR US COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES
-------------- --------------

24. The Dutch government is a supportive ally in the fight
against terrorism. Under the U.S.-Netherlands Safe Borders
Initiative, steps have been taken to improve control of
ports and airports, including:

--Netherlands-U.S. consultations on law enforcement and
counterterrorism held in The Hague in March 2003 resulted in
the "Agreed Steps" document, which catalogues specific
follow-up action to strengthen operational law enforcement
cooperation. Bilateral review occurred in Washington on
November 25, 2003;
--Continued operation and improvements in U.S. Customs
Rotterdam Container Security Initiative (CSI) and CSI Plus
at the Port of Rotterdam, leading to the establishment of a
bilateral Port and Maritime Security Working Group. Its
first meeting was held in May 2003. The US Coast Guard HQ
approved establishment of TDY billet for Rotterdam in 2003;
--Bilateral Aviation Security Working Group was established
and met in April 2003 to identify best practices;
--Visit by Dutch interagency group to Washington in June
2003 to study CIP exchanges;
--In August 2003, Dutch Finance State Secretary Joop Wijn
and U.S. Department of Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham
signed a mutual Declaration of Principles concerning the
installation of radiological portal monitors in the port of
Rotterdam - installation is progressing by year's end with
monitors expected to be operational by January 2004;
--Visit by EPA Administrator Whitman in April 2003 to review
areas for cooperation on environmental CT efforts;
--Visit by DHS Secretary Tom Ridge in September 2003; and
--Visit by U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Collins in
Rotterdam in October 2003.

Sobel